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1. 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis i s divided into three areas. The f i r s t concerns the 
conceptual basis of the relationship created between a p r i n c i p a l and 
a t h i r d party where the agent acts i n accordance with h i s principal' s ' 
express or implied instructions and also reveals h i s agency to the 
t h i r d party. The h i s t o r i c a l origins of the concept of agency are 
b r i e f l y considered, noting the movement away from formalism, through 
f i c t i o n , which i s translated into f a c t , so that the acts of the agent 
are treated as those of h i s p r i n c i p a l , enabling the creation of a 
simple contractual relationship between the p r i n c i p a l and t h i r d party, 
through the agent. 
The second part seeks to ascertain the conceptual nature of the 
relationship created by an agent who exceeds his principal's i n s t r u c -
tions i n circumstances where the agents acts are, nevertheless, held 
to a f f e c t h i s disclosed p r i n c i p a l ' s l e g a l relations with a t h i r d 
party. This investigation i s p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned to review the 
t r a d i t i o n a l English approach, which confines a p r i n c i p a l ' s l i a b i l i t y 
to those situations i n which the agent has the appearance of acting 
i n accordance with h i s p r i n c i p a l ' s instructions. This i s demonstrated 
to be inadequate and the p o s s i b i l i t y of a more sa t i s f a c t o r y theory i s 
considered. 
The t h i r d part reviews the conceptual basis of the doctrine of 
the undisclosed p r i n c i p a l , under which the acts of an agent acting 
i n accordance with h i s p r i n c i p a l ' s instructions are held to bring h i s 
p r i n c i p a l into a l e g a l relationship with the t h i r d party, despite the 
t h i r d party being unaware of the principal's existence. Research 
reveals that t h i s "anomalous" doctrine i s based upon sound h i s t o r i c a l 
foundation and that misunderstanding of i t s origins has led to 
2. 
dis t o r t i o n i n i t s l a t e r application. F i n a l l y , the problem of the 
relationship between an undisclosed prin c i p a l and t h i r d party, where 
the agent exceeds h i s pr i n c i p a l ' s instructions, i s considered, and 
the development reviewed i n i t s conceptual and p r a c t i c a l context. 
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1. 
PREFACE AND OUTLINE 
The law of agency seeks to regulate not only the i n t e r n a l r e l a -
tionship of an agent and h i s p r i n c i p a l but also the agent's powers i n 
the creation of external relations between the p r i n c i p a l and t h i r d 
party. An agent affects the l e g a l position of h i s p r i n c i p a l by the 
making of contracts or the disposition of property, i t i s t h i s power 
which i s the essence of the agency relationship. This thesis exam-
ines the conceptual basis of the relationship which a r i s e s between 
pr i n c i p a l s and t h i r d parties through the medium of the agent. 
I t i s submitted that a f u l l examination of the basic underlying 
theories i s e s s e n t i a l to an understanding of what may be regarded as 
a neglected area. An appraisal of t h i s topic i s dictated by the 
diverse views of academic commentators and by the paucity of recent 
authority, rendering that e s s e n t i a l element of commerce, certainty, 
almost l o s t . 
The l e t t e r s P, A and T are used to r e f e r to p r i n c i p a l , agent and 
t h i r d party throughout the t h e s i s . U.P. refers to an undisclosed 
p r i n c i p a l . 
Outline 
Part one of t h i s thesis concerns the basis of the relationship 
created between a p r i n c i p a l and a t h i r d party where an agent acts i n 
accordance with h i s principal's express or implied instructions, hav-
ing revealed h i s agency to the t h i r d party. 
The h i s t o r i c a l origins of the concept of agency are b r i e f l y con-
sidered, being p a r t i c u l a r l y evident i n the development of the law of 
deeds. The movement away from formalism i s noted and the f i c t i o n 
whereby formalism was avoided (qui f a c i t per alium f a c i t per se) i s 
translated into f a c t . F i n a l l y , the simple contractual relationship 
between P and T i s accepted and the stage i s set for the more 
2. 
sophisticated p r i n c i p l e s of agency discussed i n parts two and three. 
Part two concerns the l i a b i l i t y of the disclosed principal for 
acts perpetrated by h i s agent i n excess of the instructions given to 
him by h i s p r i n c i p a l . I t i s sought to ascertain the conceptual 
nature of the relationship created between P and T where the agents 
unauthorised acts do give r i s e to l i a b i l i t y on the part of P. 
The f i r s t part of the inquiry i s devoted to a sketch of the con-
t r o v e r s i a l nature of the problem, by reference to academic and j u d i -
c i a l sources. J u d i c i a l support i s indicated for the view that P's 
l i a b i l i t y to T i s based upon estoppel. This leads to a b r i e f outline 
of the nature of estoppel, being b a s i c a l l y a rule of evidence preven-
t i n g a person from denying a state of a f f a i r s . The state of a f f a i r s , 
i n t h i s case, being that P i s bound to T. 
In contrast, the notion of apparent authority i s outlined. 
B a s i c a l l y t h i s theory indicates that P's l i a b i l i t y i s t r u l y contrac-
t u a l , leading to mutual rights and l i a b i l i t i e s e x i s t i n g between P and 
T. This leads to an i l l u s t r a t i o n of the c o n f l i c t between the notions 
of estoppel and apparent authority, the i l l u s t r a t i o n being drawn by 
reference to j u d i c i a l decision and hypothetical s i t u a t i o n . 
The c o n f l i c t between the proponents of the competing theories i s 
considered and t h i s involves an attempt to reconcile the competing 
theories. Because the notion of detriment i s e s s e n t i a l to estoppel, 
the executory agreement i s seen as a major problem for the estoppel 
asserter. I t i s sought to demonstrate that the requirement of d e t r i -
ment, when properly understood, does not, i n f a c t , provide an obstacle 
to r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of estoppel with the executory agreement. I t i s 
demonstrated that when detriment i s f u l l y understood and considered 
along with the notion of r a t i f i c a t i o n (and relation-back) there may 
be no d i s t i n c t i o n i n practice between the effects produced by the two 
d i s t i n c t theories under discussion. However, th i s conclusion, being 
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based upon r a t i f i c a t i o n , depends f o r i t s proof upon the certainty 
which may be found i n the principles of r a t i f i c a t i o n . (A detailed 
consideration of r a t i f i c a t i o n i s confined to Appendix I so as not to 
in t e r f e r e with the general theme.) The conclusion, to be drawn from 
the detailed consideration of r a t i f i c a t i o n , i s that the r u l e i s sub-
je c t to such uncertainty that a combination of estoppel and r a t i f i c a -
t i o n cannot provide a satisfactory basis f o r mutual r i g h t s and l i a b i -
l i t i e s between P and T. A contractual relationship between the par-
t i e s i s the only conceptual legal relationship to adequately meet the 
needs of the case. 
An attempt i s made to introduce precision into t r a d i t i o n a l t e r -
minology, which has frequently given r i s e to needless confusion. 
Having considered loose terminology, the assertion that apparent 
authority creates a "true contract" between P and T i s considered i n 
more d e t a i l . By a "true contract", proponents of the notion of 
apparent authority, meant a consensual contract. However, the con-
sensual contract i s demonstrated to be merely a modern i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of contract flowing from one of various independent contractual bases. 
These are, the contract i n the form of a deed; that based upon the 
"quid pro quo"; and that developing from assumpsit. These theories 
of contractual o r i g i n are considered as possible h i s t o r i c a l origins 
of the agency rules. I n p a r t i c u l a r , the assumpsit theory i s consi-
dered i n some d e t a i l through the early cases. 
Having established that the relationship between P and T i s con-
tr a c t u a l i n o r i g i n , the t r a d i t i o n a l contractual theory based upon 
what may be described as "manifested i n t e n t i o n " or appearance of 
authority, i s applied to a number of cases and found wanting. 
The unsatisfactory nature of the " t r a d i t i o n a l " approach i n i t s 
application to a number of d i f f i c u l t cases having been demonstrated, 
i t i s clear that the theory does not make f o r any certainty. This 
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leads to a consideration of new approaches which may reveal true 
agency rules capable of explaining a l l cases, leading to certainty of 
prediction. The p r i n c i p a l "new approaches", c o l l e c t i v e l y described 
under the term "Inherent Agency Power", cause the inquiry to move, 
f i n a l l y , i n t o an investigation of the extent to which the new theories 
are reflected i n recent cases. 
Part three concerns an investigation into the conceptual basis 
of the doctrine of the undisclosed p r i n c i p a l . I t begins with an 
explanation of the ef f e c t of the doctrine, which i s followed by a 
note of the c r i t i c i s m whiph has been levelled at i t s theoretical 
basis. This covers both English and American academic opinion and 
English j u d i c i a l pronouncements. 
However, the u t i l i t y of the doctrine i s recognised and t h i s i s 
given expression alongside i l l u s t r a t i o n of the f a i l u r e to seriously 
seek out the true basis of the doctrine. 
Various competing theoretical bases are examined and c r i t i c i s e d , 
namely, "Trust Theory", p r i n c i p a l l y expounded by Ames; "Receipt of 
Benefit", p r i n c i p a l l y expounded by Huffcut; "Tort Theory", i l l u s t r a t e d 
by Lewis; "Primitive Assignment", advanced by Goodhart and Hamson. 
This l a t t e r theory, although i t i s rejected as a satisfactory foun-
dation, i s acknowledged f o r the part which i t plays i n advancing 
understanding of the doctrine. The case of Dyster v Randall, used by 
Goodhart and Hamson, i s reconsidered i n the l i g h t of a new approach, 
leading to a detailed consideration of the case of Said v Butt. This 
case emphasises the relationship between U.P. and T, rather than the 
A - T relationship, as the foundation of the doctrine. This i n turn 
leads to a consideration of the U.P. - T relationship, as being 
essentially a contractual relationship based upon a contract founded 
upon consideration, linked to the development of assumpsit. 
The h i s t o r i c a l origins of the doctrine are now traced i n the 
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l i g h t of the theory of contract developed from assumpsit. Having 
established, through the early cases, that a contract founded i n 
assumpsit l i e s at the root of the doctrine, anomalies i n the develop-
ment of the doctrine are considered. I t i s sought to demonstrate how 
application of a consistent theory would resolve problems, leading to 
greater certainty. 
F i n a l l y , somewhat t e n t a t i v e l y , the problem of Watteau v Fenwick 
i s considered as an aspect of the doctrine of the undisclosed p r i n c i -
pal. Although a theoretical foundation may be found f o r the 
Watteau v Fenwick r u l e , the case i s recognised as e x h i b i t i n g features 
leading to uncertainty. The "Objective Theory of Agency" i s b r i e f l y 
considered as a basis from which to achieve certainty i n t h i s area, 
leading once more to "Inherent Agency Power" - true agency 
principles. 
6. 
CHAPTER I 
" I t i s obvious that the law of agency would be as t h i n as i t 
would be uninteresting were A always confined to act solely as com-
manded by P."^^ 
This chapter i s concerned with a consideration of the basis of 
the relationship between p r i n c i p a l and t h i r d party where A acts i n 
accordance with P's express or implied instructions and reveals the 
agency relationship to T. 
In the early development of English law the parties to any tr a n -
saction were required to perform those acts required f o r i t s creation, 
i n person. Legal acts were performed through the medium of certain 
formal words which were simply meaningless i f i t was purported to 
(2) 
u t t e r them on behalf of another who was not a party to the act. ' 
The h i s t o r y r e l a t i n g to the development of deeds exemplifies 
t h i s a t t i t u d e . A was required to act, when i t became accepted that 
he could act on behalf of a P, s t r i c t l y as the a l t e r ego of P when 
surrendering P's land or making a lease or a release or a feoffment 
of land to T . ^ 
In Combes' Case i t was said that the reason f o r t h i s insistence 
was because "P appoints the attorney to be i n his place, and to rep-
resent his person; and therefore the attorney cannot do i t i n his own 
(1) S t o l j a r , Law of Agency, p.18 (hereafter cited as S t o l j a r ) . 
(2) Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, ii, 219, 
Holdsworth, History of English Law, v i i i , 222. 
(3) Combes' Case (1613) 9 Co.Rep.75aj Anon. (1565) 
Moo. K.B.70; Bridgecourt v Ashley (1612) Moo. K.B.818; 
Cremer and Tookley's Case (1628) Godb. 385,389. 
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name, nor as his proper act, but i n the name, and as the act of him 
who gives the authority. Holmes found the origins of t h i s p r i n -
c i p l e i n the Roman law which, although i t did not develop the sophi-
sticated rules of agency found i n English law, nevertheless developed 
a very similar doctrine i n r e l a t i o n to the "family". ' "... so f a r 
as r i g h t s of property, possession or contract could be acquired 
through others not slaves, the law undoubtedly started from slavery 
and the p a t r i a potestas. And t h i s lead to the f i c t i t i o u s i d e n t i f i c a -
t i o n of agent with p r i n c i p a l . This " f i c t i o n " i s of course expres-
(7) 
sed i n the maxim "qui f a c i t per alium f a c i t per se". ' 
However, the subsequent development of agency followed the 
classic pattern whereby, although o r i g i n a l l y the f i c t i o n of i d e n t i t y 
was simply a convenient way of expressing rules arrived at f o r good 
policy reasons, soon the formula acquired an independent standing. 
Instead of holding that f o r sound policy reasons a master i s responsible 
(4) 75t>- Technically A was enabled to act as a complete substitute 
because of the old rul e (dating back to Bracton) that A could use 
his principal's seal instead of his own. See Norton on Deeds 
(2nd ed. 1928) p.8 c i t e d S t o l j a r , p.15. 
(5) Buckland, Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian, 2nd ed. 
p.102 et seq. 
(6) Holmes 4 Harv. L.R. 349. Montrose 16 Can.B.R. 757,778 
also appeared to accept t h i s proposition. 
(7) See Bracton, fol,171b. The f a m i l i a embraces "those who are 
regulable i n the l i g h t of serfs ... So, too, as well freemen as 
serfs and those over whom one has the power of command." Also 
West's Symboleography Lib. I . , Sect. 3, "Of the Fact of Man" 
"The person i s he which either agreeth or offendeth, and beside 
him none other. And both may be bound either mediately or 
immediately. Immediately, i f he which i s bound doe agree. 
Mediately, when i f he, which by nature d i f f e r e t h from him, but 
not by law, whereby as by some bond i s fained to be a l l one 
person, doth contract, or offend, of which sort i n some cases 
be these which be i n our power as a wife, bondsman, servant, a 
factor, an attorney, or procurator, exceeding t h e i r authority." 
ci t e d Holmes 4 Harv. L.R.349. 
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f o r his servant, "the law treats the master as the Contractee and the 
formula becomes a reason i n i t s e l f f o r making the master answerable 
(8) 
and g i v i n g him r i g h t s . " ^ ' The sum t o t a l of t h i s development was, of 
course, that the courts regarded A as being capable of bringing P and 
(9) 
T int o a contractual relationship. ' 
Most ce r t a i n l y there appears to be l i t t l e inconsistency with any 
theory of • contract where A has linked P with T, i n that A may be 
regarded as a meeting point f o r the w i l l s of the parties. I t may be 
that t h i s i s only s t r i c t l y true where A acts as a mere nuntuis 
between P and T, but nevertheless there can be l i t t l e objection on 
theoretical grounds, even when A exercises a discretionary w i l l of 
his own. 
However, whatever s l i g h t reservations may exist i n placing the 
relationship between P and T wi t h i n the generally accepted mould of 
contract based upon consensus, the remedies which were made available 
to enforce the relationship were most ce r t a i n l y the contractual 
remedies of the day, account and debt leading on to assumpsit. I t was natural, therefore, that P and T should be regarded as being i n a 
>n fo: 
(11) 
contractual r e l a t i o n s h i p ^ ^ and t h i s must be a very real reaso r 
supposing that they were and are i n such a relationship i n law. 
(8) Holmes 4 Harv. L.R.349; c.f. Abbott 9 Harv. L.R.59L 
(9) Some writers deny that a "true" contract can exist between P and 
T. See Powell, Law of Agency, 2nd ed. p.148 (hereafter c i t e d as 
Powell) " I t was perhaps inevitable, therefore, that the courts 
should come to think that there r e a l l y was a contract between P 
and T effected through the act of A." 
(10) "To admit ... £a. p r i n c i p a l ^ n a s r i g h t s and duties under /~a_7 
contract ... and yet to deny that he i s a party to i t seems to be 
a t o t a l l y unnecessary piece of mystery making." Williams 23 Can. 
B.R.380,409. c.f. Montrose 16 Can. B.R.790 "The p r i n c i p a l i s 
affected by an agreement between the agent and the t h i r d person, 
not because he can be said to be a party to that agreement but 
because his own conduct has made i t ju s t that he should be bound 
i n accordance with the terms of the agreement." 
(11) The h i s t o r i c a l basis of contract on a conceptual plane i s d i s -
cussed i n d e t a i l l a t e r i n the thesis. 
The idea that a contract can exist without a "meeting of minds" may be 
somewhat unexpected but i t i s no more and no less i l l o g i c a l than any 
(12) 
other concept of law. v ' I t i s therefore no surprise to f i n d that 
i> 
today most commentators are happy to baldly state that " I f an agent 
makes a contract on behalf of a named p r i n c i p a l , the only contracting 
(13) 
parties are the p r i n c i p a l and the t h i r d p a r t y . F u r t h e r m o r e , 
there are very sound reasons, as previously explained, f o r holding 
that such statements represent an e n t i r e l y accurate view of the law. 
(12) See Montrose 16 Can. B.R.757; Lewis 9 Col.L.H.ll6; Thol, 
Handelsrecht, sect.70 cited Holmes 4 Harv.L.R.347 expresses a 
somewhat si m p l i s t i c a t t i t u d e when he indicates that i t i s 
"absurd to maintain that a contract i n i t s exact shape which eman-
ates exclusively from a p a r t i c u l a r person i s not the contract of 
such person JT.e. the agent/ but i s the contract of another." 
(13) Lowe, Commercial Law, 4th ed. p.39 i s t y p i c a l . 
10. 
CHAPTER I I 
"Legal technique consists i n creating p a r t i c u l a r concepts f o r 
the handling of the complex circumstances of l i f e . Vague as the 
general idea of ju s t i c e may be i t i s nevertheless the touchstone of 
the j u r i s t , and the technical concepts of law are not governed 
merely by the ordering of social facts but are moulded under the 
influence of the idea of j u s t i c e . 1 1 
This chapter concerns the concepts underlying the l i a b i l i t y of 
a disclosed p r i n c i p a l f o r acts perpetrated by his agent i n excess of 
his mandate, commonly described as f a l l i n g w i t h i n the Doctrine of 
Apparent Authority. 
The nature of the problem outlined 
I t i s remarkable that, i n an area of such p r a c t i c a l importance, 
theory and principles of the agency concept should remain so unsettled 
as to be stigmatized as the "second toughest problem i n the study of 
law."( 2) 
The conceptual basis of the relationship created between P and T 
where A acts i n such a v/ay that he appears to be authorised (although 
he i s not) to act on behalf of P, i n establishing contractual relations 
on his behalf, probably f i r s t attracted serious academic interest i n 
1905.^^ Although i t i s c l e a r l y established that a properly author-
ised agent, acting i n accordance with his instru c t i o n s , w i l l create a 
(1) Montrose, 16 Can.B.R. 757,778. 
(2) Rubenstein 44 A.B.A.J.849, "Apparent authority: an examination of 
a legal problem". See also Conard 1 J. of Legal Ed.540, "Whats 
wrong with agency" and Mechem 2 J. of Legal Ed.203, "Whats wrong 
with agency : a comment." 
(3) Cook 5 Col.L.R.36, "Agency by Estoppel". 
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contract between P and T,^^ the question i s posed as to whether the 
agent who acts i n such a way as to have "apparent authority" or 
"ostensible authority", otherwise called "authority created by 
(5) 
estoppel" or "implied", "imputed" or "constructive authority", ' 
s i m i l a r l y creates a contractual relationship between P and T. In 
1961 S t o l j a r ^ ^ was able to write that "the question has given r i s e 
to a long controversy the dust of which has not yet s e t t l e d . " Indeed 
text book writers i n general are s t i l l i n the position of having to 
(7) 
admit that the issue must be regarded as controversial. x ' 
I n Rama Corporation, Ltd. v Proved Tin General Investments, Ltd.( 
Slade J., said that "Ostensible or apparent authority which negatives 
the existence of actual authority i s merely a form of estoppel." 
Diplock L.J., i n Freeman and Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties 
(a) 
(Mangal) Ltd., ' fur t h e r explained t h i s approach saying, "an 
'apparent' or 'ostensible 1 authority ... i s a legal relationship bet-
ween the p r i n c i p a l and the contractor created by a representation, 
made by the p r i n c i p a l to the contractor, intended to be and i n f a c t 
acted on by the contractor, that the agent has authority to enter on 
behalf of the p r i n c i p a l i n t o a contract of a kind w i t h i n the scope of 
the 'apparent' authority, so as to render the p r i n c i p a l l i a b l e to 
perform any obligations imposed on him by such contract. To the 
(4) See Chapter I of t h i s thesis. 
(5) Terms variously used to describe the same legal s i t u a t i o n . 
(6) S t o l j a r , p.30. 
(7) Fridman 3rd ed., p.68, (hereafter c i t e d as Fridman) i s t y p i c a l of 
the recognition afforded to the problem. 
(8) /"1952_7 2 Q.B. 147, 149. 
(9) /~1964_7 1 A 1 1 E« R» 65°t 644. 
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relationship so created the agent i s a stranger. He need not be 
(although he generally i s ) aware of the existence of the representa-
t i o n . The representation, when acted on by the contractor by entering 
in t o a contract with the agent, operates as an estoppel preventing the 
pri n c i p a l from asserting that he i s not bound by the contract." 
The nature of estoppel 
Estoppel i s prima r i l y a rule of evidence preventing a person from 
denying a certain state of facts and "an estoppel does not i n i t s e l f 
give a cause of action; i t prevents a person from denying a state of 
fac t s . "^"^ However, estoppel may be used to raise a defence to an 
action when the p l a i n t i f f i s , estopped from s e t t i n g up the facts upon 
which he wishes to r e l y . I n p a r t i c u l a r estoppel may, i n cases of 
agency, the argument continues, make a p r i n c i p a l l i a b l e to compensate 
a t h i r d party, who dealt with an agent, i n the mistaken b e l i e f that 
the agent's actions were f u l l y authorised. The action v/hich T brings 
against P does not, however, arise from the estoppel. T's action i s 
necessarily based upon contract and the key to the success of his 
claim w i l l l i e i n P's i n a b i l i t y to deny the state of facts (that A's 
actions were authorised) which he had led T to believe existed. The 
assertion, c i t e d above, that P, i n such situations, i s " l i a b l e to 
perform any obligations imposed on him by such contract" might p r o f i t -
ably be contrasted with a l a t e r passage i n the same judgment i n which 
(10) Per Lord Esher M.R., i n Seton, Laing Co. v Lafone (1887) 19 Q.B.D. 
68, 70. See also Low v Bouverie /l^SlJ 3 Ch.82,101, per Lindley 
L.J., "estoppel i s not a cause of action - i t i s a rule of evidence 
which precludes a person from denying the t r u t h of some statement 
previously made by himself." 
(11) See Spencer Bower and Turner, "The Law Relating to Estoppel by 
Representation", 2nd ed. p.6 (hereafter c i t e d as Spencer Bower). 
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Diplock L.J. dealt with the legal relationship created by an authorised 
(12} 
act of A, acting on behalf of an undisclosed p r i n c i p a l : x ' "... i f 
the agent does enter i n t o a contract pursuant to the "actual 1 autho-
r i t y i t does create contractual r i g h t s and l i a b i l i t i e s between the 
p r i n c i p a l and the contractor." Clearly Diplock L.J. indicates a d i s -
t i n c t i o n to be drawn between P's contractual r i g h t s and l i a b i l i t i e s 
created i n the l a t t e r s i t u a t i o n and his l i a b i l i t y to perform obliga-
tions imposed i n the former case. 
The nature of apparent authority 
I n contrast to these author i t a t i v e statements, i t has been 
asserted with equal assurance that apparent authority (or ostensible 
authority) i s based upon contractual principles. Seavey indicated 
that there i s no connection between apparent or ostensible authority 
and e s t o p p e l ^ ^ and we f i n d his views echoed, not surprisingly, i n 
the Second American Restatement on Agency, "Apparent authority i s 
based upon the p r i n c i p l e which has led to the objective theory of 
contracts, namely, that i n contractual relations one should ordin-
a r i l y be bound by what he says rather than by what he intends." 
Thus, an agent with actual authority, at least where he acts on 
behalf of a f u l l y disclosed p r i n c i p a l , i s deemed to create a contract 
between his p r i n c i p a l and a t h i r d party, and, i t may be argued, i f P 
has led T to believe that A has actual authority, then again, i n law, 
(15) 
a contractual relationship arises between P and T. Powell, ' con-
sidered the doctrine of apparent authority to be an independent 
(12) at p.644. 
(13) 29 Yale L.J. 859, 873, 874. 
(14) Para.8, comment d. Seavey was Reporter on Agency. 
(15) Powell, p.70-72. 
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doctrine, bearing s i m i l a r i t y to estoppel only i n so f a r as the essen-
t i a l elements of the two doctrines were almost the same.^^ 
The c o n f l i c t between the notions of apparent authority and estoppel. 
A simple i l l u s t r a t i o n of the d i f f i c u l t i e s which may arise as a 
res u l t of a f a i l u r e to r a t i o n a l i s e the conceptual basis of apparent 
authority, which w i l l s u f f i c e to whet the appetite, i s afforded by 
(17) 
Reo Motor Car Co. v Barnes. ' In t h i s case A, the p l a i n t i f f ' s 
salesman, contracted to s e l l a motor car to the defendant and agreed 
to take the defendant's old car i n part exchange. A had previously 
completed a similar transaction with the defendant without objection 
from the p l a i n t i f f . I n f a c t , A was authorised only to make cash 
sales. Before the defendant had given up his old car or made any 
payment, the p l a i n t i f f sued f o r return of the car which had been 
delivered to the defendant. I t was held that although A had apparent 
authority, the p l a i n t i f f might repudiate the transaction so long as 
the defendant had not acted i n reliance upon i t . Such a decision 
would flow natur a l l y from the notion that apparent authority i s 
(18) 
merely a form of estoppel which negatives actual authority. ' 
However, i f the doctrine of apparent authority operates so as to 
objectively create, by manifestation of assent, a contract based upon 
consent between p l a i n t i f f and defendant, then i t would immediately 
bind the parties i n accordance with normal contractual principles. 
The fact that the agreement remained executory would be of no con-
sequence. 
(16) He further indicated that as estoppel does not create a r e l a -
tionship of P and A, i t s effect being l i m i t e d to the r e l a t i o n -
ship between P and T, to speak of "agency by estoppel" was 
"e n t i r e l y misleading." 
(17) (1928) 9 S.W. (2d) 374. Tex. C i v i l app. noted 42 Harv. L.R. 570. 
(18) To raise estoppel, the "estoppel asserter" must show reliance 
upon "the f a c t s " to his detriment. 
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Perhaps a fu r t h e r , s l i g h t l y more complicated, hypothetical 
s i t u a t i o n demonstrating the re a l technical problems thrown up by the 
c o n f l i c t i n g theories, w i l l f i n a l l y serve to crystalize the need f o r 
research i n t o the underlying theory. 
Consider where A has frequently purchased goods, on c r e d i t , on 
behalf of P, from T. In accordance with A's apparent authority and 
usual practice A enters a fur t h e r transaction at a time at which, 
unknown to A and T, P has already died insolvent. A's authority w i l l , 
(19) 
of course, be determined upon P's death. ' T w i l l wish to sue A, 
i f possible, as any action against P's estate would be unsatisfied. 
T may bring an action against A f o r "breach of warranty of authority" 
under the rule i n Collen v W r i g h t . H o w e v e r , i f A had apparent 
authority so as to bind P to T, by contract, any damages recovered 
against A would be nominal. T would s t i l l have available the r i g h t 
of action against P that he would have enjoyed, had A had actual 
authority. T's loss would be caused by P's insolvency, not by the 
breach of warranty of authority. I n contrast, i f the estoppel p r i n -
c i p l e i s applied, no contract would arise between P and T by operation 
of law and i f T did not raise the issue of estoppel there would be no 
relationship between P and T. Therefore, T could simply plead A's 
breach of warranty of authority and recover substantial damages from 
A on the basis that he had been deprived of the benefit of a contract 
with a p r i n c i p a l . 
Examination of the foundation of authority 
I now propose to examine the development of the c o n f l i c t i n g 
theories. The central problem of agency i s the theoretical foundation 
(19) Blades, v Free (1829 9 B & C. 167. 
(20) (1857) 8 E & B. 647. 
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of authority. Clearly A must have some authority i f he i s to act as 
agent f o r P, rather than act on his own account. However, i f A's 
authority was l i m i t e d to the precise terms of his mandate then he 
would be reduced to a mere "channel of communication". The problem 
arises as to the extent to which A i s to be permitted to establish 
relationships or contracts, between P and T, where A acts beyond his 
express mandate. The principles at stake are those underlying the 
basic c o n f l i c t between the protection of personal inte r e s t s , that a 
man should not be deprived of his property unless he disposed of i t 
himself, and the protection of the sanctity of reasonable expecta-
tions raised by commercial dealings. 
Clearly i f T i s about to contract with A, who claims to be act-
ing w i t h i n an authority granted by P, whereby T i s to be brought in t o 
contractual relations with P, T i s at some r i s k . I f A i s not t r u t h f u l , 
then P w i l l not be bound to T and T may lose his anticipated bargain. 
In order to avoid t h i s r i s k T could, of course, i n s i s t upon consulta-
t i o n , with P, p r i o r to any agreement. This cumbrous procedure would, 
however, be extremely inconvenient and furthermore, would render the 
law of agency superfluous. A second solution v/ould be f o r T to s t i -
pulate that A should incur a personal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to T. However, 
again t h i s agreement would f r u s t r a t e reasonable commercial expecta-
tions. I n t r u t h A and T would be the p r i n c i p a l parties to a l l agree-
ments, with P merely i n d i r e c t l y entering into the picture. The con-
cept of apparent authority provides a t h i r d solution consonant with a 
(2l) " I n the development of our law, two principles have striven f o r 
mastery. The f i r s t i s f o r the protection of property: no one 
can give a better t i t l e than he himself possesses. The second 
i s f o r the protection of commercial transactions: the person 
who takes i n good f a i t h and f o r value without notice should get 
a good t i t l e . " per Denning L.J., Bishopsgate Motor Finance 
Corp. Ltd. v Transport Brakes Ltd. /V)^ 1KB. 322, 336, 337. 
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sophisticated form of direct agency whereby a legal relationship may 
arise between P and T despite the absence of real authority i n A. 
D e f i n i t i o n of apparent authority 
(22) 
F i r s t i t i s necessary to adopt some working d e f i n i t i o n K ' of 
apparent authority, when i t i s said that an act f a l l s w i t h i n an 
agent's apparent authority, a l l that i s meant i s that the act has the 
appearance of an authorised act. An act f a l l i n g w i t h i n the scope of 
an agent's apparent authority, i s one which i n t r u t h was not autho-
rised by a p r i n c i p a l but, has the appearance of having been so 
authorised. 
The origins of the academic dispute over the basal theory to 
apparent authority. 
A protracted and animated academic struggle between J.S. Ewart 
and W.W. Cook h i s t o r i c a l l y marks the beginnings of a search f o r a 
(23) 
basal theory to the area under consideration.• ' 
Ewart was convinced that the concept underlying apparent autho-
r i t y was estoppel. This v/as consistent with his general f a i t h i n 
t h i s ubiquitous notion which he set f o r t h at length i n his t r e a t i s e 
"Principles of Estoppel by Misrepresentation."^^ Cook was equally 
i n s i s t e n t that apparent authority had nothing to do with estoppel, 
but rather, was based upon "true contract". 
The basic proposition of supporters of an estoppel theory was 
that where T makes a contract with A, who has apparent authority, 
then because A i s unauthorised, the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of P f o r the con-
t r a c t can only arise from estoppel. Consequently, unless T acted 
(22) Uncertainty as to terras has bedevilled agency. See Powell, 
p.272 also 15 Harv. L.R. 324. 
(23) 15 Harv. L.R. 324; 35 Am.L.Rev.707; 16 Harv. L.R. 186; 5 Col. 
L.R.36, 354; 6 Col. L.R. 34; 13 Green Bag 50. 
(24) Callaghan & Co., Chicago 1900. 
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with knowledge of and i n reliance upon a misrepresentation a t t r i b u t -
able to P, then T could not hold P l i a b l e . 
I n contrast, supporters of a contractual theory contended that 
t h i s proposition did not go f a r enough. They asserted that persons 
who were not aware of facts which gave the appearance of an authorised 
act could only succeed i f ; (a) they could prove a f u l l y authorised 
agency or (b) i f there was no such actual agency, then i f there was 
an appearance of i t , that i s , by estoppel. However, the argument 
progressed, since there i s apparent authority, which would be proved 
by evidence of a previous course of business, the same evidence which 
would prove apparent authority would also establish estoppel. Thus i n 
s i t u a t i o n ( a ) , P's l i a b i l i t y could be accounted f o r on principles of 
actual agency. Whereas i n s i t u a t i o n ( b ) , P's l i a b i l i t y would rest 
upon apparent agency or estoppel. Argued i n t h i s way, estoppel would 
be superfluous to agency, f o r P's l i a b i l i t y i n both cases would be 
a t t r i b u t a b l e to "normal agency rules", estoppel being merely an addi-
t i o n a l ground f o r l i a b i l i t y i n s i t u a t i o n ( b ) . ^ ' 
However, i t must be noted that t h i s l a t t e r argument t o t a l l y 
ignores the highly pertinent question related to apparent authority -
apparent to whom? 
The nub of the problem 
The point at issue between the opposed approaches is. perhaps 
(26) 
best i l l u s t r a t e d by reference to a simple factual example:^ ' 
(25) Cooke also made the curious point that an estoppel theory must 
be unsound because the doctrine of agency "was well recognised long 
before the courts began to use the language of estoppel." Perhaps 
he had not heard of Monsieur Jourdin "who talked prose although 
he did not know i t . " Molliere, Le Bourgois Gentihomme, c i t e d i n 
Re Schebsman /l94A7 Ch.83, 104. 
(26) See 16 Harv. L.R. 186. 
19. 
A buyer has authority from a firm to purchase for cash only; i t 
i s the ordinary business custom for such a buyer to purchase on c r e d i t , 
he buys for c r e d i t : -
(a) from T, a dealer who i s aware of the custom, 
(b) from T, a Patagonian, j u s t arrived, who 
knows nothing of the custom. 
Those favouring a theory based upon estoppel would hold P l i a b l e 
i n s i t u a t i o n ( a ) ; those favouring a contractual theory would hold P 
l i a b l e i n (a) and ( b ) . In support of the estoppel theory one might 
(27) 
c i t e Lord Cranworth's assertion, i n Pole v Leask, ' that i n order 
to make P l i a b l e to T one "must show that the agency did e x i s t and 
that the agent had the authority he assumed to exercise, or otherwise 
that the p r i n c i p a l i s estopped from disputing i t . " In short, i n the 
absence of a r e a l authority (actual authority) there can, upon t h i s 
(28) 
view, be no l i a b i l i t y i n P i n the absence of an estoppel. ' 
Furthermore, the doctrine of estoppel applies s t r i c t l y , with a l l 
vigour, there being no place for any notion of "holding out to the 
(29) 
world at l a r g e . " v ' I t i s a basic assumption, of those who r e l y 
(27) (1863) 33 L.J. Ch. 155, 162. 
(28) Clea r l y upon proof of l i a b i l i t y i n P i n a case i n which there i s 
a lack of authority, actual or apparent, Ewart's approach i s 
exposed as either f a l l a c i o u s or incomplete. See l a t e r discussion 
of Hambro v Burnand JV)§£J 2 K.B. 10; Fry v Smellie JJ.912] 3 K.B. 
282; Brocklesby v Temperance Building Society JlQS^jA.C.175; Thur-
ber & Co. v Anderson (1878) 88 ILL.167; Kidd v Thomas A. Edison 
Inc. (1917) 239 Fed.405 also Edmunds v Bushell and Jones (I865) 
L.R. 1 Q.B. 97. 
(29) "The 'holding out 1 must be to the p a r t i c u l a r individual who says 
he r e l i e d on i t , or under such circumstances of p u b l i c i t y as to 
j u s t i f y the inference that he knew of i t and acted upon i t . " per 
Lord Lindley i n Farquharson Bros, v King & Co., £l902j A.C. 325* 
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upon estoppel as forming the basis of P's l i a b i l i t y , that P and T have 
not agreed so as to be mutually bound, where A has acted without P's 
actual authority. In other words there has been no "meeting of 
the minds" so as to form a l e g a l l y binding agreement or contract bet-
ween them. 
However, those supporting the contractual basis to P's l i a b i l i t y 
r e l y upon the case of Pickering v B u s k , ^ ^ i n which Lord Ellenborough 
f i r s t introduced the expression "apparent authority", for there i t was 
(32) 
indicated that "an apparent authority i s a r e a l authority" v ' so f a r 
as T i s concerned. Cook contended that i t i s a fundamental p r i n c i p l e 
of the law of contract that a person i s bound by h i s "manifested 
intention" and not by his " r e a l intention". By t h i s he meant that a 
person i s bound by what he appears to be intending. This means that 
a man must be taken to have offered to enter a contract, i f he 
appears to do so, irrespective of whether he actually intended to 
make an offer or not. Thus the term "manifested intention" merely 
denotes an objective finding of intention. This p r i n c i p l e i s , i n 
essence, widely recognised throughout the law of contract and expres-
sed quite simply by Lord Wright i n Norwich Union F i r e Insurance 
(33) 
Society, Ltd. v P r i c e v ' "Intention i s to be ascertained from what 
the parties said or did". Perhaps Holmes was f i r s t to express t h i s 
(30) "A man cannot be bound by the act of another unless he has 
authorised i t . Nevertheless, i f he personally represents that 
he has authorised i t , and on the f a i t h of the representation 
some t h i r d party has changed h i s position, he ought to be 
estopped from denying the existence of the authority". Ewart, 
"Principles of Estoppel by Misrepresentation." 
(31) (1812) 15 East 38. 
(32) At p. 39. See also Hambro v Burnand f)SQt$ 2 K.B.10, 21, 22. 
(33) /19347 A- c- 455, 463. 
21. 
sentiment as a fundamental common law principle when he said "The 
Common Law of England i s no more concerned to determine whether the 
promisor i n fa c t intended that h i s utterance be taken as a binding 
assurance than i t i s interested to know v/hether the k i l l e r s heart was 
black or the driver's mood reckless." ( ^ 4 ) The widespread acceptance 
of t h i s p r i n c i p l e i s e a s i l y demonstrated by reference to the numerous 
(35) 
cases v ' expressly or impliedly r e l y i n g upon i t or indeed simply by 
reference to the notorious "postal r u l e " ^ ^ or the well s e t t l e d 
(37) 
p r i n c i p l e s of mutual mistake. ' 
Thus i t i s asserted that to accept that an offeror's l i a b i l i t y 
upon a contract "created 1 under the "postal r u l e " (where there has been 
an uncommunicated revocation of offer prior to a posted acceptance) 
i s based upon contract, i s to accept that l o g i c a l l y , P*s l i a b i l i t y 
for A's unauthorised acts, where A has apparent authority, i s also 
based upon contract. Within the accepted framework of the common 
law i t would be incongruous to explain the offeror's l i a b i l i t y as 
being based upon estoppel, i n that the offeror has represented, to 
the offeree, that h i s offer i s s t i l l open and that the offeree has 
changed h i s position i n reliance upon the representation and, 
therefore, the offeror i s estopped from denying his l i a b i l i t y that 
(34) "The Common Law", O.W. Holmes, ed. Howe. 
See 7 J.S.P.T.L. 227. 
(35) See Su l l i v a n v Constable (1932) 48 T.L.R.369; 
Van Praagh v Everidge ^1902/ 2 Ch. 266; Imperial Loan Co. v 
Stone JJ&32J 1 Q.B. 599; Northland A i r l i n e r s Ltd. v 
Dennis Ferranti Meters Ltd. C.A. The Times, October 23, 1970. 
(36) Henthorn v Praser JlQSgJ 2 Ch.27; Ramsgate Hotel Co. v 
Montefiore (1866) L.R.I. Ex.109; Byrne v Van Tienhoven 
(1880) 5 CP.D. 344. 
(37) Tamplin v James (1880) 15 Ch. D.215; Raffles v Wichelhaus 
(1864) 2 H. & C. 906. 
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( 38) would have arisen, had a contract been formed. 
(39) The inherent assumptions of the estoppel a s s e r t e r . v 
In view of the undoubted strength of a u t h o r i t y ^ ^ supporting 
the estoppel asserter, i t i s appropriate to examine the assumptions 
inherent i n such a basal theory. The basic proposition i s that P 
does not enter a contract with T, nor does A make a contract on h i s 
behalf, as A has no authority to do so. However, T has dealt with A 
i n the b e l i e f , induced by P, that A had authority. I n these circum-
stances T ought to be placed i n the same position as i f P had autho-
r i s e d A and t h i s r e s u l t i s achieved through the doctrine of estoppel. 
By definition, estoppel involves some change of position,(4-0 i n 
(38) Ewart, 5 Col. L.R. 354» could not accept contractual l i a b i l i t y 
founded upon an act which P did not do; no one having h i s 
authority did; but was done i n contravention of h i s w i l l . How-
ever, t h i s confuses in t e r n a l assent, within the agency r e l a t i o n -
ship, with external c r i t e r i o n recognised by law. Consider where 
S i n h e r i t s a guitar, a banjo and a mandolin. B says he would 
l i k e to buy the guitar for £10. S agrees and i n v i t e s B to c a l l 
to c o l l e c t the instrument next day. When B ar r i v e s S tenders 
the banjo, thinking i t to be the guitar. B says, "Not that one. 
That i s the guitar" - pointing to the mandolin. W, a layman, 
then i n s t r u c t s them as to which instrument i s , i n f a c t , the 
guitar. Can i t be doubted that, on the authorities, a v a l i d 
contract has been entered for the sale of the guitar? There 
has been no meeting of the minds i n fact or r e a l i t y , but there 
i s no "latent ambiguity" as i n Raffles v Wichelhaus. This 
interpretation must favour the Patagoniani 
(39) Ewart's terminology, 13 Green Bag 50. 
(40) See footnotes 8 and 9, p.8. 
(41) "...an act or omission r e s u l t i n g from the representation" per 
Lord Tomlin, Greenwood v Martin's Bank Ltd. JJS^J A.C. 51 > 57; 
Second Restatement Chap.l, 8B (b) 3 "Change of position ... 
indicates payment of money, expenditure of labour, suffering a 
loss or subjection to legal l i a b i l i t y . " 
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reliance upon a representation, which prevents the representor from 
denying the truth of the fa c t asserted. Consider that, i n consequence 
of P's representation, T does accept an unauthorised offer from A or 
makes one to A, which A, without authority accepts. The "contract" 
remains executory. Upon what basis can T claim to have changed h i s 
position? 
As o r i g i n a l l y formulated the estoppel theory r e l i e d upon a change 
of position being proved by ind i r e c t means. Under the rule i n Collen 
v Wright where A's act i s unauthorised, then T undoubtedly has 
an action, for breach of warranty of authority, against A. As T has 
an action against A, then t h i s must r e s u l t from the exchange of promi-
ses between T and A and, therefore, T*s act i n "speaking the words of 
acceptance" must amount to a change of position. This effort i s the 
consideration for the undertaking between A and T and a change of 
position for the estoppel against P. This theory, of course, r e l i e s 
upon the assumption that T's right against A i s contractual and that, 
therefore, T's actions must involve s u f f i c i e n t consideration for that 
relationship and, therefore, s u f f i c i e n t "change of position". Whilst 
i t must be accepted that the action for breach of warranty of autho-
r i t y i s usually considered contractual i n origin, i t must be noted 
(43) 
that t h i s i s not un i v e r s a l l y accepted. ' 
However, contract may ex i s t without detriment or change of posi-
tion. In every contract formed by the exchange of a promise i n return 
for a promise, detriment i s lacking i n the sense that no detriment 
(42) (1857) 8 E. and B. 647; see also p .15. 
(43) See S t o l j a r , p.263; Benton v Campbell JV)2^J 2 K.B. 410, 415 
per S a l t e r J . "Every agent to a contract, when he makes the 
authorised contract between h i s p r i n c i p a l and the other party, 
makes also a contract on h i s own account with the other party; he 
warrants his authority." See also, Edwards v Porter /l92%/ A.C.I, 
21; 26 Col. L.R. 224; 35 Yale L . J . 625; 16 Harv. L.R. 311; 
18 L.Q.R. 364; 48 W.Va.L.R.96. 
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e x i s t s without f i r s t acknowledgment of a binding contract. Simi-
l a r l y i n the case of breach of warranty of authority, detriment may 
be lacking but contract n o t . ^ ^ 
Furthermore, there i s , as previously indicated, j u d i c i a l and 
academic support for the proposition that the obligation imposed by 
the doctrine of breach of warranty of authority i s not contractual i n 
orig i n . I f so, re l i a n c e upon change of position or detriment as being 
revealed i n Collen v V/right i s misplaced. I n Edwards v Porter, 
McNeall v Hawes^*^, Bankes L.J. forceably asserted h i s view. "Does 
the doctrine of implied warranty of authority ... require for i t s 
application the presence of the ess e n t i a l s to the making of an ordi-
nary contract, or i s i t implied by law apart from those es s e n t i a l s 
wherever the agent professes to have the authority which i n fact he 
has not got ... I do not myself think that the doctrine of Collen v 
V/right depends for i t s application upon the existence of those essen-
t i a l s . " Similarly, Holdsworth^^, concluded that "the obligation i s 
not contractual but quasi-contractual. That the obligation i s 
(44) Cheshire, Pifoot and Purmston, Law of Contract, 8th ed. p.955 
Pollock, Pri n c i p l e s of Contract, 13th ed. p.147-150. 
(45) Montrose, 16 Can. B.R. 786, suggests that even i n the case of an 
exchange of promises i t may be possible to discover detriment i n 
that, although the mere speaking of words of acceptance may not 
su f f i c e (as Ewart asserted) the speaking of words constituting 
an undertaking imposes a moral obligation to keep one's word and 
t h i s s o c i a l recognition of obligation constitutes a detriment. 
The undertaking given by T to A, to be l i a b l e to P, would thus 
constitute detriment and as such the exchange of promises would 
include detriment. This reliance upon 18th century notions of 
" f a i r play" i s , however, unconvincing. I t i s reminiscent of 
Lord Mansfield's attempt to eliminate the doctrine of considera-
tion. See Hawkes v Saunders (1782), 1 Cowp.289. "The t i e s of 
conscience upon an upright mind are a s u f f i c i e n t consideration." 
(46) J\32-g 2 K.B. 538, 545. 
(47) 40 L.Q.R. 3. 
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expressed i n terms of contract i s an h i s t o r i c a l accident, and should 
not be allowed to affect the r e s u l t of i t s e s s e n t i a l l y non-contractual 
nature ... i t f a l l s rather under the head of non-contractual than con-
t r a c t u a l l i a b i l i t y ... i t i s i n effect an obligation which the law 
imposes on an agent who purports to act for another." 
I s detriment e s s e n t i a l to estoppel? 
These considerations lead to questioning of the requirement of 
detriment or change of position, on the part of T, so as to support 
an estoppel. However, Lord Tomlin i n the leading case of Greenwood v 
Martin's Bank L t d . i n d i c a t e d that "The es s e n t i a l factors giving 
r i s e to estoppel are ... 
(1) A representation or conduct amounting to a representation inten-
ded to induce a course of conduct on the part of the person to 
whom the representation i s made. 
(2) An act or omission r e s u l t i n g from the representation, whether 
actual or by conduct, by the person to whom the representation 
i s made. 
(3) Detriment to such person as a consequence of the act or omission." 
This statement could not be more emphatic, yet, Montrose^^ has 
sought to avoid i t s s t r i c t u r e s by pointing out that the modern doc-
t r i n e of estoppel was f i r s t formulated i n a case of apparent author-
i t y , Pickard v Sears.(5®) further, ± n the authoritative statement of 
the pr i n c i p l e s of estoppel given by Parke B. i n Freeman v Cooke^\ 
apparent authority was used to i l l u s t r a t e the doctrine but no men-
tion of a requirement of detriment was made. He concludes that " j u s t 
as detriment may not be a universal requirement for contract, so too 
i t may not be for estoppel." 
(48) £9337 AC. 51, 57. 
(49) 16 Can.B.R. 757, 786. 
(50) (1837) 6 A. and E. 469. 
( l ) (1848) 2 Ex. 654. 
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This, i t i s submitted, can be regarded as no more than an i n t e r e s -
ting and ingenious attempt to side step a d i f f i c u l t y placed i n the way 
of the estoppel asserter. The weight of authority c e r t a i n l y supports 
the view that detriment i s an e s s e n t i a l element of estoppel. Indeed 
r 
(2) 
Turner^ ' indicates that "innumerable estoppels have f a i l e d on t h i s 
ground" ( i n a b i l i t y to show a l t e r a t i o n of position to detriment). 
The true meaning of detriment i n r e l a t i o n to estoppel 
In Fung Kai Sun v Chan Fui H i n g ^ \ Lord Reid indicated the true 
t e s t to be s a t i s f i e d i n a case of estoppel was that of "material 
prejudice to the p l a i n t i f f . " Thus the representee must prove that 
"the b e l i e f ultimately entertained materialized i n conduct, and caused 
him to act upon the representation i n a manner p r e j u d i c i a l l y a f f e c t i n g 
h i s temporal i n t e r e s t s . " 
The v i t a l question which requires an answer i s therefore the 
meaning to be attached to "a l t e r a t i o n of position to the prejudice of 
the representee." Turner^^ contends that the cases indicate i t s 
meaning to be merely some change i n the business a f f a i r s of the rep-
resentee which causes some loss of money or money's worth susceptible 
to quantification and assessment. 
What then of the situation where T, as i n Reo Motor Co. v Barnes, 
enters into an executory contract to purchase from P, under circum-
stances i n which A has only apparent authority? Montrose, as observed 
e a r l i e r , sought to avoid the problem of what he saw as the absence of 
change of position by h i s assertion that detriment i s not es s e n t i a l 
(2) Spencer Bower, p.96. See Carr v London and North Western R a i l Co. 
(1875) L.R. 10 C P . 307; Horsfall v Halifax and Huddersfield 
Union Banking Co. (1883) 52 L . J . Ch. 599; George Whitechurch v 
Cavanagh JJ.302J A.C. 117. 
(3) ^95l7 A « c - 489, 506. 
(4) Spencer Bower, p.78. 
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to the estoppel theory. However, i t may be that such circumlocution 
i s rendered unnecessary upon more searching analysis of the elusive 
(5) 
element of detriment. '' 
Re-consideration of detriment 
The leading statement of pr i n c i p l e , as to the standard against 
which detriment i s to be measured, i s that of Dixon J . i n Grundt v 
The Great Boulder Pty. Gold Mines L t d . ^ "The p r i n c i p l e upon which 
estoppel i n pais i s founded i s that the law should not permit an 
unjust departure by a party from an assumption of f a c t which he has 
caused another party to adopt or accept for the purpose of t h e i r legal 
r e l a t i o n s ... One condition appears always to be indispensable. That 
other must have so acted or abstained from acting upon the footing of 
the state of a f f a i r s assumed that he would suffer a detriment i f the 
opposite party were afterwards allowed to set up rights against him 
inconsistent with the assumption. In s t a t i n g t h i s e s s e n t i a l condition, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y where the estoppel flows from representation i t i s often 
said simply that the party a s s e r t i n g the estoppel must have been 
induced to act to h i s detriment. Although substantially such a s t a t e -
ment i s correct and leads to no misunderstanding, i t does not bring 
out c l e a r l y the basal purpose of the doctrine. That purpose i s to 
avoid or prevent a detriment to the party asserting the estoppel by 
(5) Misunderstanding of the nature of "change of position and d e t r i -
ment" i s evident i n Wright's review of the American Restatement 
of Contracts and Agency 1 Unvy. of Toronto L . J . 17»4L He poses 
the r h e t o r i c a l question : "In the formation of an executory con-
t r a c t , where i s t h i s change of position by the t h i r d person who, 
because of a representation by the p r i n c i p a l , believes that the 
agent i s authorised?" This issue has been a constant thorn i n 
the f l e s h of supporters of the estoppel theory. See S t o l j a r , p.31. 
(6) (1937) 59 C.L.R. 641f 674, c i t e d with approval by Lord Denning i n 
Central Newbury Car Auctions Ltd. v Unity Finance Ltd. Jji^'j] 
1 Q.B. 371, 379. • 
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compelling the opposite party to adhere to the assumption upon which 
the former acted or abstained from acting. This means that the r e a l 
detriment or harm from which the law seeks to give protection i s that 
which would flow from the change of position i f the assumption were 
deserted that led to i t . " 
Thus the t e s t for ascertaining the existence of detriment l i e s 
i n measuring the change of position, of T, i f P were to be permitted 
to disavow the truth of his representation that A has authority. I t 
i s only when the representor, P, wishes to disavow the assumption 
which h i s representation created, that estoppel i s c a l l e d i n aid. 
The question of detriment i s only at t h i s stage relevant, and, so f a r 
as T i s concerned, the detriment i s to be measured by comparing the 
change which would be effected as a r e s u l t of an assertion of the 
true position, with that which flowed from the representation. In 
the Reo Motor Co. situation, c l e a r l y T has acted i n r e l i a n c e upon 
P's representation that A was authorised. Although the reviewer of 
the case v ' considered that such an executory "contract" could only 
be enforced on the "objective theory" of apparent authority based on 
contract, i t i s submitted that a more sophisticated view of detriment 
reveals a situation i n which enforcement under the doctrine of 
estoppel i s possible. The detriment i s simply that T would be 
deprived of his right to enforce h i s contract i f P were permitted to 
disavow h i s representation. 
However, i f t h i s view i s not acceptable, there are other sound 
reasons for arguing that T does suffer a detriment. This approach 
involves a detailed consideration of the doctrine of r a t i f i c a t i o n 
(7) 42 Harv. L.R. 570. 
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R a t i f i c a t i o n and detriment 
Where an e n t i r e l y unauthorised contract i s entered into "by an 
assumed agent on behalf of a "pr i n c i p a l " , then i t i s a well estab-
l i s h e d rule of law that the "p r i n c i p a l " may, by r a t i f i c a t i o n , make 
(8) 
the contract e f f e c t i v e l y h i s own.v ' 
I f the estoppel theory i s assumed to underlie "apparent autho-
r i t y " , then, i n order that P may sue upon the "contract" under which 
l i a b i l i t y has been imposed upon him, he must r a t i f y the agent's act. 
Quite c l e a r l y , once P has r a t i f i e d the "contract" then the r e l a t i o n -
(9) 
ship between P and T i s e n t i r e l y regularized. ' The point of i n t e r -
est, to t h i s inquiry, i s to ascertain the position of T before P 
r a t i f i e s . I f i t can be shown that, at t h i s stage, T has "altered h is 
lega l position", then T w i l l have suffered an undoubted detriment and 
the conditions of estoppel w i l l be s a t i s f i e d . 
The Rule i n Bolton v Lambert 
The leading case on the effect of an unauthorised acceptance, by 
an assumed agent, i n the name of a person to whom an offer i s made, 
i s Bolton Partners v Lambert^"*"^, a decision of the Court of Appeal. 
The r u l e , said to follow from t h i s decision, i s that the acceptance by 
A prevents T, the offeror, from withdrawing. I f t h i s rule i s absolute, 
then i t would appear that T i s greatly disadvantaged by A's acceptance, 
i n the period before P's r a t i f i c a t i o n . For T would appear to be i n 
no-man's land, he has no contract with P but cannot withdraw h i s 
offer; while T i s bound to P, P i s not bound to T. I f t h i s i s so, 
(8) The recognition of the pri n c i p l e by the House of Lords i n 
Keighley Maxsted & Co. v Durant JV)OlJ A.C. 240. 
(9) "Omnis r a t i h a b i t i o r e t r o t r a h i t u r et mandato p r i o r i aequiparatur." 
Co. L i t t . 207a; 4 I n s t . 317. 
(10) (1889) 41 Ch. D. 295. 
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then, the mere offer by T and i t s subsequent unauthorised acceptance 
by A, i s s u f f i c i e n t to deprive T of a leg a l right (of withdrawal of 
offe r ) and thus s a t i s f i e s the requirement of detriment as an e s s e n t i a l 
ingredient i n the doctrine of estoppel. Thus T w i l l be subject to P's 
whim and suffers a detriment thereby and therefore can sue P on the 
estoppel; T may be sued by P i f P does r a t i f y . 
At t h i s stage, any d i s t i n c t i o n between the theories of contract, 
based on manifested intention, and estoppel, as the conceptual founda-
tion for the legal p r i n c i p l e s surrounding apparent agency, i s almost 
reduced to a mere academic quibble^"^. However, as Story J . observed 
the maxim "omnis r a t i h a b i t i o r e t r o t r a h i t u r et mandato p r i o r i 
aequiparatur" i s a "useful and convenient r u l e " but l i k e other rules 
i t requires to be received with q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . 
Qualifications to the Rule i n Bolton v Lambert 
The q u a l i f i c a t i o n s to the Rule i n Bolton v Lambert require such 
extensive and detailed consideration that a r e l a t i o n of t h e i r i n v e s t i -
gation i s confined to an a p p e n d i x ^ s o as not to cause deviation 
from the main issue under consideration. However, to c l e a r l y state 
the object of the detailed investigation i s perhaps desirable. 
1. I f the rule i n Bolton v Lambert i s "good", without the f e t t e r of 
exceptions, then i t s effect i s , i n t e r a l i a , to s a t i s f y the 
requirement of detriment e s s e n t i a l to T's cause i n instances of 
an executory contract. I f so, there may be l i t t l e meaningful 
d i s t i n c t i o n to be drawn between the theories of estoppel and 
manifested contract as the basal theory to apparent authority. 
(11) Cf. the hypothetical problem sit u a t i o n i l l u s t r a t e d p . l5» 
Also, i f P does r a t i f y , A's right to indemnity w i l l a r i s e , 
a l i t e r , i f no r a t i f i c a t i o n . 
(12) 5 L.Q.R.440. 
(13) Appendix I . 
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P can sue T under the Rule i n Bolton v Lambert; P because of 
estoppel i s unable to defend against T's action by pleading A*s 
want of authority. 
2. I f the Rule i n Bolton v Lambert i s "bad",^ 1^ then c l e a r l y there 
i s need to distinguish between the alternative basal theories at 
present under discussion. I n t h i s context "bad" must include the 
existence of exceptions and uncertainty; 
Conclusions drawn from consideration of the issue of r a t i f i c a t i o n 
contained i n Appendix I . 
The conclusion drawn from the detailed investigation undertaken 
i s that the uncertainty which exi s t s i n r e l a t i o n to the application 
of the "Rule" i s such as to suggest, i n cumulative ef f e c t , that a 
basal theory which involves, as a necessary part of i t s adoption, 
inclusion of the Rule i n Bolton v Lambert i s f a r from s a t i s f a c t o r y . 
The exceptions and assumed exceptions are of such nebulous form and 
effect that the whole princi p l e of r a t i f i c a t i o n must be regarded with 
circumspection. I f , as has been shown to be the case, the area i s 
uncertain, or indeed i f i t leads to p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t y such as 
uncertainty of proof, then the estoppel theory i s best avoided. 
Problems of d e f i n i t i o n reconsidered 
As has been noted e a r l i e r , there has been l i t t l e agreement upon 
(15) 
de f i n i t i o n of terms i n the f i e l d of agency. ' This thesis has 
(14) See Lord Lindley i n Fleming v Bank of New Zealand JJSOQj A.C.577-
"The decision ... presents d i f f i c u l t i e s , and t h e i r Lordships 
reserve t h e i r l i b e r t y to reconsider i t i f on some further occasion 
i t should become necessary to say so." See also Second American 
Restatement para.88 "To constitute r a t i f i c a t i o n , the affirmance 
of a transaction must occur before the other party has manifested 
h i s withdrawal from i t either to the purported p r i n c i p a l or to 
the agent, and before the offer or agreement has otherwise 
terminated or been discharged." 
(15) See footnote 5, P .7; footnote 22, p.17-
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proceeded upon a working def i n i t i o n of apparent authority and i t i s 
appropriate at t h i s stage to consider a more precise d e f i n i t i o n . 
s t r a t e s , c l e a r l y , the imprecise language frequently used i n describ-
ing the meaning of authority. Cook indicates that " I f P says to T 
'A i s authorised to s e l l you my horse upon terms to be agreed between 
you and him 1, A thereby has authority to bind P." ( i r r e s p e c t i v e of 
any secret l i m i t a t i o n placed upon A by P). By t h i s i l l u s t r a t i o n he 
seeks to demonstrate that "an apparent authority i s a r e a l authority."^ 
However, to adopt Hohfeld's more precise terminology, what i s demon-
strated i s that an expression of unrestricted authority confers a 
power upon A, co-extensive with the expressed authority or instruction. 
Thus the term "apparent authority" may be said to be a misnoma. 
Apparent authority need only be r e l i e d upon i n the absence of author-
i t y or as i t i s commonly termed actual authority; apparent authority 
(19) 
denotes an absence of authority. To adopt Seavey's approach v ' 
"authority should be limited to i t s primitive meaning of a power which 
can be r i g h t f u l l y exercised", i . e . a power flowing from a right to 
carry out agreed instructions. The extent of the power, vested i n A, 
beyond h i s agreed instructions i s , under the manifested intention 
approach, to be ascertained from the extent to which h i s acts appear 
to be authorised. This r a i s e s a question, adverted to e a r l i e r , 
apparent to whom?^^ 
(16) See Montrose, 16 Can.B.R.757»763. 
(17) Fundamental Legal Conceptions, incidently Hohfeld's writings were 
collected and published posthumously under the editorship of 
W.W. Cook i n 1923. 
(18) Pickering v Busk (1812) 15 East 38, 39 per Lord Ellenborough. 
(19) 29 Yale L.J. 859. 
(20) See p.18; Slade J . i n Rama Corporation Ltd. v Proved Tin and 
Adoption of Hohfeld's analysis of " j u r a l r e l a t i o n s " (17) demon-
General Investment Ltd 
Ryan v Pilkington J}3% 
in .Kama uorp 
.. yj952/ 
9/1 W.L. 
ion 
2 Q.B. 147 and 
R. 403, 414. 
V/illmer L.J. i n 
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The notion that "apparent authority" may e x i s t at large i s 
inherent i n the oft stated requirement that there must, i n order to 
(21) 
r a i s e an estoppel, be reliance upon the "apparent authority". ' 
However, i t i s c l e a r that the old notion of a "holding out" to the 
world at large has no part to play so f a r as T's claim against P i s 
(22) 
concerned. v ' The courts do require that the representation by one 
party s h a l l "induce" the a l t e r a t i o n i n the position of the other 
p a r t y . T h u s f a r , i t i s c l e a r that Ewart's Patagonian merchant^ 2^ 
would f a i l because of h i s i n a b i l i t y to show that he personally was i n -
duced to r e l y upon A's authority. 
The "true contract" 
Having discussed Cook's rather loose terminology i t i s now pos-
(25) 
s i b l e to consider again h i s assertion that there i s a "true contract" v ' 
created between P and T where A has a "power" under the principles of 
apparent authority. He went to some length to demonstrate that t h i s 
contract i s one created by consensual agreement, i f not " i n f a c t " then 
(26) 
" i n law". ' However, Montrose pointed out that such a statement con-
s t i t u t e s merely an incorrect statement of the legal rule i t s e l f and i s 
(21) See Powell, p.57 also Underwood v Bank of Liverpool Jv)2.£j 
1 K.B. 775, 798. 
(22) See Martin v Gray (1863) 14 C.B.N.S. 839 per E r i e C.J. "Formerly 
i t was considered s u f f i c i e n t i f the party was held out to the 
world as. a member of a firm. Now, however, i t i s necessary that 
there should be di r e c t evidence that the holding out should come 
to the knowledge of the p l a i n t i f f . " See also Edmundson v 
Thompson and Blakey ( l 8 6 l ) 2 F. and F. 566, where there was a 
holding out to some, yet, the person seeking to sue P was not 
able to bring himself within the c l a s s . Also, Lord Lindley i n 
Farquharson Bros, v King & Co. J±902j A.C.325. footnote 29, ante, 
p. 19. 
(23) See Oliver v Bank of England JJ.9WZJ 1 Ch.6l0; Kershaw v Smith 
(A.F.) and Co. Ltd. JJSY^J 2 K.B.455. 
(24) See p.18. 
(25) See p.17. 
(26) 5 Col. L.R.36. 
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not an explanation of i t . ' Whilst i t may be accepted that there i s 
a contract i n lav/ and that agency exhibits rules "sui generis", i t may 
be doubted whether the "true contract" can be, what Cook regarded i t 
to be, based upon "simple contract" founded on agreement between 
pa r t i e s . Cook's demonstration of h i s theory assumed that a l l contracts 
were based upon the same theory of consensual agreement ( i n the case 
of apparent authority, the agreement being based upon an objective 
finding). 
Consider h i s example i l l u s t r a t i n g h i s b e l i e f : "A says to B, 'X 
i s authorised to s e l l you my horse upon terms to be agreed upon bet-
ween you and him.' P r i v a t e l y A in s t r u c t s X not to s e l l for l e s s 
than #150. X offers the horse to B for $.00 and B accepts. We a l l 
agree that A i s bound, but why? By estoppel? So says the new school. 
A has not contracted with B, for he has not assented : there has been 
no meeting of the minds. To be sure there has not i n f a c t . I con-
tend there has been i n law. A's statement to B i s nothing more or 
l e s s than an offer to contract with him leaving the terms to be fixed 
by X." Ewart contended that A's statement to B was not an offer to B 
but merely a statement that A was w i l l i n g to be bound by an offer which 
was to be made by X, consequently there could be no question of a con-
t r a c t between A and B. This c r i t i c i s m of Cook's theory i s based upon 
what was also Cook's misconception - that for the case to be covered 
by contract i t must f a l l within the simple consensual form of con-
t r a c t . In order to develop t h i s l i n e of inquiry i t i s necessary to 
take a b r i e f excursion into the jurisprudential basis of contract. 
The jurisprudence of the origins of contract 
The basic concept, currently accepted as underlying contractual 
(27) 16 Can.B.R.757, 783. 
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l i a b i l i t y , i s that an agreement, entered into by parties who intend 
( 28) 
to create rights and duties, should be l e g a l l y enforced. ' This i s 
the concept which underlies the type of contract described by Cook as 
the "true contract". The theories of contract generally accepted i n 
(29) 
the nineteenth century were based upon "consensus". ' 
Lewis put forward three independent bases, to what he regarded 
as rights i n contract, a r i s i n g from quite d i s t i n c t forms of 
obligation. 
The f i r s t situation, considered as a basis for an action i n con-
t r a c t , i s a u n i l a t e r a l declaration of willingness to be bound. This 
was the form of contract enforced by an action i n covenant. Although 
there would appear to be no i n j u s t i c e i n requiring that a promisor 
should be bound to keep his promise, having stated that he i s w i l l i n g 
to do so and, morally, there i s no doubt an obligation to abide by 
one's promises, by our law a u n i l a t e r a l declaration of w i l l , i n 
i t s e l f , i s i n s u f f i c i e n t to impose binding obligations. The archaic 
form of contract i s the formal undertaking by deed. Here i t i s the 
form of the promise which provides the binding force. I n an action 
upon a contract alleged to take the form of a u n i l a t e r a l undertaking, 
(31) 
there must be proof of a formal act of execution. ' 
(28) See Weeks v Tybald (1605) c i t e d 91 L.Q.R. 247f 263. 
(29) Probably derived from Kant's concept of contract which involved 
the promisor i n a delivery of h i s freedom, from obligation, to 
the promisee. This required the mutual w i l l of the parties, 
r e s u l t i n g in the common basis of meeting of the minds i n 19th 
century theory. See Pound on Kant, "Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Law p.260. See also "Innovation i n Nineteenth 
Century Contract Law", Simpson, 91 L.Q.R.247t267. 
(30) 9. Col. L.R. 116,132. He r e l i e d heavily upon material published 
i n 52 Am.Law Reg.764 and 53 Am.Law Reg.112, by Crawford D. Hening. 
(31) The formal contract i s further considered i n Chapter I I I p.113 
and p,117with reference to the undisclosed p r i n c i p a l . 
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A second ancient form of contract was the obligation enforced by 
the action of debt. In i t s origin t h i s was the contract a r i s i n g from 
a completed sa l e . The binding force here flowed from the notion of 
"quid pro quo". This was the promise to pay a definite sum upon 
receipt of something of value. Upon receipt there was created a bind-
ing promise, not simply because of the promise but because of the 
receipt of something of value; i t was the receipt which raised the 
duty to pay, based upon principles of unjust enrichment. 
The t h i r d notion underlying our lav/ of contract was that develop-
ing through the action of assumpsit. The obligation arose i n an 
action of assumpsit i n the fa c t that the promisee could show that he 
had done something, which he would not otherwise have done, at the 
i n s t i g a t i o n of the promisor. I t i s here that the element of deceit, 
fundamental for procedural reasons i n an action of assumpsit, i s 
raised. The argument being, that had the promisor not so requested, 
the promisee would not have so acted; the f a i l u r e on the promisor's 
part to carry out h i s part of the undertaking thereby constituting 
a fraud on the promisee. In more contemporary thinking, the action 
of assumpsit i s seen as a vehicle for the proposition that reasonable 
(32) 
expectations ought not to be defeated. x 
The "true contract" again 
Following Cook's assertion that i n cases of apparent authority 
(33) 
there i s a "true contract" between P and T v ' and the counter 
assertion that t h i s cannot be so, as there i s i n f a c t no meeting of 
(32) See Atiyah, Inaugural Lecture at Canberra University "Considera-
tion i n contracts : a fundamental restatement." also Paley W. 
"Moral and P o l i t i c a l Philosophy c i t e d 91 L.Q.R. 247, 267. 
(33) See also Second American Restatement para.8. Comment, indicates 
that apparent authority "conforms to the principles of contract." 
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the minds, i t i s pertinent to consider which species of contract i s 
most c l o s e l y resembled i n the area under discussion. 
Quite c l e a r l y the u n i l a t e r a l w i l l of P cannot be the basis of any 
contract i n cases of apparent authority. The principle of u n i l a t e r a l 
( 35) 
w i l l could only have application to formal contracts. ' 
(34) Montrose, 16 Can.B.R. 757, 783, refined Ewart's c r i t i c i s m of 
Cook's application of the doctrine of "manifested intention" 
so as to exclude any theory of contract based upon the combined 
w i l l s of P and T. This refinement again exposed loose termi-
nology i n the formulation of the theory. Cook found the com-
bined w i l l s to be expressed i n the formation of a contract i n 
the "manifestation of consent by the p r i n c i p a l to the t h i r d 
person, and i n the case of a b i l a t e r a l transaction, a counter-
manifestation which completes the transaction." Montrose, 
however, indicated that the requirement of "consent" to a 
simple contract consists i n a consent to the s p e c i f i c terms of 
the contract. Thus there can be no "contract to make a contract"; 
such an agreement i s i n e f f e c t i v e u n t i l the terms of the future 
contract are agreed. Further, " i n the case of apparent agency 
there i s no o r i g i n a l agreement between P and T. P's representa-
tion that A i s authorised does not necessarily r e s u l t i n a con-
t r a c t between P and T, that P w i l l be bound by the dealings 
between A and T ... there may be such a contract between P and 
T, but i t does not a r i s e from T's consent to the arrangement 
with A. That consent does not also operate as consent to such 
a contract with P. In any case such a contract i s quite d i f -
ferent from the contract whose terms are s e t t l e d between A and T." 
This d i s t i n c t i o n drawn between "consent", as conceived of by 
Cook as consent given by P to be bound by the agreement between 
A and T, and consent, as required by the "general p r i n c i p l e s of 
contract", i n the sense of a b i l a t e r a l willingness to conform to 
s p e c i f i c terms, demonstrates the inadequacy of Cook's termin-
ology and the f a i l u r e to "prove" h i s theory i n jurisprudential 
terms. 
(35) Moreover there i s the ancient rule that only the parties to a 
deed can sue or be sued upon i t , even though they are agents 
and not p r i n c i p a l s . Combes' case (1613), 9 Co. Rep. 75a. See 
Chapter I . Further, f a r from the contract being an expression 
of P's w i l l , h i s w i l l i s quite absentI 
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The receipt of the "quid pro quo" making i t unjust that P should 
r e t a i n the "thing" without f u l f i l l i n g the obligation annexed to the 
making over of the "thing", would appear a more f r u i t f u l basis f o r a 
contract between P and T. However, there are two pressing considera-
tions which make the pri n c i p l e of doubtful value i n t h i s instance. 
The f i r s t point i s the basic p r i n c i p l e of our law, that contrac-
tual obligations or quasi-contractual obligations, are not to be 
imposed upon persons except with t h e i r knowledge and consent. 
Whilst i t i s recognised that the p r i n c i p l e of unjust enrichment i s 
preserved to cover the exceptional case, there would appear not to be 
a suitable case for i t s application where a more basic p r i n c i p l e i s 
available. The second d i f f i c u l t y i s the problem raised by the execu-
tory contract. The notion of "quid pro quo" would not meet the needs 
of such situations and the problems of Reo Motor Car Co. v Barnes 
would again a r i s e . 
Of the Lewis t r i l o g y there remains the theory, based upon assump-
s i t , which l i n k s with the theory of the objective nature of agreement. 
(37) 
Cookv ' maintained that the effect of apparent authority was p r e c i s e l y 
the same as actual authority, "so f a r as the persons to whom I have 
held a given person out as possessing c e r t a i n authority are concerned, 
the relationship of p r i n c i p a l and agent does e x i s t : he i s authorised, 
(36) See Bowen L. J . i n Falcke v Scottish Imperial Insurance Co. (1886), 
34 Ch.D. 234»240. "The general p r i n c i p l e i s , beyond a l l question, 
that work or labour done or money expended by one man to preserve 
or benefit the property of another do not according to English 
law create any l i e u upon the property saved or benefited, nor, 
even i f standing alone, create any obligation to repay the expen-
diture. L i a b i l i t i e s are not to be forced upon people behind 
t h e i r backs any more than you can confer a benefit upon a man 
against h i s w i l l . " 
(37) 6 Col. L.R. 36 i n h i s reply to Ewart 5 Col. L.R. 354. 
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has authority to act f o r me to that extent : he i s i n fa c t my agent, ' 
with a l l that authority and I am bound i f at a l l , because through my 
agent I have entered into those contracts which have been duly 
accepted." Thus Cook maintains that by a lega l f i c t i o n P himself has 
made a promise which causes T to adopt a p a r t i c u l a r course of action 
i n expectation of a promised reward, therefore, i t i s h i s contract. 
There i s , however, very substantial authority of great antiquity that 
such a f i c t i o n i s unnecessary. 
(39) 
In Seignior and Wolmer's Case x ' Dodderidge J . said "An assump-
s i t to the servant for the master, i s good to the master: and an 
assumpsit by the appointment of the master of the servant, s h a l l bind 
the master and i s h i s assumpsit. I f my b a i l y of my manor buy c a t t e l 
to stock my grounds, I s h a l l be chargeable i n an action of debt: and 
i f my b a i l y s e l l corn or c a t t e l , I s h a l l have an action of debt for 
the money; for whatsoever comes within the compass of the servants 
service, I s h a l l be chargeable with, and likewise s h a l l have advan-
tage of the same." 
Thus where P has not act u a l l y authorised the contract i t could 
be shown to be h i s contract by showing that the man who made i t , A, 
was h i s servant. The person receiving the promise recovered because 
i t was made i n the masters business. I n terms of assumpsit, the 
f a i l u r e , on the part of P, to make the payment to T constituted a 
deceit. T would not otherwise have acted or undertaken an obligation. 
To hold P l i a b l e i n deceit i t was not necessary to show any dire c t 
contact between P and T: i t was simply enough to show P "caused" the 
harm which T suffered. The f i c t i o n of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of P and A, so 
that P may be found to have undertaken the obligation i s unnecessary. 
(38) Note that t h i s explanation i n terms of " f a c t " i s again trans-
parently u n s c i e n t i f i c , for the factual situation, as he defines 
i t , involves the acceptance of lega l rules which he i s attempt-
ing to expound. 
(39) (1623) Godbolt 360; 78 E.R.212. 
40. 
"P i s l i a b l e simply because he has set i n motion the machinery and h i s 
act motivated or induced the p l a i n t i f f (T) to change h i s position for 
a stipulated reward. " ^ ^ 
Again, the issue of the executory contract must be considered. 
Does the Reo Motor Car Co. v Barnes situation, pose any problem for 
t h i s approach? The nature of an executory contract i s that i t remains 
i n the form of a "promise for a promise". However, i n essence, the 
theory of assumpsit proceeds on the basis that T would not have 
promised but for P's promise or action, which led T to promise, i n 
the expectation of a benefit which P has f a i l e d to provide. I t i s 
not P's promise upon which T recovers, but rather, he recovers upon 
the fac t that P has caused T to do an act. This i s so even though 
the act which T has been caused to do i s merely to make a promise 
with the intention of being l e g a l l y bound. The executory contract 
poses no conceptual problem for t h i s theory. 
(40) 9 Col. L.R.116, 134. This does of course r a i s e to some extent 
the policy argument ra i s e d i n Hern v Nichols (1701) 1 Salk.289 f 
so often c i t e d yet infrequently followed (see also Wayland's 
case (1706) 3 Salk. 234) that the employer should bear the loss 
as he was r e a l l y the person who, because of t r u s t i n the servant, 
brought the l o s s about. "Wherever one of two innocent persons 
must suffer by the acts of a t h i r d , he who has enabled such a 
t h i r d person to occasion the loss must sustain i t . " The mystic 
quality of the term "enabled" has bedevilled lawyers f o r 
centuries. See Lord Halsbury i n Farquharson Bros. & Co. v 
King & Co. Jl302j A.C. 325* 332. "In one sense every man who 
s e l l s a p i s t o l or a dagger enables an intending murderer to 
commit a crime; but i s he, i n s e l l i n g a p i s t o l or a dagger to 
some person who comes to buy i n h i s shop, acting i n breach of 
any duty? Does he owe any duty to a l l the world ... to prevent 
people taking advantage of h i s s e l l i n g p i s t o l s or daggers i n h i s 
business, because he does in one sense enable a person to commit 
a crime?" See Jerome v Bentley £952? 2 A l l E.R. 114, 118 per 
Donovan J . , "Enabled i n t h i s context means the doing of something 
by one of the innocent parties which i n f a c t misled the other." 
also s i m i l a r statement of principle i n Central Newbury Car 
Auctions, Ltd. v Unity Finance Ltd. 1 Q.B. 571. 
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A note of dissent 
Montrose^"^ considered the relationship "between P and T to be 
contractual, but, did not accept i t was based upon assumpsit, which 
I have indicated to have been found s a t i s f a c t o r y . j j e contended 
that the basis of P's l i a b i l i t y was the agreement made between A and 
T. He found Cook's explanation to be unsatisfactory, based as i t i s 
upon loose language and c i r c u l a r reasoning. Ewart's theory of 
estoppel, he considered displayed some merit and he devised a more 
direc t contractual theory based upon the indir e c t approach, under-
l y i n g the estoppel theory. As has been demonstrated e a r l i e r , the 
theory of estoppel requires that two stages be accepted i n placing 
l i a b i l i t y at P's door for A's unauthorised a c t s . The f i r s t i s that 
i n cases of actual authority a power i s vested i n A whereby P may be 
bound to T. The second i s , that i n the apparent authority situation, 
i t i s demonstrably the case that P ought to be under the same l i a -
b i l i t y as he would have been under, had actual authority existed. 
Montrose adopts a somewhat s i m i l a r p r a c t i c a l approach, which 
does, however, present theoretical d i f f i c u l t i e s . He contends that 
the agreement between A and T i s that P w i l l be l i a b l e to T and T 
l i a b l e to P. Further, that t h i s agreement w i l l be enforced (that 
between A and T ) , SO as to make P l i a b l e , simply because P has shown 
(41) 16 Can.B.R. 757, 788. 
(42) His r e f u s a l to accept the assumpsit theory was, apparently, 
based upon h i s reluctance to accept a different basal theory for 
actual authority to that adopted for apparent authority. He 
considered actual authority to produce a contract which could 
not, i n cases of s p e c i a l agency, be j u s t i f i e d upon grounds of 
enforcement of reasonable expectations. There was, he claimed, 
no ground for saying that i n sp e c i a l agency (actual authority 
without any apparent authority) T should reasonably believe A's 
statement as to the extent of h i s authority. This, with respect, 
displays misunderstanding of the assumpsit theory, which merely 
required that P should "cause" T's change of position. T's 
b e l i e f , reasonable or not, i s irr e l e v a n t to actual authority. 
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a willingness to be l i a b l e by v i r t u e of a representation to T . ^ ^ P 
has led T reasonably to expect that contractual obligations would 
a r i s e . This, i t i s contended, i s s u f f i c i e n t reason for enforcing the 
agreement between A and T. The achievement of j u s t i c e i s seen as 
the j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Montrose accepts that objections may be raised, 
that such a theory takes no account of the "factual element" i n such 
a transaction. The theory of estoppel takes account of the factual 
situation, that T w i l l usually deal with A because he believes A to 
be authorised. However, he contends that the f a i l u r e to take t h i s 
aspect of positive b e l i e f into consideration poses no serious d i f f i -
c u lty for, i n practice, either T does believe A i s authorised or he 
w i l l refuse to deal with P. The f a i l u r e to take account of T's 
b e l i e f i s therefore not a serious defect i n the theory of agreement 
between A and T. The merit of the theory i s , perhaps, the precision 
which i t gives to the relationship between P and T. Certainly the 
executory contract poses no problem. 
I consider, however, that i t ought to be noted that Montrose's 
proposition requires a f l e x i b i l i t y i n the doctrine of p r i v i t y which 
has yet to be discovered i n the mainstream of the law of contract. 
(43) In cases of actual authority there has been an agreement with T, 
not merely a representation, that P would be l i a b l e . But l i a -
b i l i t y i s based upon the same basis as i n the text. 
(44) This argument i s i n essence supported by the approach adopted i n 
Atiyah's "Inaugural address" (footnote 32 p.36) where he argues 
that contracts are enforced because there are "good reasons" for 
enforcing agreements. Consideration i n the technical sense i s a 
red-herring, i f there are v a l i d "considerations" for supporting 
enforcement, i n p r a c t i c a l terms, then t h i s i s s u f f i c i e n t . 
(45) See Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. v Selfridge & Co. Ltd. JJ.9v£J 
A.C. 847; Midland Silicones Ltd. v Scruttons Ltd. /T962/ A.C.446. 
c.f. New Zealand Shipping Co., The v Satterthwaite (A.M.) 
& Co. ^SljjJ 2 W.L.R. 865 taking into.account maritime practice 
upon a matter of p r i v i t y , also, Fleming v Bank of New Zealand 
^9007 A.C.577. 
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Application of Traditional Theory to the Cases 
Having established that the obligations a r i s i n g i n cases of appa-
rent authority are derived from a contractual base, i t i s necessary 
to consider the e f f i c a c y of the theory, i n i t s application i n the 
cases, so as to "prove" i t s worth. 
Wright submitted that the English courts have admitted of only 
two bases of l i a b i l i t y (apart from the doctrine of the undisclosed 
p r i n c i p a l considered i n Chapter I I I ) of a p r i n c i p a l . T h e s e are, 
of course, contract and estoppel. Wright considered that the l i a -
b i l i t y of P "followed naturally from contract doctrine" to the extent 
that "the p r i n c i p a l has manifested h i s consent to a given contract to 
the agent - r e a l authority - or has manifested his consent to a t h i r d 
person - apparent authority . . . " ^ ^ Accepting the f r a i l t y of h i s 
reasoning, one may adopt t h i s general proposition of the limited 
sources of l i a b i l i t y and reinforce i t with a more general statement 
of the t r a d i t i o n a l English approach. 
Pridman states, "...the p r i n c i p a l w i l l only be bound to the t h i r d 
party by acts which are within the agent's authority. Anything that 
the agent does i n excess of that authority w i l l not aff e c t the p r i n c i -
pal unless the p r i n c i p a l adopts what the agent has done i n accordance 
with the doctrine of r a t i f i c a t i o n . " ^ * ^ Authority, he a s s e r t s , may 
only be created "by contract - actual authority, or by estoppel -
apparent authority."(49) 
(46) An attempt was made by V.C. MacDonald to c l a s s i f y the English 
cases into categories s o l e l y based upon either " r e a l " authority 
or "apparent authority". 1934 3 D.L.R. 305 "An agents authority 
to bind h i s p r i n c i p a l i n contract." 
(47) 1 Unvy of Toronto L . J . 17, 42. 
(48) Pridman, p.89. 
(49) He does instance a t h i r d category of authority created by opera-
tion of law, but, by t h i s , he merely means the special cases of 
''agency of necessity" and agency presumed i n the case of a wife 
or mistress. The wife's agency of necessity has been abolished, 
Matrimonial Proceedings and Property act, 1970, section 41. 
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I f a theory i s to be generally acceptable then i t must provide, 
at the very l e a s t , a plausible explanation of the d i f f i c u l t case, 
together with a r e a d i l y understandable explanation of the mainstream 
cases. I f i t can be shown that there are situations i n which P i s 
l i a b l e i n respect of a transaction, entered by A, who had no authority 
or apparent authority (where the elements of estoppel are not demon-
strably present), that P, i n short, i s l i a b l e simply because i t was 
his agent (or has been h i s agent), then any contractual theory, based 
on o b j e c t i v i t y , may have to "give way" to some other p r i n c i p l e . 
The d i f f i c u l t ease of Hambro v Burnand 
A case requiring explanation i n terms of any proposed a l l 
embracing theory of obligation imposed i n the absence of actual 
authority i s Hambro v Burnand. 
Here, a group of underwriters at Lloyd's authorised A to under-
write the solvency of corporations. The group of underwriters, P, 
authorised A to underwrite insurance p o l i c i e s i n the names of A and 
P. In the names of A and P, A underwrote a policy which guaranteed 
the b i l l s of an insolvent company. T accepted a b i l l drawn by the 
insolvent company a f t e r having taken A's word that he was authorised 
to issue the guarantee; T did not request nor did he obtain sight of 
the written power of attorney, indeed i t appeared he was not aware of 
i t s existence. When the b i l l became due, the insolvent company d i s -
honoured i t . T sued P and A upon the policy of guarantee and was 
successful i n the Court of Appeal. I submit that the case poses con-
siderable d i f f i c u l t y f or any attempt to j u s t i f y the decision i n terms 
of actual or apparent authority. However, no one has suggested that 
the decision i s "wrong", yet there i s no general agreement upon the 
(50) /19027 2 K* B- 399; £9047 2 K.B.10 
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nature of A's authority. I t i s submitted that the case defies c l a s s i -
f i c a t i o n into any theory of " r e a l " or "apparent" authority. 
At f i r s t instance Bigham J . held that the underwriters were not 
l i a b l e on the policy, on the grounds that A had acted outside h i s 
authority i n f a i l i n g to underwrite i n accordance with the objects f or 
which he was employed. On appeal, however, t h i s reasoning was i n t e r -
preted as an impermissable inquiry into motive. Collins M.R., 
approached the argument i n t h i s way: " I t has been contended for /"°P_7 
that, although express authority was given i n writing, as i n the 
present case, authorising an agent to make such a contract as he here 
made, i t i s open to the pr i n c i p a l to say that, nevertheless, i f i t 
appears on inquiry into motives which existed i n the agent's mind, that 
he intended, i n making the contract, to misuse for h i s own ends the 
opportunity given to him by h i s authority, and apply i t to a purpose, 
which, i f the princ i p a l had known of i t , he would not have sanctioned, 
then because the agent was so influenced by improper motives, the 
princip a l i s not l i a b l e upon the contract made by him. I should have 
said myself, apart from authority on the subject, that such a proposi-
tion could not hold water." He went on to say that, "where a written 
authority given to an agent covers the thing done by him on behalf of 
the p r i n c i p a l , no inquiry i s admissable about the motive upon which 
the agent acted." 
Authority on the subject was, i n f a c t , somewhat d i f f i c u l t to find 
but support was gained from the American case Westfield Bank v Cornen,^''"^ 
where Andrews J . , stated, "...whenever the very act of an agent i s 
authorized by the terms of the power, that i s , whenever by comparing 
the very act done by the agent with the words of the power, the act 
i s i n i t s e l f warranted by the terms used, such act i s binding on the 
( l ) (1867) 37 N.Y.320. See also North River Bank v Aymar (1842) 3 
H i l l (N.Y.) 262 c i t e d i n support. 
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constituent as to a l l persons dealing i n good f a i t h with the agent; 
such persons are not bound to inquire into the f a c t s aliunde. The 
apparent authority i s the r e a l authority." 
Did actual authority e x i s t ? 
The general proposition under discussion i s that i n order that P 
should be bound there must have been either an actual authority or an 
apparent authority exercised by A. Can t h i s proposition stand along-
side Hambro's case? Did actual authority e x i s t ? 
I t i s established beyond a l l doubt that i f T i s aware that A 
(2) 
acts for h i s own purposes then he cannot hold P l i a b l e . v ' In these 
circumstances A cannot be said to have actual authority. Thus, upon 
the English approach outlined above, v ' unless P makes some representa-
tion or permits A to make a representation on h i s behalf, then A can-
not be said to have "authority" when he acts for himself. However, 
Hambro's case would appear to indicate that, i n circumstances where T 
i s unaware of the improper motive, A does have a power to affect P with 
l i a b i l i t y - despite the f a c t that T was unaware of any written power 
of attorney. Ought Reckitt*s case to be regarded as an exception to 
the rule that inquiry into motive i s inadmissable? I f the general rule 
i s that inquiry into motive i s inadmissable, then Hambro's case 
exhibits a rule under which a f i c t i t i o u s " r e a l " authority i s created -
there i s no place here for a rule that l i a b i l i t y e x i s t s upon apparent 
authority based on o b j e c t i v i t y . Reckitt would be the exception which 
reveals the truth. 
P o w e l l ^ ^ has argued that the power i n Hambro's case flowed from 
(2) Reckitt v Barnett, Pembroke and S l a t e r , Ltd. Jy}2<£f A.C. 176. 
A strong case as there was no evidence of actual knowledge, on 
T's part, that A had an improper motive, he was fixed with con-
str u c t i v e notice. 
(3) P.44. 
(4) Powell, p.79. 
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actual authority "The underwriter did i n fa c t underwrite a policy i n 
the names of himself and h i s p r i n c i p a l s . He therefore acted within h i s 
express authority." This i t i s submitted, i s d i f f i c u l t to reconcile 
(5) 
with Reckitt's case. ' Moreover, i t i s submitted that i t was 
i m p l i c i t i n the written power of attorney that the agent, i n Hambro*s 
case, should only underwrite payments by corporations which he reason-
ably considered to be solvent. "Hence the agent was not authorized to 
do the very thing which he d i d . " ^ ^ 
I f we accept, as i s indeed generally accepted, that A acted quite 
outside h i s actual authority, then on the principle underlying the 
present inquiry, the authority, which bound P, must have been 
apparent authority. 
Support for the view that Hambro's case was indeed a case of 
(7) 
apparent authority i s to be found i n the writings of Montrose. I t 
flows from h i s general assertion that an appointment of A to a c e r t a i n 
position necessarily c a r r i e s with i t an incidental authority to d i s -
close the nature of the appointment. He contends that any other 
agreement must necessarily amount to an instruction not to disclose the 
agency. This being so, A's act amounts to a representation, on behalf 
of P, that he has authority to transact a certain c l a s s of business. 
Thus the very act of A amounts to a holding out by P giving A an 
apparent authority. He, therefore, regards Hambro's case as purely 
and simply an i l l u s t r a t i o n of apparent authority. 
S t o l j a r ^ ' deals with Hambro's case i n a rather pragmatic way 
(5) See footnote 2 ante. 
(6) Seavey, "Agency Powers", 1 Okla.L.R.3. 
(7) 50 L.Q.R. 229,230; 16 Can.B.R.757; 17 Can.B.R.693,7H. 
(8) S t o l j a r , p.100,101. 
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which l i m i t s considerably any princip l e to be drawn from the decision. 
He does, however, consider that i t displays the feature of apparent 
authority. Whilst accepting that A i n fact had no authority to do 
that which he did do, the question i s posed, "How could the t h i r d 
party ever know whether A was acting honestly?" Any scrutiny of the 
power of attorney would of course have yielded no hint of wrong doing; 
(9 
A would s t i l l appear to be acting within h i s authority. Mathew L.J. 
asked "could i t i n such a case be suggested that, a f t e r inspecting 
the documents, the p l a i n t i f f s would then be bound to inquire into the 
motives which actuated the agent i n acting upon them? How could such 
an inquiry, p r a c t i c a l l y be made?" Of course no inquiry could reason-
ably be expected to reveal the absence of authority. However, S t o l j a r 
recognises that no actual authority does e x i s t , but, creates a form 
of "constructive apparent authority" on the assumption that even i f a 
scrutiny of the power of attorney was undertaken i t would not reveal 
the absence of authority. Consequently i t i s considered j u s t that 
T's position ought not to be prejudiced by h i s f a i l u r e to inspect any 
written authority. However, S t o l j a r deals with the case alongside 
instances of agents exceeding borrowing powers^"^ and i s regarded 
merely as an i l l u s t r a t i o n of the pri n c i p l e , accepted i n those cases, 
that a d i s t i n c t i o n ought to be drawn between an agent's express power 
to borrow and the use he.makes of the power. He concludes that 
Hambro's case constitutes "an excellent i l l u s t r a t i o n of how the doc-
t r i n e of apparent authority works with regard to written documents." 
Two points may be made with respect to S t o l j a r ' s approach: 
(9) At p.26. 
(10) See Withington v Herring (1829) 5 Bing.442; Perry v Hall (1860) 
2 De G.P. and J . 38. 
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1. I f the case i s to be regarded as an i l l u s t r a t i o n of a narrow 
rule i n r e l a t i o n to written documents, then perhaps excessive 
concern i s unwarranted. However, S t o l j a r appears to be i n singu-
l a r i s o l a t i o n i n t h i s r e s t r i c t i v e interpretation. 
2. The whole tenor of the judgments i n Hambro's case i t s e l f , v/as to 
the effect that the case was not an instance of the usual con-
struction of apparent authority, which i s , of course, based upon 
objective findings which were absent i n the instant case. Indeed, 
Mathews L.J., as previously noted, based his judgment on the point 
that A had i n h i s possession the i n d i c i a of authority, so that i f 
A had requested inspection, "there would have been apparent 
authority. 1 1 
C o l l i n s M.R., as previously indicated, was at pains to discover 
what may be c a l l e d "constructive actual authority." 
Romer L. J . was content to find that T ought, i n j u s t i c e , to be 
i n the same position "as i f they had asked to see the written autho-
r i t y and i t had been produced to them." 
The court did, i n f a c t , expressly negative any holding out or 
appearance of authority created, by the p r i n c i p a l . However, i n c i t i n g 
the judgment of Andrews J . , i n Westfield Bank v Cornen, that "The 
apparent authority i s the r e a l authority", where motive i s inadmiss-
able, c l e a r l y the court "struggled to find apparent authority where 
• + A ,,(11) none exist e d . " s ' 
The question remains, as posed e a r l i e r i n r e l a t i o n to apparent 
authority, "apparent to whom?" "As i t was not apparent to either the 
agent or the t h i r d person, i t could only have been apparent to the 
(12) 
court as a matter of law." x ' 
(11) Seavey 1 Okla. L.R. 3,14. 
(12) Wright, 1 Unvy. of Toronto L.J. 17, 43. 
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More d i f f i c u l t cases f a l l i n g outside the t r a d i t i o n a l theory of 
apparent authority. 
I t would appear that what was apparent to'the court, as a matter 
of law, was that had T made a proper inquiry, then the situ a t i o n would 
have been such that A would have appeared to have authority, apparent 
authority. One might at t h i s juncture pose the question, what of the 
(13) 
Patagonian businessman? ' Had he made a l o c a l inquiry as to custom 
then the buyer would have been disclosed to have had apparent autho-
r i t y . Ought the Patagonian to be placed at a disadvantage, as com-
pared with h i s knowledgeable counterpart? Does the Hambro principle 
make for uncertainty, where certainty existed? The early American 
case of Thurber and Co. v A n d e r s o n ^ m e t t h i s problem, which now 
discloses i t s e l f , i n terms of the d i f f i c u l t y of reconciling a desired . 
r e s u l t with t r a d i t i o n a l theory. 
In t h i s case, a father appointed h i s son to be general manager 
of the father's grocery store. The son ordered goods (al e and cigars) 
from a s e l l e r who ca r r i e d on business i n another area. The goods were 
delivered but the father refused to pay for them, claiming that h i s 
son had no authority to make such a contract. The judgment makes i t 
c l e a r that the father had expressly instructed the son that he was not 
to make contracts i n respect of the cl a s s of goods i n question. There 
could be no question of actual authority. I t was held that the father, 
P, was l i a b l e on the contract created by the son, A. The son, as a 
general manager would, under normal circumstances, have had authority 
to purchase the goods i n question. Further, however, the business 
(13) See p.19. 
(14) (1878) 88 ILL.I67. The case was either unknown or ignored by 
Ewart and h i s contemporaries. 
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community w i t h i n which the son normally operated thought that the son 
had a greater authority than was actually intended by the father. The 
important point which the case makes was, that the father never held 
out his son as general manager to the s e l l e r , T, i n question. T, 
carrying on business i n another area, did not know of and, necessarily 
therefore, could not have r e l i e d upon, the son's expanded authority 
as general manager. 
A second American case serves to emphasise the d i f f i c u l t i e s 
encountered when attempts are made to explain cases wi t h i n the r i g i d 
confines of either actual or apparent authority. 
I n Kidd v Thomas A. Edison, I n c . ^ 1 ^ a general booking agent 
promised, on behalf of his company, that expenses incurred by an-
a r t i s t e during a tour, would be met by the company. The contract took 
the form commonly adopted by similar companies and was such as to f a l l 
w i t h i n the customary authority of booking agents. Unfortunately the 
agent i n question had only a l i m i t e d authority which did not extend 
to such an undertaking as was given. The question f o r decision was 
whether the expenses incurred were recoverable from P. The a r t i s t e 
i n question did not know what was i n f a c t customarily w i t h i n a book-
ing agent's authority. Nevertheless Judge Learned Hand held that P 
was bound by A's undertaking to T. This must constitute a departure 
from any theory of apparent authority. T could not have r e l i e d upon 
any holding out by P but could only have r e l i e d upon A's unauthorised 
(15) The Montrose approach, that A may hold himself out by v i r t u e of 
his authority to disclose his agency, would not appear to 
explain t h i s case, as T was unaware of A's capacity. 
(16) (1917) 239 Fed. 405 (S.D.N.Y.) 
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assurance that he had a u t h o r i t y . v ' 
Brocklesby v Temperance Permanent Building Society 
To return to authoritative but d i f f i c u l t English cases, I con-
sider two more instances i n which obligations were imposed upon P i n 
circumstances i n which explanation w i t h i n the t r a d i t i o n a l theories of 
actual or apparent i s d i f f i c u l t or impossible. 
( 
The facts of Brocklesby v Temperance Permanent Building Society v 
are somewhat complex but a f u l l r e i t e r a t i o n i s desirable. 
P had loaned money upon a mortgage of land, thereby obtaining 
possession of the t i t l e deeds to the land. P himself borrowed money 
from the X Bank and, as security, deposited the t i t l e deeds with the 
X Bank. Subsequently P wished to borrow a larger sum from the Y bank 
(17) Application of the Montrose approach to t h i s case would, again, 
f a i l to achieve any convincing argument as to the existence of 
apparent authority. Even i f one accepts that A was authorised 
to disclose his agency, a general agency, the customary incidents 
of that agency were unknown to T. 
Montrose does, however, take his thesis to extraordinary 
lengths. Taking i l l u s t r a t i o n (3) of the F i r s t American Restate-
ment, r e l a t i n g to disclosed agency, he asserts that i t displays, 
contrary to the commentary, an instance of apparent authority. 
" I l l u s t r a t i o n (3)s P employs A as the general manager of his 
foundry, i n s t r u c t i n g A to purchase his alloys only from a certain 
f i r m . A. f i n d i n g the alloys to be unsatisfactory, and without 
consultation with P, purchases alloys from another f i r m , T, 
w r i t i n g to T upon personal stationery, and signing the l e t t e r 
only 'A, agent of P.1 P i s bound upon t h i s transaction." 
Montrose contends that although T i s unaware that A i s 
general manager "A's signature means that he i s P's agent f o r 
the purchase of alloys, and i s equivalent to such a statement 
made to T, by P. The mere fa c t of an agent negotiating with a 
t h i r d person amounts to a representation by him, equivalent to 
one by the p r i n c i p a l , that he has authority to transact that 
class of business." I submit that whatever the basis of P's l i a -
b i l i t y , i f i t does exi s t , i n t h i s i l l u s t r a t i o n , i t c e r t a i n l y can-
not be apparent authority as generally understood. A has not 
disclosed his capacity as general manager and his disclosure of 
agency, as a special agency, i s incomplete and unauthorised i n 
the absence of f u l l disclosure. The words "A agent of P" are 
descriptive only. Indeed, Montrose himself, 50 L.Q.R.224,230, 
indicated "Hambro v Burnand cannot be applied where i t i s sought 
to r e l y on a representation by an agent that he has authority to 
do a p a r t i c u l a r act when he has no actual authority to do i t . " 
(18) JlBB^J A.C. 173. 
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on the same security. I t was, of course, necessary tha t , i n order to 
repossess the t i t l e deeds, pledged with the X Bank, he should f i r s t 
pay o f f the f i r s t loan. For t h i s purpose he gave A, his son, a 
wr i t t e n authority addressed to the X Bank to hand over the t i t l e deeds 
to the son on payment to i t of the loan and i n t e r e s t . He also gave 
the son a second authority, addressed to the X Bank, s t a t i n g that 
the Y Bank had agreed to make a larger loan and noting the amount of 
i t . A used only the f i r s t general authority to obtain possession of 
the deeds from the X Bank and then pledged them with the Z Bank (not 
as required, the Y Bank) to secure a loan i n excess of the authorised 
sum, keeping the excess sum f o r himself. Later the Z Bank required 
repayment of the loan and A forged a transfer of the mortgage to 
himself. He also obtained a transfer of the equity of redemption, 
a l l of which gave him the appearance of being owner of the land. A 
then mortgaged the land to bui l d i n g societies which repaid the loan 
from the Z Bank. P then sought to redeem the mortgages by o f f e r i n g 
to pay o f f the amount which he had actually instructed A to borrow on 
his behalf. The point at issue was whether P was bound by A's deal-
ings with the Z Bank. I f so, he would have to repay the f u l l amount 
which A had borrowed and the building societies repaid. I f he was 
not bound then his only obligation would indeed be to repay the 
amount of the loan actually authorised. I t was held i n every court 
that P was l i a b l e to repay the f u l l amount borrowed. 
Before considering the basis upon which l i a b i l i t y was imposed, 
i t i s necessary to note the p a r t i c u l a r nature of t i t l e deeds to land. 
Unlike negotiable instruments (which by t h e i r very nature constitute 
impersonal r i g h t s unattached to an exclusive owner) they c l e a r l y i n d i -
cate a p a r t i c u l a r owner and specify that P, not A, i s that owner. I n 
the event of A attempting to dispose of the deeds, T w i l l be put on 
inquiry as to the true owner. A, i t would appear, cannot transfer 
54. 
t i t l e deeds i n the absence of a wr i t t e n authority from P. 
In the instant case A did have a w r i t t e n authority to obtain 
possession of the deeds; he did have authority to borrow, but t h i s 
authority was l i m i t e d i n amount. 
Lord MacNaghton based P's l i a b i l i t y upon the fa c t that, as he 
saw i t , the Z Bank had, upon P's i n v i t a t i o n , dealt i n good f a i t h with 
A, without notice of the l i m i t a t i o n as to amount placed upon A*s 
(19) 
authority. ' This does, of course, ignore the fa c t that (a) P made 
no direct representation of any borrowing power vested i n A and (b) 
any representation by A to the Z Bank must have been outside his 
authority, as the second w r i t t e n authority addressed to the X Bank 
indicated that the loan was to be obtained v i a the Y Bank. 
Lord Herschell based P's l i a b i l i t y upon the authorised delivery 
(21 
of the deeds to A, coupled with an authority to raise money on them.v 
He f e l t that loss should not f a l l "upon those who, f i n d i n g him £&-J 
i n possession of the deeds with authority i n f a c t to borrow, had no 
knowledge of the l i m i t a t i o n of the amount which he was authorised to 
raise upon the security of the deeds." Again, l i a b i l i t y i s imposed i n 
respect of only one authorised act, the obtaining of possession, and 
an unauthorised act of borrowing. 
Powell considered that the indication i s that t h i s was a case of 
"apparent authority i n which P delivered to A the means of getting the 
deeds, but did so by means of a document, i . e . the f i r s t w r i t ten 
authority, which contained, i n ef f e c t , a representation that A had 
(21) 
unlimited authority to borrow on the security of the deeds."x 
(19) At p.184. 
(20) At p.180. 
(21) Powell, p.84. 
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Fridman, consistently with his r i g i d c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of authority, 
considers the case to he decided on authority by estoppel. He i n t e r -
prets the case as authority f o r the proposition that "the delivery of 
t i t l e deeds to an agent either d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y , i n circum-
stances i n which the agent i s made to appear, or would normally 
appear, to the outside world as the owner of such deeds, or e n t i t l e d 
to deal with them, w i l l give r i s e to an estoppel, despite whatever 
(22) 
l i m i t a t i o n s exist i n the agent's a u t h o r i t y . " v ' 
I submit that the Brocklesby case does not, on any objective 
t e s t , support either Powell's or Fridman's r u l e . How can i t be said 
that an authority to give up possession of deeds contains " i n e f f e c t " 
an authority, unlimited i n extent, to pledge? How can the mere 
delivery of deeds int o the possession of A constitute circumstances 
i n which A i s made to appear as owner of the deeds, or e n t i t l e d to 
deal with them, when the deeds on t h e i r face n o t i f y that the owner i s 
P? 
Fry v Smellie 
Fridman himself goes on to cl a s s i f y the second English case, 
which necessarily must be discussed i n t h i s context, as an i l l u s t r a -
t i o n of the "Brocklesby r u l e " . 
(23) 
I n Fry and Mason v Smellie and Taylor, P owned shares i n a 
l i m i t e d company and wished to obtain a loan of not less than £250, 
using the shares as security. P gave A the documents of t i t l e to the 
shares (the share c e r t i f i c a t e and a signed transfer form with the 
name of the transferee l e f t blank) and instructed him to borrow not 
less than £250 on the security. A borrowed £100 from T, depositing 
the documents with T. When A f a i l e d to repay the loan, T completed 
(22) Fridman, p.112. 
(23) ZL9127 3 K.B.282. 
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the blank transfer and obtained the shares. The Court of Appeal held 
that T was e n t i t l e d to the shares as against P. As noted e a r l i e r , 
Fridman, as an adherent of the p r i n c i p l e of authority by estoppel as 
an explanation of the Brocklesby case and, of Pry's case as an i l l u s -
t r a t i o n of the Brocklesby p r i n c i p l e , consistently treats Pry's case as 
based upon a representation of authority, c o n s t i t u t i n g apparent 
authority. Powell, however, refused, f o r powerful reasons to be d i s -
cussed l a t e r , to regard the case as based upon apparent authority. 
An examination of the judgments i n Pry's case i t s e l f , reveals an 
il l u m i n a t i n g passage i n which the conceptual basis of P's l i a b i l i t y 
i s discussed. Vaughan Williams, L . J . ^ ^ considered the l i a b i l i t y i n 
terms of estoppel which c l e a r l y indicated that the term was used i n a 
general sense, meaning simply that P would be unable to as'sert his 
t i t l e , f o r reasons unconnected with the doctrine of estoppel by rep-
resentation. "What r e a l l y creates the estoppel, as i t i s called, i s 
the r e l a t i o n of the transferor to the transferee - the r e l a t i o n of 
pr i n c i p a l and agent ... I t i s r e a l l y an instance of the application of 
the rule that when one of two innocent persons must suffer, the person 
who rendered i t possible f o r the wrongdoer to do the wrong by reason 
of the t r u s t he reposed i n the wrongdoer should suffer rather than 
the person who suffers from the agent's having that opportunity ... 
I t occurs to my mind that i t i s not s t r i c t l y speaking estoppel by 
representation." The essential point to be extracted from t h i s pas-
sage and which requires emphasis, i s that i t i s accepted that i n a 
case where there i s no actual authority vested i n an agent, where the 
(24) At p.292. 
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essentials of apparent authority or authority created by way of estop-
pel by representation are absent, there i s nevertheless recognised 
l i a b i l i t y imposed upon P simply because of the relationship of p r i n c i -
pal and agent. 
Powell argued that Fry's case could not be based upon apparent 
authority and he based his argument upon principles fundamental to 
our law, not simply upon the t e c h n i c a l i t i e s of "holding out". I t i s 
a well established pr i n c i p l e that the mere delivery of property i n t o 
the hands of another, i s not s u f f i c i e n t to give r i s e to an estoppel 
(26) 
should that other attempt, unlawfully, to dispose of the property. 
I f , therefore, Fry's case i s to be regarded as a case of authority 
created by representation, giving r i s e to estoppel or apparent 
authority, then he argued, i t s effect i s that wherever P, an owner, 
gives his agent, A, a blank transfer of shares, or similar document, 
by an unauthorised act A may divest P of his t i t l e , without the 
necessity of any further representation on the part of P. This con-
sequence c e r t a i n l y does not follow when a motor vehicle, even accom-
panied by the "best evidence of t i t l e " , the r e g i s t r a t i o n book, i s 
(27) 
given i n t o the possession of an agent. 
(28) 
Fridman^ ' has necessarily attempted to counter Powell's 
approach by asserting that i t ignores the effect of placing a document 
"of t h i s kind" in t o the hands of an agent, i n circumstances i n which 
(25) Powell, p.82, 83. 
(26) See Biggs v Evans /l89^/ 1 Q.B.88; Central Newbury Car Auctions, 
Ltd. v Unity Finance Ltd., Mercury Motors (Third Parties), /l95]J 
1 Q.B.371; Mercantile Credit Co. Ltd. v Hamblin j\9^ 2 Q.B.242. 
(27) See cases cite d i n footnote 26 ante. There i s of course an 
exception to the rule i n the case of a negotiable instrument 
which by i t s very nature imposes a duty of care upon P. See 
section 20 of the B i l l s of Exchange Act, 1882. 
(28) Fridman, p.113. 
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the agent can reasonably be taken to have complete authority to behave 
i n the way he has done. He asks two r h e t o r i c a l questions: (a) I s 
there not a representation contained i n the document? (b) Is t h i s 
not l i k e the case where,an owner has entrusted goods to another i n 
circumstances i n which t h i r d parties can reasonably i n f e r that the 
possessor of the goods i s e n t i t l e d to deal with them? To each 
question I submit the answer ought to be noI 
In support of his contention that the document contains a rep-
resentation i n i t s e l f he cites the view of Pickford J., i n Puller v 
(29) 
Glyn, M i l l s , Currie and Co., ' (a case i n which P did not actually 
sign a transfer himself because he was merely the purchaser of the 
shares. The transfer had, however, been signed by the owner, and P 
l e f t the share c e r t i f i c a t e , together with the signed transfer i n the 
hands of A, who unlawfully pledged the shares). 
" I must therefore consider the pr i n c i p l e on which t h i s estoppel 
rests. I n my view i t does not rest on the mere manual act of s i g -
nature. That act i s not an essential element i n the estoppel. I t s 
importance, where i t exists, i s as one step towards placing i n the 
power and disposition of another an instrument which carries with i t , 
and which when produced to a t h i r d person w i l l convey to that t h i r d 
person that such an authority exists ... I n my view the p l a i n t i f f , 
though he did not actually sign the transfer himself, gave r i s e to 
j u s t the same mischief as i f he had a f f i x e d his signature himself." 
However, i s there, objectively, anything i n a blank share trans-
f e r which i n i t s e l f s i g n i f i e s that A has an authority to deal with 
the shares himself? In f a c t , the document clear l y indicates that P 
owns the shares and cannot by any f i c t i o n be said to s i g n i f y anything 
(29) ^91^7 2 K.B.168. 
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as to A*s authority. Support f o r t h i s l a t t e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which, I 
believe conclusively, disposes of the approach indicated by Pickford J. 
and adopted by Pridman, i s to be found i n the broad statement of p r i n -
c i p l e per Lord Greene M.R. i n Wilson and Meeson v Pickering. "The 
application of the p r i n c i p l e of estoppel to instruments handed to an 
agent i n blank, i n order that they may be f i l l e d i n by him, has been 
much debated i n the past. The view, which so f a r as my researches go, 
appears to me to have the weight of j u d i c i a l opinion behind i t i s 
that, apart of course from some specific representation of authority 
or some holding out or some special character of the agent from which 
his authority would natura l l y be inferred, the rul e that a person who 
signs an instrument i n blank cannot be heard as against a person who 
has changed his position on the f a i t h of i t , to assert that the i n s t r u -
ment as f i l l e d i n i s a forgery or that i t was f i l l e d i n i n excess of 
the agent's authority, i s confined to the case of negotiable i n s t r u -
ments." 
Now, whilst there i s no doubt that one cannot say that estoppel 
(31) 
i s any longer r e s t r i c t e d to negotiable instruments, w ' nevertheless, 
i t appears that something beyond mere signing of a document i s 
normally required to raise the estoppel. In Mercantile Credit Co. 
Ltd. v Hamblin v ' i t was held that a further requirement, proof of 
negligence i n the t r a d i t i o n a l formulation of duty, breach and damage, 
(30) /19467 K.B.422, 427. 
(31) See Branwhite v Worcester Works Finance Ltd. JlSS^J 1 A.C.522 
commenting adversely on Campbell Discount Co. Ltd. v Gall JJ-S&lJ 
1 Q.B.431 i n which the p r i n c i p l e was r e s t r i c t e d to negotiable 
instruments. Also United Dominions Trust Ltd. v Western JjS)*]^] 
2 W.L.R.64. 
(32) jV)^ 2 Q.B.242. 
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was e s s e n t i a l to r a i s e the estoppel. (33) Why then, i f Fry's case i s 
34 c o r r e c t l y decided, was the signing of the instrument s u f f i c i e n t ? ^ ' 
As to Fridman's drawing a p a r a l l e l between the mere signing of an 
instrument and the entrusting of goods i n the possession of an agent 
i n circumstances which lead a th i r d party reasonably to i n f e r an 
authority to deal with them has been vested i n the agent, t h i s does, 
perhaps, merely serve to emphasise the weakness i n h i s argument, for, 
there appears to be a clear d i s t i n c t i o n between the two situations. 
In the case of goods, there are additional circumstances giving an 
appearance of authority. In the case of the instrument, the addi-
(35) 
tional circumstances are absent, ' 
Perhaps there has been a s u f f i c i e n t demonstration to warrant the 
claim that i n many cases the courts and academics have struggled to 
find apparent authority and, although they have succeeded i n convin-
cing themselves that they have found i t , a f e e l i n g of uneasiness must 
(33) The document signed being a hire purchase proposal form. 
(34) I t could hardly be said to be an unambiguous statement of A's 
authority - see Colonial Bank v Cady (1890) 15 App. Cas. 267. 
(35) Hence the emphasis upon the special character of the factor under 
1 K.B.275; Cole v North Western Bank (1875) L.R.10C.P.354-
Perhaps Fridman's argument may be considered to be based upon a 
misconception i n that he equates the handing over of a blank 
transfer with the position, at common law, of P handing goods into 
the possession of a factor. As has been recognised i n section 1 
of the Factors act 1889, a factor i s a general agent customarily 
empowered with authority to s e l l . Fry's case did not consider 
the question of a c l a s s of general agent. Further, under the 
Factors Act, which b a s i c a l l y simply codified the common law, 
the factor must take possession of the goods for some purpose 
connected with h i s business as a factor. Emphasis on the mere 
handing over of a signed transfer obscures what must, properly, 
be taken into consideration - other surrounding circumstances 
and policy considerations - i n an effort to draw Fry's case 
within a too r e s t r i c t i v e theory. 
the Factors Acts. See Pearson v Rose and Young, Ltd. / l 9 5 l 7 
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remain. I consider i t to be s u f f i c i e n t l y well established by the 
English cases, considered above, that development of a satisfactory 
theory to cover the d i f f i c u l t cases has been s t i f l e d , rendering pre-
d i c t i o n d i f f i c u l t , i f not impossible. 
Uncertainty i n current theory 
Perhaps two simple references w i l l serve to demonstrate the 
present uncertainty. 
A t i y a h ^ ^ boldly states that " I t seems ... that i n addition to 
cases i n which the agent acts w i t h i n his 'usual' or 'ostensible' 
authority, there i s an independent p r i n c i p l e which, at least i n some 
circumstances, enables an agent to pass a t i t l e beyond his actual 
(37) 
a u t h o r i t y . " v ' However, he goes on to note that there i s another 
view, that the authorities supporting t h i s "independent p r i n c i p l e " 
are anomalous and should not be extended. "On t h i s view the t h i r d 
party w i l l only be protected i f the agent had apparent authority or 
usual authority beyond his actual authority." 
(38) 
This view i s i n f a c t voiced i n Chitty^ , "There i s a l i n e of 
(36) The Sale of Goods, 4th ed. p.187, 188. 
(37) See ^ 196^7 J.B.L. 130, 136, where Atiyah, without c i t i n g d i r e c t 
authority claims, " I f a person takes his car to a dealer and 
instructs him to s e l l i t f o r £500 and the dealer s e l l s i t f o r 
£400 i t would seem elementary that the t h i r d party gets a good 
t i t l e ... This i s because the dealer i s merely exceeding his 
authority and not doing an act which i s r i g h t outside i t . " 
This formulation would appear to render negatory the statutory 
provision i n section 2 ( l ) of the Factors Act 1889. c.f. Chitty 
on Contracts, 23rd ed. Vol.11, para.65 where i t i s stated that 
" I n so f a r as /the r u l e / i s good law, JJxJ should probably be 
confined to situations where an agent i s entrusted with t i t l e 
deeds to property with authority to borrow on the security of 
such property, and borrows i n excess of the sum authorised." 
(38) Chitty on Contracts, 23rd ed. V o l . I I , para.65. 
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cases i n d i c a t i n g that where an agent has some authority and exceeds i t , 
the p r i n c i p a l may be bound by the acts of such agent, though there i s 
neither actual nor apparent authority. Such cases are hard to recon-
c i l e with the normal principles of authority, f o r such a rule would be 
d i f f i c u l t to l i m i t . 1 ^ 5 9 ^ 
I n view of the manifest d i f f i c u l t y i n reconciling t r a d i t i o n a l 
doctrine with the approaches adopted, although not avowedly, i n the 
series of cases investigated i n the foregoing pages, I consider i t 
essential to delve more deeply f o r an approach which w i l l more 
genuinely meet the needs of the diverse situations. 
Agency Power 
The search f o r a more satisfactory theory leads to a consideration 
of a more adventurous approach to the concepts underlying the " d i f f i -
c u l t " cases. The development of the approach i n question has been 
p r i n c i p a l l y undertaken by Seavey. As Reporter on Agency i n the 
American Restatement, he was able to give comprehensive expression to 
his theory of the "Inherent Agency Power". 
(39) See also Fridman, p.97i where he asserts that a usual authority, 
being implied as part of actual authority, where i t i s r e s t r i c t e d 
but notice i s not given to t h i r d parties, may be r e l i e d upon by 
such t h i r d parties, as being an authority objectively ascertained 
- there i s no need to r e l y upon apparent authority or ostensible 
authority which only results from conduct on the part of the 
pri n c i p a l which gives r i s e to an estoppel i . e . involving a sub-
j e c t i v e test of knowledge. This appears to be based upon 
Edmunds v Bushell and Jones (I865) L.R. I.Q.B.97, 99 per 
Cockburn C.J. "... f o r i t i s a well established p r i n c i p l e that 
i f a person employs another as an agent i n a character which 
involves a p a r t i c u l a r authority he cannot by secret reservation 
deprive him of that authority." See consideration of the case 
Chapter I I I i n r e l a t i o n to the problem of Watteau v Fenwick 
(1893) 1 Q.B.348, p.131 c.f. the position of a wife forbidden 
to pledge her husband's c r e d i t , the husband w i l l not be l i a b l e , 
unless there i s conduct giving r i s e to estoppel, Debenham v 
Mellon (1880) 6 App.Cas.24. 
1 
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Terminology again 
The American Restatement attempts to introduce some precision 
into the terminology surrounding agency, by the use of the terms 
"power" and "authority". However, the attempt has not been wholly 
successful and before a consideration of the A r t i c l e s covering 
"Inherent Agency Power", i t i s worthwhile noting the apparent defects 
i n the terminology adopted. 
A u t h o r i t y ^ i s defined i n t h i s way: "Authority i s the Power 
of the agent to affect the legal relations of the p r i n c i p a l by acts 
done i n accordance with the principal's manifestations of consent to 
him."(4l) 
Although authority may properly be said to create power i t would 
seem to be inaccurate to describe "authority" as "the power". 
However, quite c l e a r l y Seavey was aware of the dangers of the misuse 
of terminology and himself defined "power" as an a b i l i t y , given by a 
legal r u l e , to create, change, or extinguish legal relations by doing 
an a c t . ^ ^ 
(40) Para.7 American Restatement (unchanged i n Second Restatement). 
(41) C r i t i c i s e d i n 16 Can.B.R.757 and also i n 17 Can.B.R.248, "The 
Law of Agency", Falconbridge. 
(42) Seavey, 29 Yale L.J. 859f 861. See also "The authority of an 
agent - d e f i n i t i o n " , Corbin 34 Yale L.J.788, 794. "Authority 
d i f f e r s from power : Authority i s a f a c t ; power i s a legal 
r e l a t i o n . Authority i s conduct of the p r i n c i p a l , including 
either oral or w r i t t e n communication to the agent; power i s 
neither conduct nor a document. Authority may create power, 
but not aiv/ays /e.g. where P himself has no power to empower 
A, he may authorise i n e f f e c t i v e l y ; power may be created by 
authority, but may also be created by other operative facts. 
Authority denotes merely the factual relationship between 
pri n c i p a l and agent, power expresses the concept of possible 
future changes i n the legal relations of the p r i n c i p a l and 
t h i r d persons. Authority merely describes an h i s t o r i c a l event; 
power predicts possible events i n the future." 
64. 
Paragraph 140 of the Restatement outlines the general rules as 
to the l i a b i l i t y of a pr i n c i p a l to a t h i r d person. 
"The l i a b i l i t y of the pr i n c i p a l to a t h i r d person upon a trans-
action conducted by an agent, or the transfer of his interests by an 
agent, may be based upon the fa c t that -
(a) the agent was authorised; 
(b) the agent was apparently authorised; or 
(c) the agent had a power a r i s i n g from the agency r e l a t i o n and not 
dependent upon authority or apparent authority." 
Quite c l e a r l y i t i s incorrect, i n view of the d i s t i n c t i o n drawn 
between power and authority,(43) s a y an agent's power can 
arise from the fa c t of the agent's "power a r i s i n g from the agency 
r e l a t i o n . " The relationship between P and A i s a f a c t . That a power 
arises from t h i s relationship i s a re s u l t which i s achieved by the 
application of a legal rule to a factual s i t u a t i o n . Thus the 
Restatement groups together various factual situations i n which an 
agent has, by lav/, a power to bind P to T by what i s described as the 
"inherent agency power." 
The power i s defined i n t h i s way:^44) "inherent agency power i s 
a term used i n the restatement of t h i s subject to indicate the power 
of an agent which i s derived not from authority, apparent authority 
or estoppel, but solely from the agency r e l a t i o n and exists f o r the 
protection of persons harmed by or dealing with a servant or other 
agent." The comment to paragraph 140 gives evidence of the under-
l y i n g reasons f o r the "inherent agency power." "... i n transactions 
i n which t h e i r i s neither authority nor apparent authority, the 
(43) See previous footnote, 42. 
(44) Second Restatement, para. 8A. 
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p r i n c i p a l may be subjected to l i a b i l i t y because, i n view of the 
relations of the parties or the subject matter involved, policy 
requires that the agent should have power to bind the p r i n c i p a l . " 
I t i s now clear that policy and not concepts creates rules i n 
t h i s area. (45) rpQ - t ^ g jfce specific instances from paragraphs 140 
and 8A, i t may be said that l i a b i l i t y may be imposed upon P under 
inherent agency power because: 
Policy requires that, 
(1) A's acts should r e s u l t i n P's l i a b i l i t y , or, more narrowly, 
(2) To effect the protection of persons harmed by A. 
The need f o r expression of policy 
I t i s , furthermore, clear that there i s a real need f o r a 
cohesive statement of policy or perhaps a disclosure of underlying 
concept or concepts i n t h i s uncharted area. 
The American experience has given r i s e to greater expression than 
has hi t h e r t o been the case i n English lav/. Indeed, perhaps the most 
frank expression of recognition of the problem and indication as to 
i t s solution was made so long ago as 1917 *>v Judge Learned Hand i n 
Kidd v Thomas A. Edison, Inc. He recognised the d i f f i c u l t y i n 
explaining many of the cases decided upon apparent authority i n terms 
of consent or manifested consent, consonant with the p r i n c i p l e of 
o b j e c t i v i t y underlying the concept. He said: "The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of 
a master f o r his servant's act i s not at bottom a matter of consent 
(45) Concepts no doubt arise from policy but an established concept 
becomes policy i n i t s e l f . I n t h i s s i t u a t i o n i t becomes d i f f i -
c u l t to distinguish policy and concept. Inherent agency power 
appears to be an area i n which the policy element of e x i s t i n g 
concept i s absent. 
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to the express act or of an estoppel to deny that consent, but i t i s 
a survival from the ideas of status ... While we have substituted f o r 
archaic status a test based upon consent, i . e . the general scope of 
business, withi n that sphere the master i s held by principles quite 
independent of his actual consent and indeed i n the face of his own 
instructions." He also, i n explaining the cases ostensibly decided 
upon apparent authority, went on to meet the r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n based on 
apparent authority, l a t e r to be submitted by Montrose,(^O 0f those 
cases i n which T r e l i e d solely upon information communicated by A. 
"Certainly i t begs the question to assume that the p r i n c i p a l has 
authorized the agent to communicate a part of his authority and not 
to disclose the r e s t . . . The considerations which have made the rule 
survive are apparent. I f a man select another to act f o r him with 
some discretion, he has by that f a c t vouched to some extent f o r his 
r e l i a b i l i t y . While i t may not be f a i r to impose upon him the results 
of a t o t a l departure from the general subject of his confidence, the 
detailed execution of his mandate stands on a d i f f e r e n t footing." 
The Restatement, under the influence of Seavey, although i t 
gives recognition, under i t s head of inherent agency power, to t h i s 
basis of l i a b i l i t y quite apart from any theory based upon consent, 
does not attempt any f i r m guidelines as to i t s application. Seavey 
appeared almost to despair of achieving any such breakthrough. He 
s a i d , » m m m the d i f f i c u l t y i s i n drawing a l i n e ... the persons 
included w i t h i n the generic term 'agent' operate under widely d i f f e r -
ing circumstances and the closeness of t h e i r r e l a t i o n to the pr i n c i p a l 
varies from those authorized merely to conduct one transaction to 
those who are i n complete control of a business. Ho blanket rule w i l l 
(46) See footnote 15f p.51 
(47) "Agency Powers" 1 Okla. L.R.3,19. 
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or should cover a l l situations. The l i n e of l i a b i l i t y must be pricked 
out as cases arise. 
Wright, who approved of the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of "inherent agency 
powers" as an i n t e g r a l part of the Restatement, was also pessimistic 
of achieving c e r t a i n t y . » t m t i t i s doubtful whether any group of 
rules can accurately prophesy exactly when the courts w i l l s h i f t the 
r i s k of loss from the t h i r d person to the p r i n c i p a l . The value of 
the Restatement l i e s i n showing us that we are deluding ourselves 
by an attempt to t a l k of 'authority' and 'estoppel'." 
The measure of agreement 
There appears to be general agreement, amongst those recognising 
the concept of inherent agency power, only upon the existence of two 
situations i n which, i n cases of disclosed agency, P w i l l be held 
l i a b l e i n the absence of an "authority" f a l l i n g w i t h i n the t r a d i t i o n a l 
English c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . The agreed situations may be outlined as: 
(1) Where the agent acts e n t i r e l y f o r his own benefit.(^®) 
(2) Where A i s entrusted by P with possession of documents of t i t l e , 
signed blank transfers of shares, perhaps certain chattels with 
some authority to d e a l . ^ ^ Here i t may be said that P has 
(48) Surely a curious admission of f a i l u r e i n an area i n which 
certainty has always been recognised as being of the utmost 
importance. See the recent judgment of Sachs L.J., i n 
Eaglehill Ltd. v Needham Builders Ltd. Jv)12j 2 Q.B.8, i n 
which he approved of the stress which has been l a i d upon 
certainty i n the law merchant ever since the time of 
Lord Mansfield. 
(49) 1 Unvy. of Toronto L.J. 17, 44. 
(50) E.g. Hambro v Burnand. 
( l ) E.g. Brocklesby v Temperance Building Society; Pry v Smellie. 
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(2) 
enabled A to create a false appearance of authority (or ownership v ') 
when A acts i n an unauthorised manner. 
More uncertainty exists i n r e l a t i o n to other c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s 
variously submitted: P may be l i a b l e f o r a l l acts usually incidental 
to transactions which a general agent i s authorised to conduct even 
though forbidden by P. ' 
A second p o s s i b i l i t y i s that P may be held l i a b l e where A acts 
outside his apparent authority but f o r the benefit of a disclosed 
p r i n c i p a l , representing that he has authority. 
(5) 
I make no attempt to produce an exhaustive l i s t of situations. ' 
However, from i t s very nature, a l i s t of instances reveals a funda-
mental defect i n a mere c l a s s i f i c a t i o n under the head of "inherent 
agency power". Although "inherent agency power" may be an accurate 
description of the source of l i a b i l i t y i n P, i t i s , nevertheless, 
(2) See Ewart 18 L.Q.H. 159, 163. "The difference between giving to 
another an appearance of ownership or authority, and enabling that 
other to assume such appearance, i s i n the law of estoppel quite 
immaterial. The question must be looked at from the purchaser's 
side: Here i s a man who appears to own these goods; the true 
owner did that which enabled the man to present such an appear-
ance; therefore the true owner should lose." 
(3) See footnote 39, ante, p.62 ; See also Whitehead v Tuckett (1812), 
15 East 400; Smith v M'Guire (I858). 3 H. and N. 554» instances i n 
which a disclosed p r i n c i p a l was held l i a b l e even though there i s no 
ind i c a t i o n i n the reports that T r e l i e d upon any apparent authority 
objectively assessed, indeed, i n the l a t t e r case i t appears P's 
l i a b i l i t y turned not upon what T could have discovered on inquiry 
of P, but rather upon what he could have discovered i f he had 
inquired of others with whom A*s reputation was established. A. 
case which would, no doubt, bring great joy to the Patagonian 
merchant, p.19 . 
(4) See Butler v Maples (1870) 9 Wall 766; Thurber v Anderson (I878) 
88 ILL.167. 
(5) Perhaps the Second American Restatement provides the most compre-
hensive l i s t of p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r English law. 
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merely descriptive and goes no fur t h e r . I t i s a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
ex post facto, to cover an apparently amorphous group of decisions i n 
which l i a b i l i t y has been imposed upon P "simply because of the 
relationship of p r i n c i p a l and agent. 
I f we accept that recognition of the head of "inherent agency 
(7) 
power" i s a step forward i n legal knowledge, ' we must also acknow-
ledge i t s dangers. 
Powell commented that there was no objection to speaking i n 
(8) 
terms of an all-embracing p r i n c i p l e ^ ' to explain the l i a b i l i t y of a 
pr i n c i p a l upon his. agent's unauthorised acts beyond the usual c l a s s i -
f i c a t i o n s provided: 
"1. the universal pr i n c i p l e does not obscure such essential d i s t i n c -
tions as are necessary i f the parties are to be treated equitably 
i n a l l cases; 
2. both lawyers and those engaged i n commerce have a reasonably clear 
perception of the rules by which they are to be guided i n practice; 
5. the p r i n c i p l e , i f i t i s a legal p r i n c i p l e , w i l l r e a l l y f i t every 
case." 
A conceptual basis f o r the class f a l l i n g w i t h i n descriptive term 
"inherent agency power" 
In order to meet the above reservations i t i s c l e a r l y essential 
(6) See judgment of Vaughan Williams L.J. i n Pry v Smellie c i t e d p.56. 
(7) For as Wright commented "So long as we continue to speak of 
l i a b i l i t y of a p r i n c i p a l as dependent on 'authority' or 'estoppel' 
the law w i l l c e r t a i n l y furnish no guide to 'law i n a c t i o n 1 . " 
1 Toronto L.J. 17, 47. 
(8) I t i s doubtful whether "inherent agency power" i s intended to be 
elevated in t o an a l l embracing p r i n c i p l e , as noted above, i t may 
more properly be considered as a purely descriptive term. 
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to attempt to seek out a basic p r i n c i p l e or conceptual basis f o r 
l i a b i l i t y f a l l i n g w i t h i n the descriptive c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of "inherent 
agency power". Two questions are posed: 
(1) Why should P be liable? 
(2) How should the desired r e s u l t be achieved? 
(9) 
Seavey^ ' commenced his search f o r what was, i n e f f e c t , an 
answer to the f i r s t question with the assertion that, assuming P to 
be l i a b l e on grounds other than those t r a d i t i o n a l l y accepted, "there 
must be some reasons of public policy which require 2 ^ i a b i l i t v 7 ... 
I t must be i n the protection of some conceived interest of business 
that, except i n the case of a special a g e n t , o n e i s prevented from 
creating powers l i m i t e d to the express authority given." He notes 
that the notion that interests may only be protected i n certain ways 
defined by law i s by no means l i m i t e d to the law of agency or powers.^^ 
(9) "The Rationale of Agency", 29 Yale L.J. 859, 883. 
(10) I t ought to be noted that Seavey was a proponent of the c l a s s i f i -
cation of agents in t o "general" and "special" agents. This 
approach i s followed i n the Restatement, where special rules are 
outlined as applicable to one class or the other, see paras. 127» 
128, 132, 161, 161A, 194. However, there i s no agreement to be 
found amongst academic writers as to a d e f i n i t i o n or indeed as to 
the existence of the d i s t i n c t i o n . See Powell, p.30; Bowstead on 
Agency 13th ed. p.89; Halsbury, Laws of England 4th ed. para.711; 
S t o l j a r , p.43. Powell emphatically denied i t s existence, p.31» 
ind i c a t i n g that para.3» comment ( a ) , of the Restatement to the 
effect that "the d i s t i n c t i o n between a general agent and a special 
agent i s one of degree", could be regarded as n u l l i f y i n g any 
purported d i s t i n c t i o n . 
(11) See the r e s t r i c t i o n imposed upon the creation of casements over 
land "... but i t must not therefore be supposed that incidents of 
a novel kind can be demised and attached to property, at the 
fancy or caprice of any owner. I t i s cl e a r l y inconvenient both 
to the science of the law and to the public weal that such l a t i -
tude be given; ..." per Lord Brougham, Keppell v Bailey (1834) 2 
My. and K. 517»535* Similarly those instruments, recognised as 
negotiable, cannot be enlarged to include others, not so recog-
nised, merely upon an expression of inten t i o n to create a 
negotiable instrument. 
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The' courts have consistently sought to disallow extraordinary modes of 
dealing, they being considered injurious to an individual or perhaps a 
class of society. Whenever an agent exceeds his authority i t i s 
l i k e l y that either P or T w i l l suffer i n consequence. Seavey suggested 
that the reasons actuating the placing of t h i s burden upon P could be 
grouped under three heads. The f i r s t two heads, i t would appear, are 
merely more pa r t i c u l a r aspects of the t h i r d . 
The f i r s t reason, i s because t r u s t was reposed, i n A, by P. In 
answer to the possible objection that T also has reposed t r u s t i n A, 
i t i s suggested that a d i s t i n c t i o n i s to be drawn between the adver-
s o r i a l relationship between A and T and the f i d u c i a r y relationship 
between P and A. An analogy i s drawn between the t r u s t i n g with a 
power i n the case of agency and the t r u s t i n g with t i t l e i n the case 
(12) 
of a t r u s t , properly so called. ' 
The second, rather ten t a t i v e , reason i s "control". The sub-
mission being that " l i a b i l i t y follows control and the p r i n c i p a l has 
a power of control at a l l times". This assertion of a form of " s t r i c t " 
l i a b i l i t y i n respect of a "dangerous and novel" or " u l t r a hazardous" 
(13) 
a c t i v i t y i s c e r t a i n l y a stimulating thought. ' Is i t f a n c i f u l to 
equate the creation of an unexpected and unusual power outside "usual 
business methods" with instances of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y ? 
The t h i r d reason i s "business convenience."^"'"^ The assertion 
(12) See " L i a b i l i t i e s i n the administration of t r u s t s " , 28 Harv. 
L.R. 725, 733; "Contracts f o r the benefit of t h i r d persons", 
15 Harv. L.R. 767, 775. 
(13) See Honeywell v Stein and Larkin ^9347 1 K « B « 191» f o r an 
i l l u s t r a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e as applied i n the law of t o r t . 
(14) Apparently approved by Wright 1 Toronto L.J. 17, 47, where he 
maintained that adherence to "authority" and "estoppel" meant 
that "we shall have to expect occasional decisions, completely 
out of harmony with business experience, simply because they 
purport to proceed on an a p r i o r i assumption which at no time 
ever explained a l l the cases." 
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i s t h a t : "Agency i s essentially commercial; generally there i s neither 
time or opportunity to examine the extent of the powers of the i n d i v i -
dual agent by tr a c i n g them to t h e i r source. They have to be c l a s s i f i e d 
at face value. The general agent must cir c u l a t e more or less as does 
a negotiable instrument, without hindering conditions. Because of 
t h i s , an agent sent out habitually with powers l i m i t e d i n certain 
abnormal ways would be i n a position to cause i n j u r y to t h i r d persons. 
In sending out an agent, the p r i n c i p a l knows, or should know, that his 
vouchers w i l l not be c a r e f u l l y -looked t o . And he knows that the agent 
w i l l not be apt to mention a lack of authority, f o r t h i s might often 
i n t e r f e r e with sales. He knows of the human qu a l i t i e s v/hich, at times, 
w i l l lead even a f a i t h f u l agent to overstep his authority i n the 
desire to make sales. I t i s said that the t h i r d party need not deal 
with the agent. But i f business i s to continue, agents must be dealt 
with and protection given as experience rather than logic dictates." 
In short, the reply to the question - why should P be l i a b l e f o r 
A's unauthorised acts? - i s , because business convenience demands 
that he should be so l i a b l e i n certain circumstances. The question 
" i n which circumstances?" produces the c i r c u l a r answer, "those i n 
which business convenience so dictates." 
Powell v 1 conceded that i t was a highly desirable state of 
a f f a i r s that the courts should have the highest regard f o r business 
convenience, provided i t involved no vio l e n t disturbance of reasonable 
legal principles. Indeed he accepted that the English law of agency 
has "sometimes tended to be confined w i t h i n the blinkers of legal 
principles which have l i m i t e d i t s view." Nevertheless, whilst accep-
t i n g "business convenience" as "a lamp to l i g h t our path when the 
(15) Powell, p.95. 
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road i s not clear, we must be careful not to l e t i t shine so b r i g h t l y 
i n our eyes that we are dazzled and blinded by i t . " He expressed a 
confidence i n the a b i l i t y of our j u d i c i a l process to adopt an 
approach which would meet the needs of the business community without 
the need to adopt such an "overriding legal p r i n c i p l e " . H e 
fu r t h e r considered, that his in t e r p r e t a t i o n of decided cases led to 
the conclusion that although commercial needs have been recognised, 
"business convenience" has not been accepted as an overriding p r i n c i p l e 
determining P's l i a b i l i t y f o r A's unauthorised acts. De facto recog-
n i t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e , i n certain cases, was as much as he could 
accept i n so f a r as the courts have not always disclosed the reasons 
(17) 
f o r decisions v or have rested t h e i r decisions upon a distorted 
application of recognised agency principles or of estoppel. 
There i s no doubt that the open recognition of "business con-
venience", as a general pr i n c i p l e of l i a b i l i t y , could have disadvan-
tages. Too much discretion i s l e f t i n the judge, too much hope i s 
created i n lawyer and l i t i g a n t . R i g i d i t y , Powell f e l t , could u l t i -
mately follow from j u d i c i a l recognition of the p r i n c i p l e . Precedents 
(16) See the approach adopted i n the area of r e s t r a i n t of trade i n 
c l a s s i f y i n g agreements as contrary to public policy, also, i n 
r e l a t i o n to those t r u s t s which should f a i l as charitable t r u s t s , 
the element of public benefit being absent. A minimum of legal 
principles are l a i d down as a framework, leaving the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of change to meet a developing society. 
(17) He f e l t that some cases brought under the head of "inherent 
agency power" could be explicable on other grounds e.g. disputes 
between equally innocent owners and purchasers. The second 
Restatement does, however, recognise t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y . Para.141 
"A p r i n c i p a l , although not subject to l i a b i l i t y because of 
principles of agency, may be l i a b l e to a t h i r d person on account 
of a transaction v/ith an agent, because of principles of estoppel, 
r e s t i t u t i o n or n e g o t i a b i l i t y . " 
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as to the nature of "business convenience could f e t t e r the development 
of a system suited to commercial practice. 
The development of principles governing "usual authority", 
established by evidence of those actually practising i n commerce, 
Powell saw as the solution to the issue. His endeavours were, 
therefore, devoted largely towards defining more cl e a r l y the rules 
governing "usual authority", which may be regarded as an aspect of 
(1Q) 
apparent authority.* ' His conclusion was that "Business Con-
venience i s best served i f the courts act upon evidence of what i s 
(19) 
usual i n business." v ' 
Thus f a r I have proferred answers to the question "why should P 
be l i a b l e f o r A*s unauthorised acts?" but, the reply i s i n such broad 
terms that development i s clear l y essential i f an answer to the . 
question, "How should the desired r e s u l t be achieved?" i s to have 
precision. 
Development of a theory to clothe inherent agency power 
A p r i n c i p l e of l i a b i l i t y analagous to that adopted i n the law of 
t o r t , whereby a master i s made vicariously l i a b l e f o r the t o r t s of his 
servant would appear, at very least, an i n t e r e s t i n g p o s s i b i l i t y . 
Again w i t h i n a context of "business convenience", the more specific 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r P's l i a b i l i t y i s based upon the ground that P i s 
responsible f o r having created reasonable expectations i n innocent 
t h i r d parties dealing with his agent. This of course begs the questions 
What i s a reasonable expectation? Surely the concept of "holding out" 
(18) C.f. Pridman, footnote 39, p.62. 
(19) I shall return to t h i s solution i n considering Burt v Claude 
Cousins and Co. Ltd., and another J\31\J 2 Q.B.426, p.85 post. 
The approach c e r t a i n l y recognises the p l i g h t of the Patagonian 
businessmanI 
(20) See 48 Va. L.R. 50, Mearns, "Vicarious L i a b i l i t y f o r Agency 
Contracts." 
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adequately covers reasonable expectation. Mearns, however, holds 
otherv/ise, i l l u s t r a t i n g his argument i n the following way. 
Consider the shop assistant who, being anxious to make a sale, 
offers a deduction, i n respect of goods displayed at f u l l price, upon 
t h e i r being discovered to be shop-soiled. The assistant has no 
authority to do t h i s but the customer being unaware of t h i s accepts 
the bargain and arranges to pay C.O.D. Later, the manager of the shop, 
observing the discrepancy i n the price, corrects the b i l l before the 
goods are despatched. The customer upon receipt of the amended b i l l 
c a l l s to see the manager and i s t o l d that as the assistant had no 
authority to vary the price, the goods must either be paid f o r or 
returned. The man i n the street, i t i s suggested, would consider the 
reasonable expectation of the customer would e n t i t l e him to his bar-
gain. Why? Because the shop assistant was part of the manager's 
business organisation. Although t h i s may appear a sensible reply, a 
lawyer would, no doubt, indicate the answer to be erroneous. The 
assumption, claims Mearns, i s that the average person observing a 
servant about his business, quite reasonably, assumes that the servant 
i s carrying out his duty properly. The lawyer, steeped i n legal 
theory, assumes i t i s "unreasonable" to expect such acts, which are 
actually unauthorised, to be enforced. He looks f o r some "objective 
manifestation" to displace the presumption that P i s not bound. The 
underlying assumption i s that i f A acted outside his authority then 
he, pri m a r i l y , i s the person who must s a t i s f y any expectations created. 
Mearns claims that, "This r e f l e c t s a rather l i m i t e d view of what i s 
necessary to give adequate protection to those dealing i n a commer-
c i a l world, unless i t i s the Nineteenth Century World." 
At once the germ of a p r a c t i c a l answer to the question, "How 
should the desired r e s u l t , of holding P l i a b l e f o r A's unauthorised 
acts, be achieved?" presents i t s e l f . The j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r any 
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adoption of a theory of "vicarious contract l i a b i l i t y " must be as wide 
(21) 
i f not wider than the j u s t i f i c a t i o n s of "vicarious t o r t l i a b i l i t y . " v ' 
But, as Mearns suggests, "... though there may be no consent to 
specific promises, consent to the relationship (of p r i n c i p a l and agent) 
should be enough f o r anyone. In a real sense, the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
being placed upon the pr i n c i p a l i s a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y he himself assumed 
i n sending a member of his enterprise to represent himself i n the busi-
ness world. The agent, you must re a l i z e , would not be out there 
"promising away" were i t not f o r his obligation to serve the p r i n c i p a l . " 
This argument bears a s t r i k i n g s i m i l a r i t y to the unsophisticated 
formulation of the reasons f o r 'vicarious t o r t l i a b i l i t y 1 submitted 
(22) 
by Lord Pearce i n Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v Shatwell x ' 
"The doctrine of vicarious l i a b i l i t y has not grown from any very clear,, 
l o g i c a l or legal p r i n c i p l e but from social convenience and rough j u s t i c e . 
The master having (presumably f o r his own benefit) employed the ser-
vant, and being (presumably) better able to make good any damage which 
may occasionally r e s u l t from the arrangement, i s answerable to the 
world at large f o r a l l the t o r t s committed by his servant w i t h i n the 
scope of i t . " 
I n short, the argument f o r "vicarious contract l i a b i l i t y " i s that 
(2l ) Baty, "Vicarious L i a b i l i t y " , l i s t s nine reasons, a l l of which, 
i n his opinion are unsatisfactory. See also Street, Foundations 
of Legal L i a b i l i t y , I I p.458. Also expressions of j u d i c i a l 
opinion, Duncan v Pindlater (1839) 6 CI. and F. 894, 910 per 
Lord Brougham; Hutchinson v York, Newcastle and Berwick Rly. 
(1850) 5 Exch. 343, 350 per Alderson B.; Jones v Staveley Iron 
and Chemical Co. Ltd. j\3b^J 1 Q.B. 474, 480 per Denning L.J.; 
Taff Vale Rly. v Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants JJ$01J 
A.C. 426, 439 per Farwell J.; Broom v Morgan J\3^J 1 Q.B. 597, 
608 per Denning L.J. The "deep pocket" theory i s perhaps the 
most widely accepted today, although i t s formulation has become 
extremely sophisticated. See Limpus v L.G.O.C. (1862) 1 H. and 
C. 526, 539 per Willes J. 
(22) ^196^7 A ' c » 6 56, 685. 
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the employer who creates, controls and benefits from the agency r e l a -
tionship should stand to lose rather than someone who deals i n good 
f a i t h with his agent. Our business community r e l i e s to a great extent 
upon " f i r s t appearances". This i s necessarily so, f o r constant resort 
to checking that an agent was not deviating from his authority would 
undermine efficiency. 
Four questions 
Several important questions must be posed at t h i s juncture: 
(1) Does t h i s suggested "new approach" contribute to precision or 
certainty? 
(2) Does i t detract from, and i s i t compatible with, established 
principles? 
(3) Is the approach reconcilable with an established conceptual 
basis of P's l i a b i l i t y f o r A's unauthorised acts. 
(4) Has the inquiry deviated from the " i s " to the "ought". 
Precision or certainty 
Clearly, being based upon analogy with the pr i n c i p l e adopted i n 
r e l a t i o n to master and servant t o r t i o u s l i a b i l i t y , no greater p r e c i -
sion may be expected than i n t h i s l a t t e r case. Two questions are 
suggested as aids to establishing l i a b i l i t y . F i r s t , "was the employee 
a general agent? l , v ' Second, i f so, "was the promise within the scope 
of the agency power?" This l a t t e r question recognises that P ought 
not to be l i a b l e i n respect of substantial departures from duty. The 
scope of the agency power w i l l be established by ascertainment of 
(23) Mearns accepted the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of "general agent". As t h i s 
i s always a "question of degree", some other t e s t , such as 
"business agent", could be equally well adopted e.g. see the 
cla s s i f i c a t i o n s i n the Continental "Commercial Codes" whereby 
agents transacting certain types of business must be registered 
and hence c l a s s i f i e d . 
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various factual incidents of the relationship. I l l u s t r a t i o n s of these 
would be ( l ) Whether the promise i s similar i n nature to those s p e c i f i -
c a l l y authorised by the p r i n c i p a l ; (2) Whether the promise i s similar 
to those previously made with knowledge of the p r i n c i p a l and under-
w r i t t e n by him though not s p e c i f i c a l l y authorised; and (3) Whether 
the promise i s of a kind usually w i t h i n the specific authority of 
agents s i m i l a r l y employed. 
Mearns1 approach thus demotes a consideration of consent to a 
mere preliminary function adopted i n establishing the existence of 
the agency relationship. The real basis of l i a b i l i t y under t h i s doc-
t r i n e i s to "pin r e s p o n s i b i l i t y on those who deal with others through 
(25) 
the instrument of a general agent." x ' 
Compatibility with established principles 
There would be, i t would appear, no need to abandon the well 
established rules surrounding the accepted doctrines of apparent 
authority or authority created by estoppel. The objectively assessed 
l i a b i l i t y provides a welcome degree of certainty. The value of the 
suggested approach appears to l i e i n the resolution of cases which do 
not r e adily f a l l w i t h i n established principles. Where, unable to f i n d 
classic examples of authority, the courts have sought to "dabble" i n 
"implied", "ostensible", "constructive", "general apparent", or 
(26) 
"customary authority". ' 
Reconciliation with the established conceptual basis f o r P's 
l i a b i l i t y 
"Vicarious contract l i a b i l i t y " , as a technical term, would appear 
(24) The Patagonian merchant would succeed upon t h i s approach, see p.19. 
(25) See footnote 23, ante, p.77. 
(26) The terms used f o r what would appear to be the "cover up" 
situations, see footnote 5 p.H. 
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to denote that P's l i a b i l i t y i s vicarious, that i s , he i s responsible 
f o r a contract entered into by another, A. 
(27) 
S t o l j a r ' s , theory of transmissable contracts or transmissable 
contract-interests provides an extremely convenient l i n k with the 
(28) 
theories of contract previously discussed. ' He submits that i n 
the three party agency relationship there i s indeed created a contract 
between A and T. In addition, there i s created another between P and 
T, "the p e c u l i a r i t y however being that the A-T contract i n most 
cases (yet not always) disappears i n favour of the designated contract 
betv/een P and T." This, he claims, "explains and overcomes the hiatus 
i n the law of agency between the formation of a contract as between 
one set of persons (A and T) and the transfer of i t s incidents to 
another set (P and T ) . " ^ 2 ^ 
However, i n more v e r i f i a b l e form i t may be that the l i n k between , 
Stoljar's theory and the notion of "vicarious contract l i a b i l i t y " , 
and the underlying source of P's l i a b i l i t y , l i e s i n the history and 
development of assumpsit. 
The h i s t o r i c a l origins 
An important point to be borne i n mind, when considering early 
(27) S t o l j a r , p.36. 
(28) See p.34 et seq. 
(29) See the discussion of a similar approach, suggested by Montrose, 
at p. 41. Note how S t o l j a r 1 s theory neatly explains the nature 
of warranty of authority and also s a t i s f i e s the requirement of 
the doctrine of r a t i f i c a t i o n , that A's act must not constitute 
a mere n u l l i t y i f i t i s to support P's r a t i f i c a t i o n , Brook v Hook 
(1871) L.R.6 Ex. 89. 
(30) See p.38 et seq. 
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mercantile transactions, i s that they were executed i m m e d i a t e l y . ^ 
The executory contract did not become commonly adopted u n t i l the turn 
(32) 
of the nineteenth century. ' Because of t h i s the normal form of 
action was i n debt, f o r the price of goods come to the use and 
benefit of P. Further,* i t was held at a very early time that even 
when a servant had bought goods under his own deed, i f the goods had 
pr o f i t e d the master, then absence of authority i n the servant would 
not assist the master. However, i t was not merely the receipt of 
goods which created l i a b i l i t y i n P, the master. The essential factor 
was that the servant should have acted apparently as P's agent. 
The courts, i n order to ascertain precisely how the goods came int o 
P's possession, therefore, directed attention to A's conduct at the 
(35) 
time of purchase. Thus i n 1379 Bellewe^ ' reported that even 
though T, the s e l l e r , was unable to show that A acted w i t h i n his 
(actual) authority, P was l i a b l e , f o r " i f one has a b a i l i f f or a 
(31) See Blackstones Commentaries 247 "and, therefore i f the vendor 
says, the price of the beast i s £4, and the vendee says he w i l l 
give £4, the bargain i s struck; and they neither of them are at 
l i b e r t y to be o f f , provided immediate possession be tendered 
by the other side. But i f neither the money be paid, nor the 
goods delivered, nor tender made, nor any subsequent agreement 
be entered i n t o , i t i s no contract; and the owner may dispose 
of the goods as he pleases." 
(32) Witness the development of the implied warranties of "corres-
pondence with description", (unnecessary f o r the most part i n 
face to face contracts) " f i t n e s s " and "quality" which took 
place, not by chance, at the same time. 
(33) Randolph v Abbot of Hailes (1313-14) Eyre of Kent, 6 and 7 
Edw.2 (Selden Soc, Vol .27) 32, c i t e d F i f o o t , History and 
Sources of the Common Law. 
(34) Otherwise there would have been the d i f f i c u l t y of proof where 
the master claimed he had received the goods by way of g i f t or 
from another quite outside his household. 
(35) Anon. (1379) Bellewe, 58, 136, c i t e d F i f o o t , History and Sources 
of the Common Law. 
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servant, who i s known to be one's servant, i f you send him to the f a i r 
to purchase merchandise and other things, i t i s reasonable that he £sj 
should be charged with the payment, i f the merchandise come to his use." 
This development w i t h i n the action of debt v/as followed from 
around the fourteenth century by a recognition that P's l i a b i l i t y 
lay not simply i n debt but i n "contract". I t appears that the accept-
ance of a contractual nexus between P and T grew alongside the related 
development which transformed the action f o r debt from a " r e a l " 
action (the executed contract) giving i t the form of a contractual 
undertaking. 
This contractual l i a b i l i t y , of great a n t i q u i t y , would appear to 
resolve the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved i n holding P l i a b l e even though he 
has not authorised A's act. The early cases showed i t was no longer 
necessary to regard P as l i a b l e because of receipt of the goods, rather, 
l i a b i l i t y flowed from his "enabling" A's action. P would therefore be 
(37) 
l i a b l e f o r the acts of even a fraudulent agent. ' 
Because the origins of P's contractual l i a b i l i t y , enforced by 
assumpsit, were i n debt, there ought not to have been d i f f i c u l t y i n 
holding P l i a b l e where he came int o possession of goods v i a A, des-
p i t e the fact that A had not s p e c i f i c a l l y acted on behalf of P at the 
time of the contract. However, the emphasis placed upon the,appearance 
(36) See Pifoot, History and Sources of the Common Law, p.227 et seq. 
(37) (1469) Y.B. 8 Edw. 4» Mich. f o l . 116, p.1.9. " i f I command my 
servant to buy certain things, or i f I make someone my factor 
or attorney to buy merchandise etc., and he buys the merchandise 
from another, i n that case I sha l l be charged by t h i s contract 
even though the goods never come to my hands and even though I 
have no knowledge of ^A's precise acts7j, and the reason i s 
because I have given him such a power JXo effect the unauthorised 
act/." Cited F i f o o t , History and Sources of the Common Law. 
1 
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of A's act at the time of the contract, related e a r l i e r , overshadowed 
the old l i a b i l i t y f o r goods coming to P's use, when the action f o r 
debt f e l l i n t o desuetude. An action i n assumpsit was considered 
inappropriate i f A's acts were not such as to a t t r i b u t e his actions 
to P. ' I t was i n t h i s way that P's l i a b i l i t y came to be c l a s s i -
f i e d as " t r u l y contractual". Indeed, l i a b i l i t y f o r goods coming to 
the use of P was subsequently based upon an implied r a t i f i c a t i o n of 
A's unauthorised act. The implication of r a t i f i c a t i o n was considered 
essential i n order to preserve the contractual nature of P's l i a b i -
l i t y , now regarded as of the essence. 
The emphasis on the contractual nature of the P-T relationship 
eventually, when the consensual theory of contract became widely 
accepted, obscured the source of the relationship - i t was not a con-
sensually formed contract. The incidents of the relationship are 
contractual, but are not consensually formed. I t i s t h i s oversight 
which gives r i s e to conceptual problems i n ascertaining the proper 
basis of the P-T relationship. 
I submit that a theory of "vicarious contract l i a b i l i t y " , which 
may be rationalised i n terms of "a transmissable contract - i n t e r e s t " , 
although not necessarily so, f a l l s r e adily w i t h i n the conceptual 
basis of P's l i a b i l i t y , previously established as flowing from the 
origins of assumpsit. Assumpsit c e r t a i n l y exhibits tortious facets 
i n i t s development and the notion that P i s l i a b l e because he has 
enabled A to act to T's detriment i s h i s t o r i c a l l y harmonious. 
Has the inquiry deviated from the " i s " to the "ought"? 
The proof of any theory l i e s i n i t s satisfactory application to 
decided cases. In t h i s way the theory may be demonstrated to be a 
useful t o o l f o r prediction. I shall consider, i n some d e t a i l , the 
(38) Alford v E g l i s f i e l d (1564) 2 By. 230b. 
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recent Court of Appeal decision i n Burt v Claude Cousins and Co. Ltd. 
and Shaw^"^ which has been c r i t i c i s e d as lacking i n p r i n c i p l e . 
This investigation i s merely i l l u s t r a t i v e and must be regarded as 
simply a compromise instead of a f a r reaching and exhaustive review 
of many diverse areas which I f e e l i s desirable. Leave to appeal 
was granted i n Burt's case but unfortunately no appeal was pursued. 
I t i s , therefore, p a r t i c u l a r l y important to establish principles 
w i t h i n the p a r t i c u l a r area concerned, especially i n view of the doubts 
expressed i n Barrington v L e e ^ ^ , decided by a d i f f e r e n t l y constitu-
ted Court of Appeal only eight months a f t e r Burt's case and indeed 
more doubts recently expressed i n the case of Sor r e l l v Pinch. 
/"Because of the detailed consideration which these cases 
require I have set out my f u l l investigation i n Appendix I I so as not 
to cloud the basic issues of t h i s t hesis.J 
The point at issue i n Burt's case was who should bear the loss 
of a deposit, paid by a prospective purchaser to an estate agent, 
appointed by the prospective vendor, i n the event of the estate agent 
acting so as to render i t impossible f o r the purchaser to recover the 
sum from the agent. The issue has been reduced by the m a j o r i t y ^ ^ , 
i n each of the three cases previously referred t o , as to basically a 
question of whether the vendor i s bound by a contract to repay the 
sum. Lord Denning M.R. has expressed what I believe to be a se l f 
induced s t r a i t j a c k e t as the key to the dilemma i n t h i s way: " I f an 
(39) 1)311] 2 Q.B. 426; J\31\J 2 A l l E.E. 611. 
(40) See the c r i t i c i s m i n Barrington v Lee JlSllJ 3 A l l E.R.1231. 
(41) JJSIlJ 3 A l l E.R. 1231. 
(42) Unreported Court of Appeal decision, 12th June 1975« 
(43) Lord Denning M.R. dissenting i n each case from the reasoning 
of the majority. 
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agent makes a contract f o r a named p r i n c i p a l (having actual or 
ostensible authority to do so), then that p r i n c i p a l i s hound by the 
contract"(44) otherwise the vendor (P) i s not bound to repay. This 
position of course f a i l s to give recognition to any notion of 
inherent agency power. 
However, I submit that the elaborate arguments, related i n 
Appendix I I , directed towards the f i n d i n g of an implied undertaking 
by P to repay, reveal a f a i l u r e to appreciate the principles of agency 
which would adequately meet the needs of the s i t u a t i o n . The attitudes 
expressed upon the policy issue are important. Megaw L.J., i n Burt's 
case,(45) commenced his judgment with these words: " I have no doubt 
that i n the absence of special circumstances j u s t i c e requires that 
the prospective vendor rather than the prospective purchaser should 
bear the loss." Sachs L.J. was equally f o r t h r i g h t " I t i s the 
vendor who selects and appoints the estate agent" and c i t i n g Hern v 
N i c h o l l s ^ ^ ) ».,, i t i s more reason that he that employs and puts 
t r u s t and confidence i n the deceiver should be the loser than a 
stranger ..." 
Nevertheless, the Court's attempt to f i n d an implied term so as 
to achieve the desired end, as i s demonstrated i n Appendix I I , 
t o t a l l y f a i l e d to meet the requirements of the classic test f o r 
implication of such a t e r m ^ 8 ) ^ which test was indeed simply ignored. 
Why was worse than doubtful reasoning adapted, rather than applica-
t i o n of well recognised rules? I submit i t was because the application 
(44) In Sorrel1 v Pinch. 
(45) At p.624. 
(46) At p.622. 
(47) (1701) 1 Salk. 289. 
(48) See Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd. v Cooper /l9A]J A.C.108. 
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of the recognised rules as to the implication of a term would not 
enable achievement of the desired end, so cl e a r l y set out at the 
commencement of the majority judgments. However, I furt h e r submit 
that application of t h i s demonstrably unsound a p p r o a c h w a s dic-
tated by a f a i l u r e to recognise the notion of agency power as the 
basis of P's l i a b i l i t y . Burt's case, together with Barrington v Lee 
and Sorrell v Finch, i l l u s t r a t e s the application of the pr i n c i p l e of 
agency power without affording i t recognition. 
Lord Denning M.R., i n Barrington's case submitted that the 
reasoning of the majority i n Burt's case, i n f i n d i n g an implied term 
so as to impose l i a b i l i t y upon P, was reasoning only applicable to an 
action i n t o r t and that no t o r t was revealed. However, 
Stephenson L.J., i n Barrington's case, without f u r t h e r comment said 
" I regret that I cannot, i n agreement with Lord Denning M.R., hold 
that the reasoning ... was appropriate only to a claim i n t o r t and 
not to a claim on an implied promise to pay."^"^ This, I believe, 
recognises the tor t i o u s origins of the contractual remedy, based on 
assumpsit, which l i e s against P. The remedy i s not based upon a con-
sensual (express or implied) contract but upon a pr i n c i p l e of 
"vicarious contract l i a b i l i t y . " There i s no agreement as to the 
existence of ostensible authority on the part of A, the evidence as 
to the practice of estate agents being at best inconclusive. I t i s 
the fact of an agency relationship which gives r i s e to the "legal 
r u l e " which binds P to T. I f i t were not f o r the employment of A, 
(49) See Lord Denning's c r i t i c i s m of the majority approach i n 
Barrington v Lee at p. 1237, c i t e d i n Appendix I I . 
(50) See Appendix I I , p. 8. 
(1) At p.1247. 
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by P, then A would not "be "out there promising away". As Lord 
Denning M.R. said i n Barrington's case, "the claim to the return of 
the deposit l i e s i n contract and nothing else", but the contract has 
i t s origins i n assumpsit and not i n consent. Although the conceptual 
basis of l i a b i l i t y has perhaps not been f u l l y understood, Burt's case 
(2) 
i s a classic i l l u s t r a t i o n of i t s application. v ' 
In short, the inquiry has f a l l e n upon the " i s " although the 
present development of the law does not appear to recognise the route 
whereby the " i s " and "ought" converge. 
Conclusion 
The findings of t h i s chapter may be quite b r i e f l y stated. The 
notion of apparent authority gives precision, i n instances of t r a d i -
t i o n a l application, enabling the minutiae of agreements to be 
(2) The confusion has been given fu r t h e r expression i n S o r r e l l v 
Pinch where Lord Denning M.R. (again dissenting) indicated that 
his understanding of Burt's and Barrington's cases was that each 
was based upon "ostensible authority". He found that any 
ostensible authority had been negatived i n the instant case and 
that as there was no actual authority either, "... by no means 
can a t h i r d person ... be bound by the contract. He treats P 
as a t h i r d person i n the absence of actual authority. However, 
i f the majority found ostensible authority, i n those cases 
referred t o , then i t was without requiring evidence as to the 
practice of estate agents. 
(3) See also Mendelssohn v Normand Ltd. J}31^J 1 Q.B.177, where i t 
was held that the "ostensible authority" of an agent could arise 
and override a w r i t t e n statement r e s t r i c t i n g the agent's 
authority. This was i n spite of the well established cases i n 
which i t has been held constructive notice may l i m i t authority. 
See Jacobs v Morris jy^yi] 1 Ch.8l6; Reckitt v Barnett, Pembroke 
and Slater, Ltd. A.C.I76. c.f. Overbrooke Estates Ltd. v 
Glencombe Properties, Ltd. JJSl^J 3 a l l E.R.511 where notice was 
held to have l i m i t e d the agents ostensible authority. 
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ascertained with certainty, upon an objective t e s t . The basic under-
l y i n g p r i n c i p l e may quite properly be said to be that of contract, 
notions of estoppel being unnecessarily confusing and r e s t r i c t i v e and 
h i s t o r i c a l l y inaccurate. •However, i n the grey area i n which l i a b i l i t y 
has been imposed outside the areas of t r a d i t i o n a l application, the 
theory of "vicarious contract l i a b i l i t y " , with a conceptual basis 
akin to that of apparent authority, may to some extent point the way 
to c e r t a i n t y i n the "business t r a n s a c t i o n " , ^ ^ where i t s development 
simply awaits overt recognition. 
(4) See the somewhat nebulous d i s t i n c t i o n drawn between "business 
transactions" i n areas i n which business confidence i s to be 
guarded and "private transactions" i n which the sanctity of 
individual property r i g h t s i s paramount. Compare Fry and 
Mason v Smellie and Taylor J}3\2] 5 K.B. 282 with Jerome v 
Bentley & Co. /l352j 2 A l l E.R. 114. Note how Conant's notion 
of the "Objective Theory of Agency", 47 Nab. L.R.678, lends 
support to t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n and also f o r , i n d i r e c t support, ( 
development i n r e l a t i o n to the law of t o r t i n the United States: 
"Agency recovery i n t o r t under the theory of Apparent Authority" 
69 W.Va.L.R.186, R.B. Stone; "Apparent Authority - An extension 
of the deep pocket theory", 23 S. Carolina L.R. 826, Harris; 
" L i a b i l i t y of Principals f o r t o r t s of Agents, Comparative study", 
47 Nab.L.R.42, Conant. See also Second American Restatement, 
Comment to para.l6lA. "The reasons f o r the extensive powers of 
general agents as a part of a principal's business organisation 
do not apply to special agents." 
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CHAPTER I I I 
"One of those not infrequent situations i n our law where a. legal 
problem of an important and recurring character remains unsolved f o r 
want of l i t i g a n t s . 
This chapter considers the conceptual basis underlying the 
Doctrine of the Undisclosed Principal. 
Introduction to the Doctrine of the Undisclosed Principal 
The doctrine of the Undisclosed Principal springs from the si t u a -
t i o n i n which an agent contracts i n his own name, so that the t h i r d 
party i s unaware that the person with whom he i s dealing i s an agent. 
So f a r as T i s concerned A i s r e a l l y a p r i n c i p a l , acting on his own 
behalf and i n his own name. The problem which arises i s as to the 
relationship which i s created between the p r i n c i p a l , who i s undis-
closed and unknown, and the t h i r d party. A may enter upon a trans-
action i n t h i s form even though he i s f a i t h f u l l y observing P's 
instruc t i o n s . There i s fu r t h e r , however, a more complex problem, 
which may f a i r l y be c l a s s i f i e d as f a l l i n g w i t h i n the sphere of an 
inquiry i n t o the aforementioned doctrine, i n which A acts so as to 
exceed his real authority. A consideration of t h i s l a t t e r problem 
forms the l a t e r subject matter of t h i s chapter. 
In answer to the question of what relationship i s created bet-
ween P and T where T i s unaware of P's existence, i t may broadly be 
( l ) Montrose 17 Can.B.R. 693, 695. 
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stated that ( i n addition to the legal relationship a r i s i n g between A 
and T), T can sue P and P can sue T upon discovery of t h e i r respective 
i d e n t i t i e s . This i s the effect of the doctrine of the Undisclosed 
(2) 
Principal. ' At f i r s t sight the doctrine appears to achieve a par-
t i c u l a r l y curious r e s u l t . I t appears to enforce a contract between 
persons who cannot be parties to i t , or perhaps, T would appear to 
f i n d that instead of having simply contracted with A, he has contracted 
with an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t person, P. 
Criticism of the doctrine 
Cri t i c i s m of the doctrine has been p a r t i c u l a r l y severe. I n order 
to express the academic and j u d i c i a l assessment, a b r i e f catalogue of 
opinion i n an abbreviated form i s i n s t r u c t i v e . 
Sir Frederick Pollock maintained a p a r t i c u l a r l y v i r u l e n t opposi-
t i o n to the doctrine as may be witnessed by his writings i n the Law 
Quarterly R e v i e w . T h e following quotation being a t y p i c a l expres-
sion of his revulsion of the "anomalous doctrine". 
"The p l a i n t r u t h ought never to be forgotten that the whole law 
as to the r i g h t s and l i a b i l i t i e s of an undisclosed p r i n c i p a l i s incon-
sistent v/ith the elementary doctrines of the law of contract. The 
r i g h t of one person to sue another on a contract not r e a l l y made with 
the person suing i s unknown to every legal system except that of 
England and America. 
Judi c i a l opinion has been s i m i l a r l y f o r t h r i g h t . 
"At the same time, as a contract i s constituted by the concur-
rence of two or more persons and by t h e i r agreement to the same terms, 
(2) Higgins v Senior (1841) 8 M. and W. 834; Browning v Provincial 
Insurance Co. (1873) L.R.5 P.C.263; Calder v Dobell ( l87l) 
L.R.6 CP.486; Trueman v Loder (1840) 11 A. and E.594; 
Smethurst v Mitchell (1859) 1 E. and E. 623; Thomson v Davenport 
(1829) 9 B. and C. 78. 
(3) 3 L.Q.R. 358; 12 L.Q.R.204; 14 L.Q.R. 2. 
(4) 3 L.Q.R. 358, 359. 
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there i s an anomaly i n holding one person bound to another of whom he 
knows nothing and with whom he did not, i n f a c t , intend to c o n t r a c t . " w / 
These expressions of reserve as to the propriety of the doctrine 
may perhaps be traced to the e a r l i e r misgivings of Lord Blackburn i n 
Armstrong v Stokes where he said:-
" I t might be said, perhaps t r u l y , t h i s i s the consequence of that 
which might o r i g i n a l l y have been a mistake, i n allowing the vendor 
/~T_7 "to have recourse at a l l against one /~P_7 "t° whom he never gave 
cr e d i t , and that we ought not to establish an i l l o g i c a l exception i n 
order to cure a f a u l t i n a ru l e . " ^ ' 
American academic writers have been no less c r i t i c a l . 
"... the effect of holding him £~2j l i a b l e i s to give to the 
other party ^ ~T_7 the benefit of a l i a b i l i t y which he did not contem-
plate at the time of the contract and f o r which he did not s t i p u l a t e . 
I n other words, the r i g h t to hold a pr i n c i p a l l i a b l e i n such circum-
stances amounts to a 'God-send' ... a r a t i o n a l theory f o r the p r i n c i -
(8) 
pal's l i a b i l i t y i s not easy to discover."^ ' 
"Logically there i s no direct r e l a t i o n between the undisclosed 
(9) 
p r i n c i p a l and the t h i r d person with whom the agent contracts." s ' 
These opinions are of course based upon the underlying assumption, 
which Huffcut expressed succinctly i n his Treatise on Agency, that A's 
act can only create a contract between himself and T. "A contract 
(5) Keighley Maxsted & Co. v Durant J\3§\] A.C.240,261 per Lord 
Lindley. See also Lord Davey's judgment at p.256 and also that 
of A.L. Smith L.J., Durant v Roberts and Keighley Maxted and Co. 
^9007 1 Q.B.629, 635. 
(6) (1872) L.R. 7 Q.B. 598. 
(7) At p.604. 
(8) Mechem 23 Harv. L.R. 513* 
(9) Ames 18 Yale L.J. 443i 445 and 453« See also Comparative aspects 
of Undisclosed Agency, 18 M.L.R.33. 
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creates s t r i c t l y personal obligations between the contracting parties. 
I n short permitting the undisclosed p r i n c i p a l to sue or be sued may 
work out j u s t i c e , but i t i s nevertheless an anomaly, and, l i k e a l l 
anomalies, unfortunate."^"'"^ 
Recognition of the u t i l i t y of the doctrine 
However, the voices raised i n c r i t i c i s m of the doctrine have 
t y p i c a l l y directed t h e i r attention towards c r i t i c i s m of i t s t h e o r e t i -
cal basis and have not generally sought "to bury the undisclosed 
p r i n c i p a l but to save and sustain him.»•(•'••'• ) Indeed Earl Cairns L.C., 
(12) 
i n Kendall v Hamilton v ' expressed his unqualified approval of the 
doctrine without reference to the conceptual d i f f i c u l t i e s raised by a 
doctrine apparently so ali e n to t r a d i t i o n a l legal theory. 
"Wow, I take i t to be clear that, where an agent contracts i n his own 
name f o r an undisclosed p r i n c i p a l , the person he contracts with may 
sue the agent, or he may sue the p r i n c i p a l ... I t would c l e a r l y be 
contrary to every p r i n c i p l e of j u s t i c e that the creditor who had seen 
and known and dealt with and given cre d i t to the agent, should be 
driven to sue the p r i n c i p a l i f he does not wish to sue him, and, on 
the other hand, i t would be equally contrary to ju s t i c e that the 
creditor on discovering the p r i n c i p a l , who r e a l l y has had the benefit 
of the loan, should be prevented suing him i f he wishes to do so." 
Failure to consider the basis of the doctrine 
Furthermore, i n a l a t e r passage i n the same case, Lord Blackburn, 
i n discussing the doctrines of Election and Merger, displays v/ithout 
(10) Cited 9 Col.L.R.116,130 as the t r a d i t i o n a l approach to the doctrine. 
(11) S t o l j a r , p.228. 
(12) (1879) 4 App. Cas.504, 514. 
(13) p.544. 
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hesitation an almost cavalier a t t i t u d e to the theoretical basis of the 
undisclosed principal's l i a b i l i t y . 
" I do not think the defence f l e c t i o n / a meritorious one; but I 
think i n the present case there i s no great hardship. The P l a i n t i f f s 
/~T_7 had a r i g h t of recourse against Hamilton /~U.P._7 f o r which they 
never bargained, but they did nothing inequitable i n taking advantage 
of that which the law gave them. They have destroyed that remedy by 
taking a judgment against persons /~A_7 who turn out to be insolvent. 
I do not think Hamilton /~U.P._7 does anything inequitable i n taking 
advantage of the defence which the law gives him. The P l a i n t i f f s got 
a r i g h t by operation of law, v/ithout any merits of t h e i r own, by what, 
as f a r as regards them, was pure good luck. They have l o s t i t by 
what was no f a u l t of t h e i r s , but was, as f a r as they were concerned, 
pure bad luck. I f the P l a i n t i f f s were w i l l i n g to take advantage of 
t h e i r good luck against the Defendant, i t seems no hardship that he 
should take advantage of t h e i r bad luck against them." 
I n short there may appear to be a true gap between theory and 
practice, i f so, "either the theory i s inadequate or the practice i s 
wrong. "(^^O rp^g n e e d f o r a detailed study of the conceptual basis 
(15) 
of the doctrine under discussion i s c l e a r l y indicated. ' 
(14) Noy, Maxims, 90 "debile fundamentum f a l l i t opus". 
(15) Montrose, 16 Can. B.R. 757, 777, j u s t i f i e s the search f o r a 
basic theory on the grounds that although a legal rule may be 
j u s t i f i e d by reference to public policy or j u s t i c e , t h i s 
involves a fundamental investigation i n t o the problems of the 
jurisprudence of a system of law. I f one can ref e r to a par-
t i c u l a r solution as being consonant with an established legal 
r u l e ( i . e . enforcement of contract) then any r u l e which i s so 
supported i s also consonant with j u s t i c e i n the enforcement of 
established p r i n c i p l e . 
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Explanation of the reasons f o r the common law affording sanction to a 
" l o g i c a l l y indefensible" doctrine. 
Before a detailed consideration of the concepts underlying the 
doctrine i s attempted i t i s pertinent to note, b r i e f l y , Lord Lindley's 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n of i t s development alongside his acknowledgment of i t s 
theoretical problems. 
"The explanation of the doctrine that an undisclosed p r i n c i p a l 
can sue and be sued on a contract made i n the name of another person 
with his authority i s , that the contract i s i n t r u t h , although not i n 
form, that of the undisclosed p r i n c i p a l himself. Both the p r i n c i p a l 
and the authority exist when the contract i s made; and the person who 
makes i t f o r him i s only the instrument by which the p r i n c i p a l acts. 
I n allowing him to sue and be sued upon i t , effect i s given, so f a r 
as he i s concerned, to what i s true i n f a c t , although the t r u t h may 
not be known to the other party. 
At the same time, as a contract i s constituted by the concurrence 
of two or more persons and by t h e i r agreement to the same terms, there 
i s an anomaly i n holding one person bound to another of whom he knows 
nothing and with whom he did not, i n f a c t , intend to contract. But 
middlemen, through whom contracts are made, are common and useful i n 
business, and i n the great mass of contracts i t i s a matter of i n d i f -
ference to either party whether there i s an undisclosed p r i n c i p a l or 
not. I f he exists i t i s , to say the least, extremely convenient that 
he should be able to sue and be sued as a p r i n c i p a l , and he i s only 
allowed to do so upon terms which exclude i n j u s t i c e . 
Clearly Lord Lindley acknowledges a s a c r i f i c e of pr i n c i p l e i n the 
interests of commercial convenience. The doctrine i s seen as simply 
an expression of the f e e l i n g that j u s t i c e i s served where an 
(16) Keighley Maxsted & Co. v Durant JlSOlJ A.C. 240, 261. 
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undisclosed p r i n c i p a l i s f i x e d with the burdens and endowed with the 
benefits of a contract made at his i n s t i g a t i o n . 
Competing Theories 
The basic and fundamental objection to the doctrine i s that i t 
does not conform to basic principles of the law of contract. I t i s 
argued that there cannot exist a contractual bond between parties of 
whom one may not know of the existence of the other with whom he i s 
alleged to contract. Huffcut expressed the pr i n c i p l e quite simply 
"a fundamental not ion of the common law i s that a contract creates 
(17) 
s t r i c t l y personal obligations between the contracting p a r t i e s . f , v ' 
The Trust Theory 
Ames made an early attempt to found the doctrine upon the con-
(18) 
cept of the t r u s t . ' He argued that although the courts recognised 
the anomalous character of the doctrine, the f e e l i n g that i t was ju s t 
to recognise the undisclosed p r i n c i p a l as having the benefits and 
burdens of contracts made on his behalf, overrode the conceptual d i f -
f i c u l t i e s . I t was i n fa c t merely because of a f a i l u r e to ascertain a 
more r a t i o n a l means of achieving j u s t i c e that the anomalous character 
of the doctrine developed. 
Ames commenced his investigation of the doctrine with an examina-
t i o n of the "measure of j u s t i c e " which might have been attained i f 
actions, under the doctrine, by and against the undisclosed p r i n c i p a l 
had not been allowed. This proposition envisages a similar s i t u a t i o n , 
(17) Huffcut, Agency, 2nd ed. ch.10 p.158. 
(18) 18 Yale L.J. 443. See also 8 L.Q.R. 220 Trusteeship and Agency. 
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i n the case of simple contracts, to that which now exists i n the case 
of contracts under seal and negotiable instruments. Claims against T 
could only be brought by A; claims made by T could only be made against 
A and A alone. 
The t y p i c a l transaction may be analysed i n the following manner. 
T sells goods on credit to A, who, without T*s knowledge, i s buying on 
behalf of an undisclosed p r i n c i p a l , U.P. The argument i s that the t i t l e 
to the goods sold must pass from T to A as t h i s i s the declared in t e n -
t i o n of the parties, A being the sole buyer i n the sale. This excludes 
a concomitant sale of the same goods from T to U.P. However, although 
A and not U.P., acquires the legal t i t l e from T, A holds the t i t l e 
throughout the transaction f o r the benefit of U.P. To be more precise, 
A, i n buying f o r U.P., i s not acting as an agent or representative of 
his employer U.P. but as his trustee. By way of reinforcement from a 
more f a m i l i a r scene, i f the subject matter of the sale was land, no 
one would suggest that the t i t l e to the land would pass d i r e c t l y to 
U.P. Rather A, who acquires t i t l e , holds i t , not f o r himself, but as 
t r u s t e e ^ f o r U.P.<20) 
Conversely, i f T undertakes to s e l l and convey a parcel of land 
to A and A i s acting f o r the benefit of U.P., T having no knowledge 
of t h i s , T i s most c e r t a i n l y bound to A. This i s the agreement bet-
ween A and T. But T does not intend to assume an obligation to U.P., 
th i s would be an additional obligation. I n d i r e c t l y U.P. may acquire 
the benefits of the contract, because A, having acquired T's obligation 
(19) This suggestion of a " t r u s t theory" was not novel, see Mollett v 
Robinson (I872) L.R. 7 C.P. 84, 119 per Kelly C.B; also apparent 
approval i n Armstrong v Stokes (I872) L.R. 7 Q.B.598, 605 per 
Blackburn J. 
(20) See 16 M.L.R. 303 where Muller-Preienfels makes clear "the 
doctrine of the undisclosed p r i n c i p a l finds no place i n the law 
of r e al property." 
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f o r the benefit of U.P., holds i t , throughout the transaction, as a 
"t r u s t - res". But again A acts not as a representative of U.P. but 
as U.P.s trustee. Thus i f Ames1 theory based upon t r u s t i s accepted, 
then a doctrine which allows U.P. to be sued by T, i s exposed as 
anomalous i n another sense. I t allows T to sue the cestui que t r u s t 
(U.P.) upon contracts entered into by the trustee (A). 
Attainment of .justice under the t r u s t theory 
To return to the question of the measure of j u s t i c e which i t 
would be possible to a t t a i n i f actions by and against the U.P. were 
barred. 
Consider f i r s t claims i n favour of A. A holds the legal t i t l e to 
the claim f o r the benefit of U.P. U.P., as cestui que t r u s t , would 
realize i n d i r e c t l y through A, as his trustee, a l l that a direct 
action at present secures f o r U.P. T would have precisely the same 
defences against A as he has at present against U.P. suing i n his 
(21) 
own name.v ' 
What, however, of imposing upon U.P. the obligations incurred by 
A i n r e l a t i o n to T? Ames maintained that the p r i n c i p l e of "equitable 
execution" would suffice to compel U.P. to make good the obligations 
of A. The relationship between U.P. and A impliedly, i f not expressly, 
involves an undertaking by U.P. to indemnify A i n respect of autho-
(22) 
rised undertakings entered on his behalf. v ' Thus i f say A entered 
i n t o a contract with T to purchase T's land f o r £10,000, although only 
A i s l i a b l e to pay the sum due under the contract, U.P. i s under a 
(21) T's defences against A would of course be legal rather than 
equitable as they may appear to be under the theory allowing 
U.P. a direct action. 
(22) See Adams v Morgan & Co. ^92^7 2 K.B.234, a f f 'd Jl92^/ 1 K.B.751, 
esp.752 where McCardie J. compared A's position to that of a 
trustee. Also Sir George Jessel M.R. i n Re Johnson, Shearman v 
Robinson (1880) 15 L.R. Ch.D. 548. Also see Brandeis, L i a b i l i t y 
of Trust Estates on contracts made f o r t h e i r benefit 15 Am. 
L.R. 449. 
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duty to provide A with such funds. A's r i g h t to indemnity i s a valu-
able asset and as such, Ames considered that by means of "equitable 
execution" T could secure to himself the benefit of A's r i g h t against 
U.P. The means whereby t h i s s a t i s f a c t i o n of T's claim could be 
attained was through an order of specific performance of U.P.s o b l i -
gation to indemnify, granted i n favour of T. In the event of A's 
insolvency, such an order would be of no int e r e s t to A's general 
(23) 
creditors, f o r the order could only be of benefit to T. ' 
Ames accepted that the t r u s t theory coupled to "equitable execu-
t i o n " had not been applied by the courts. Nevertheless, he maintained 
that had the p o s s i b i l i t y of achieving the end of allowing actions bet-
ween P and T through t h i s means been appreciated, then there would 
have been no need to have invoked the "anomalous" doctrine of the 
(24 
undisclosed p r i n c i p a l . However, as Seavey has pungently commented. 
(23) The pr i n c i p l e has been applied i n cases of trustees v/ho have been 
supplied with supplies to benefit the t r u s t estate. The trustee 
has a r i g h t to apply t r u s t property i n exoneration of l i a b i l i t i e s 
properly incurred i n administration of the t r u s t estate. Should 
the trustee prove u n w i l l i n g to enforce his r i g h t against the t r u s t 
property then the creditor may through "equitable execution" com-
pel him to do so. Ames, Cases on Trusts 2nd ed. 423 c i t e d 18 Yale 
L.J. 443. Moreover, the trustee's r i g h t may be enforced against 
the general assets of the cestui que t r u s t , Hardoon v B e l i l i o s 
/l90l7 A.C.118,123, unless the cestui can show good reason why i t 
should not be so. See also Clavering v Westley (1735) 3 P.W.402, 
reversed i n unreported appeal before Lord Talbot, referred to i n 
Walter v Northam Co., (1855) 5 D.M. and G. 629, 646. The case i s 
not authority f o r the proposition that an equitable debt w i l l be 
due from the cestui where a trustee has incurred such a debt, 
such p r i n c i p l e was expressly denied by Lord Cranworth i n Walter's 
case. However, i t does demonstrate that an equitable r i g h t of 
exoneration may l i e against the cestui where the trustee has 
incurred a debt i n execution of his t r u s t . 
(24) 29 Yale L.J. 859, 878. 
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" I f the ri g h t s of the t h i r d party are properly taken care of, as 
i n f a c t they are, the only abnormality i s the in f o r m a l i t y of allowing 
a dire c t action at law. The same i s true i n the case of s u i t against 
the p r i n c i p a l ; there should be no objection simply on the ground that 
a short cut has been taken. The only c r i t i c i s m of the doctrine that 
can have permanent value i s that i t produces unjust r e s u l t s . " 
However, i t was precisely upon the point that unjust results 
were fostered by the accepted doctrine that Ames concluded his plea 
f o r reappraisal of t r a d i t i o n a l thinking. I n three situations he 
argued the "anomalous" doctrine produced unjust results i n that T 
pr o f i t e d at the expense of the undisclosed p r i n c i p a l . He further 
argued that the principles of t r u s t and equitable execution would 
a l l e v i a t e these so called i n j u s t i c e s . The three instances he d i s -
cussed are as follows. 
1. Where an undisclosed p r i n c i p a l pays an agent i n discharge of 
his duty to indemnify, then the agents r i g h t of indemnity or 
exoneration i s ended. Consequently T can no longer maintain 
any r i g h t to equitable execution. I t i s , however, arguable 
that under the "anomalous" rule the U.P. w i l l remain l i a b l e to 
T despite his payment to A, unless the conduct of T led P to 
(25) 
suppose that T was already paid. x ' 
2. Where the misconduct of A i s such, a f t e r having contracted with 
T, (say he misappropriates goods bought on credi t f o r the U.P.) 
that he loses his r i g h t to indemnity. Again T could not main-
t a i n an action f o r equitable execution and yet under the 
(26) 
anomalous rule P would remain l i a b l e to T. ' 
(25) Considered i n d e t a i l l a t e r , p. 125 Heald v Kenworthy (1855) 
10 Ex. 739; Irv i n e v Watson (1880) 5 Q.B.D.414; Armstrong v 
Stokes (1872) L.R.7 Q.B.598; Thomson v Davenport (1829) 
9 B. and C. 78. See also Railton v Hodgson (I8O4) 4 Taunt. 
576 and Higgins, 28 M.L.R.I67 c.f. Mechem 23 Harv. L.R.513,590. 
(26) See p.134. 
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3. Where no r i g h t of exoneration ever arose because of A's having 
contracted with T i n such a manner as to exceed his instructions. 
(27) 
Again T could not maintain an action f o r equitable execution. x ' 
( 28) 
However, i t would appear under the rule i n Watteau v FenwickA ' 
that U.P. would be l i a b l e to T i f A's act would have been 
wit h i n A's ostensible or apparent authority had the agency been 
(29) 
disclosed. ' 
However, i t must be clear that there would c e r t a i n l y not be unani-
mous agreement that these situations do give r i s e to i n j u s t i c e , nor 
can i t be said that the results which Ames at t r i b u t e s to the anomalous 
doctrine are necessarily accurate. 
Appraisal of the t r u s t theory 
To return to the main thesis maintained by Ames, undoubtedly his 
explanation of the- passing of r i g h t s to the undisclosed pri n c i p a l i s 
at t r a c t i v e as a l o g i c a l scheme designed to pass A's r i g h t s and 
l i a b i l i t i e s to U.P. I t nevertheless derives i t s l o g i c a l appearance 
from an acceptance of the proposition that i t i s i l l o g i c a l to create 
(27) See Re Johnson (1880) 15 L.R.Ch.548 "Where a trader has by his 
w i l l directed his. executor or trustee to carry on his trade and 
to employ a specific portion of the t r u s t estate f o r the purpose, 
the rule i s that though the executor or trustee i s personally 
l i a b l e f o r debts incurred by him i n carrying on the trade pur-
suant to the w i l l , he has the r i g h t to resort f o r his indemnity 
to the specific assets so directed to be employed, but no 
furth e r ... but the rule does not apply where the executor or 
trustee i s i n default i n the specific t r u s t estate devoted tp 
the trade : i n such a case the defaulting executor or trustee 
not being himself e n t i t l e d to an indemnity except on terms of 
making good his default, the creditors are i n no better position.. 
(28) (1893) 1 Q.B.348. 
(29) This t h i r d instance i s of doubtful value i n t h i s context as i t i s 
probably a quite separate l i a b i l i t y from that a r i s i n g under the 
t r a d i t i o n a l doctrine under discussion. See f u l l consideration 
of the problem of Watteau v Fenwick at p.130 et seq. 
(30) See p.l26et seq. 
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a direct l i n k between the U.P. and (T. w ' In short, i f i t i s not 
i l l o g i c a l to say that A i s not the sole party to the transaction 
entered in t o with T, then Ames' theory i s exposed as being based upon 
a false premise. 
St o l j a r argues that Ames f e l l i n t o error by adopting the 
commonly held misconception that " t i t l e " i s to be considered as 
passing from one party to another as one would "throw a b a l l to 
(32) 
another. 1 1 w ' The better view i s to regard " t i t l e as merely denoting 
r i g h t s i n respect of certain "things". I n other words, t i t l e means 
the r i g h t to "take and keep". Thus where T transfers physical things 
to A, he also transfers " r i g h t s " . These " r i g h t s " merely represent a 
conclusion of law and not a f i n d i n g of f a c t . I t i s , therefore, per-
f e c t l y " l o g i c a l " to recognise the r i g h t s , as a conclusion of law, as 
vesting i n U.P. even though T i s unaware. This merely recognises a 
pri n c i p l e of law under v/hich U.P. has the same ri g h t s as A. 
Furthermore, i t i s clear that the t r u s t theory, being based upon 
notions of property r i g h t s which can be pursued either by the 
equitable beneficiary or against him, has a manifest defect i n that 
i t provides no solution f o r cases i n which benefits have either not 
passed or not been received - i t provides no solution to the execu-
te') 
tory contract. ' Moreover, as Seavey observed, although Ames 
(31) See the previous exposition of Ames1 i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the 
problem at p.95« 
(32) S t o l j a r , p.229. 
(33) C.f. Higgins, "The Equity of the Undisclosed Principal" 28 M.L.R. 
I67, 170 footnote 20. See also the problems posed by the executory 
contract i n the previous consideration of disclosed agency. 
Higgins based U.P.s l i a b i l i t y upon U.P.s duty to indemnify A. I f 
so, then of course as A's l i a b i l i t y may arise i n the case of the 
executory contract, then U.P.s l i a b i l i t y would also arise. 
However, i f A was not l i a b l e then U.P. i s not l i a b l e and t h i s 
notion i s c l e a r l y defective i n the l i g h t of Danziger v Thompson 
]}SA£7 K.B.654 discussed p.109. 
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performed a considerable service i n pointing out the analogy between 
the cestui que t r u s t and an undisclosed p r i n c i p a l , he f a i l e d to 
(34) 
observe the distinguishing features. ' 
The p r i n c i p a l i s a cestui i n so f a r as he receives p r o f i t s but 
he does not only receive p r o f i t s i n a passive manner, he controls the 
means of making the p r o f i t s . The undisclosed p r i n c i p a l i s a master 
and i t may be that t h i s feature provides the key to many of the 
(35) 
problems i n t h i s area. ' 
Fridman^^ dismisses the t r u s t theory i n these words, "Though 
the f i d u c i a r y nature or aspect of the agency relationship i s c l e a r l y 
established, there seems l i t t l e point i n t r y i n g to explain what i s 
r e a l l y a common law relationship i n terms which have an equitable 
flavour. What s i m i l a r i t y there i s between the position of an agent 
and that of a trustee ought not to be carried too f a r . " I t i s d i f f i -
c u l t to disagree with t h i s conclusion f o r , as has been noted, the 
t r u s t theory cannot meet a l l situations and the f a i l u r e to take 
account of the dissimilar features of the cestui and the undisclosed 
p r i n c i p a l renders i t misleading. Moreover i n a recent dictum Ungoed-
(37) 
Thomas, J. categorically denied the existence of such a concept; ' 
(34) 29 Yale L.J. 859. 
(35) See the conclusions based upon Mearns approach to disclosed 
agency p.76. See also Street, Foundations of Legal L i a b i l i t y , 
f o r the influence of the master/servant concept upon agency. 
(36) Fridman, p.188. 
(37) Pople v Evans ^ 9 6 8 7 2 A l l E.R.743, 749. 
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"... where there i s a contract between an agent f o r a p r i n c i p a l , whose 
i d e n t i t y i s undisclosed, then, whether t h e i r relationship with the 
t h i r d party i s considered as sounding i n contract or i n property 
r i g h t s , there i s no t r u s t relationship between any of the parties which 
can be recognised as between the t h i r d party on the one and the p r i n -
c i p a l and agent, or either of them on the other hand.11 
Receipt of Benefit Theory 
A f u r t h e r attempt to explain the underlying theory of the doctrine 
of the undisclosed p r i n c i p a l , one which again exhibits an "equitable 
(38) 
flavour" i s the "Receipt of Benefit" theory proposed by Huffcut. ' 
Huffcut, as has already been indicated, ' regarded the b e l i e f 
that there was a contractual relationship between T and TI.P. as 
"anomalous" and "unfortunate". Nevertheless, he sought to r e t a i n the 
incidents of such a relationship by suggesting a more s a t i s f y i n g basis 
f o r the mutual r i g h t s and obligations of T and U.P. He claimed that 
the l i a b i l i t y of U.P. was "probably the outcome of a kind of common 
law equity,(40) powerfully aided and extended by the f i c t i o n of the 
i d e n t i t y of the p r i n c i p a l and agent." Moreover, he claimed that " t h i s 
doctrine i s as old as the Year Books" as "the action against an undis-
closed p r i n c i p a l rests l o g i c a l l y upon the ground that the principal's 
estate has had the benefit of the contract and ought to bear the burden." 
I f i t should be assumed, f o r the moment, that a "Receipt of 
Benefit" theory was adopted by the courts then perhaps i t might be 
useful to consider j u s t one s i t u a t i o n , similar to that previously 
(38) Huffcut on Agency, 2nd ed. (1901). 
(39) See footnote 10, p.91. 
(40) Perhaps the term "common law equity would meet with the approval 
of Professor Pridman, see footnote 36, ante. 
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adverted to,^-*-) i n order to ascertain what measure of certainty the 
theory might produce. Consider where T has executed his consideration 
i n r e l a t i o n to a contract negotiated by A on behalf of U.P. I t would 
appear that the theory could impose l i a b i l i t y upon U.P., irrespective 
of the state of accounts between U.P. and A , ( ^ ) i f w a s accepted 
that consideration given to A was given to U.P. Yet again, i f t h i s 
solution was not adopted, the theory would equally serve to negate 
U.P.s l i a b i l i t y i f the state of accounts between U.P. and A was such 
that U.P. had not, i n f a c t , received any benefit. Similarly, t h i s 
l a t t e r solution would lead to the conclusion that no recovery, by T, 
would be possible where the contract was e n t i r e l y executory. 
Again, i f the f i r s t proposition was accepted, that U.P. should be 
held l i a b l e simply because he has received a benefit, then i t would 
appear to be open to the same objection as that raised i n r e l a t i o n 
to the " t r a d i t i o n a l " theory, that i t i s anomalous. A donee or bene-
f i c i a r y does not have to bear the burden of a contract simply because 
he receives the benefit of goods purchased. In the case of a donee 
i t i s quite clear that to impose such a l i a b i l i t y would be unjust and 
to base the U.P.s l i a b i l i t y upon t h i s ground alone, must be seen to be 
(43) 
equally unsatisfactory. N 
Revision of the Receipt of Benefit Theory 
However, a rather more sympathetic approach to Huffcut's theory 
reveals i t i n a more appealing form. There are two basic differences 
between the position of the undisclosed p r i n c i p a l and that of the bene-
f i c i a r y or donee under a contract. The f i r s t i s that, where A has 
acted i n accordance with U.P.s instruc t i o n s , U.P. has been d i r e c t l y 
(41) See s i t u a t i o n one, referred to i n footnote 25, p.98. 
(42) C.f. Thomson v Davenport (1829) 9 B & C 78 footnote 25, ante. 
(43) I t would simply provide grounds f o r U.P.s l i a b i l i t y to be sued 
but not to sue. 
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responsible f o r the contract being formed. He has caused the contract 
to be made. The second i s that when U.P. receives the benefit of the 
contract, p r i o r to discharging his obligation to indemnify A, then he 
obtains a benefit at a time at which he i s under an undoubted contrac-
t u a l obligation (to A) to bear i t s burden. I t may, thus, not be 
thought anomalous to hold TJ.P. l i a b l e to T where he has caused "the 
contract" and benefited. Furthermore, i t may be thought proper that 
where T has contracted with the agent of an undisclosed p r i n c i p a l then 
he should be subrogated to the r i g h t s of the agent against the 
pr i n c i p a l . 
Having arrived at what appears to be an acceptable - in t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of the "Receipt of Benefit" theory, closely supported by the notion of 
subrogation, i t i s unfortunately only too clear that i t suffers from 
the same defect as was revealed i n r e l a t i o n to the "Trust Theory". 
Neither the notion of receipt of benefit or the notion of subrogation 
would bind U.P. i f a contract was executory. I t might, moreover, be 
added that the notions produce the same r e s u l t , i n instances where (a) 
TJ.P. has expressly forbidden A's act or (b) U.P. has sett l e d his 
account with A, as was revealed to re s u l t from an application of the 
"Trust Theory", U.P. i s not l i a b l e . These are areas producing acute 
(44) 
problems i n the cases. 
The Tort Theory 
A fur t h e r theory which demands consideration i s the "Tort Theory"{ 
The theory i s based upon the simple precept that U.P., by concealing 
(44) Discussed i n r e l a t i o n to the problems of Armstrong v Stokes (1872) 
L.R.7 Q.B.598 and Watteau v Fenwick (1893) 1 Q.B.348, see p. 125 
et seq. and p.130 et seq. 
(45) Development of t h i s theory leads to the theory based upon 
assumpsit, developed by Lewis, 9 Col. L.R.116, considered 
post, p.H3» 
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his i d e n t i t y , has wrongfully deceived T and that, i n consequence, U.P. 
ought to be held l i a b l e to T. The d i f f i c u l t i e s which t h i s theory 
involves are manifest. There must be reluctance to accept that con-
cealment of U.P.s existence i s necessarily a wrong. However, even i f 
t h i s i s accepted, an action i n t o r t at T's insistence presents prob-
lems as to assessment of d a m a g e s . B a s i c a l l y to r t i o u s damage i s 
assessed as merely the expense and trouble involved i n T's negotia-
tions. There could be no p o s s i b i l i t y of an order f o r specific per-
formance being made against U.P. A, i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , would be 
unable to s p e c i f i c a l l y perform, being t o t a l l y without the means,1 and 
yet U.P., who has the means, would remain untouched. I t would appear 
to be clear that a proper measure of damages i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n i s 
that appropriate to contract. T ought to be able to recover, against 
U.P., a sum s u f f i c i e n t to compensate him f o r the loss of the benefit 
which he would have received had there been no "breach of contract" 
by U.P.(47> 
Moreover, a theory based purely upon a " f a u l t p r i n c i p l e " f a i l s 
to provide a remedy where U.P. has not directed A to conceal U.P.s 
i d e n t i t y . No doubt i f U.P. expressly instructed A to conceal U.P.s 
involvement, then t h i s may be regarded as deceit. However, i t has 
never been a pr i n c i p l e of the common law that merely to give another 
an appearance of wealth, so that a t h i r d party may be influenced to 
extend cre d i t to or place reliance upon that other, should give r i s e 
(46) See Koufos v Czarnikow jJ.3G%J 1 A.C.350 as to the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the rules f o r assessment of damages i n contract and i n 
t o r t . See also the special problems as to assessment i n the 
t o r t of deceit i n Doyle v Olby (ironmongers) Ltd. ]V)&£J 
2 Q.B. 158. 
(47) On the assumption, as always, that the doctrine of the undis-
closed p r i n c i p a l i s to be maintained. See p.91« 
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to l i a b i l i t y / 4 8 ^ 
The need f o r contractual form as a basis f o r the doctrine of the 
undisclosed p r i n c i p a l . 
Thus f a r the d i f f i c u l t i e s revealed as inherent i n the various 
theories advanced, are that they do not adequately provide f o r recip-
rocal claims between U.P. and T (the unrefined form of the "Receipt 
of Benefit Theory") or they are r e s t r i c t e d to purely executed con-
sideration (the "Trust Theory") or the relevant principles f o r 
assessment of damages appear .inadequate, (the "Tort Theory"). I n 
short, i n order to circumscribe the legal consequences, of the well 
accepted doctrine of the undisclosed p r i n c i p l e , the theory must 
have a t r u l y "contractual" basis. The concept of contract i s the 
only legal form which adequately meets the case and i t would appear 
that i t must be presumed to form the basis of the established doctrine. 
"A p r i m i t i v e and highly r e s t r i c t e d form of assignment" 
Goodhart and Hamson put forward such a theory, accepting the 
basis of the doctrine as contractual, the contract being entered into 
by A and T. The undisclosed principal's r i g h t s , they submitted, were 
based upon a "primitive and highly restricted'form of assignment. " ^ ^ 
This theory involves two basic points: (a) that a contract does 
exist between A and T and (b) that there i s no direc t contract bet-
ween U.P. and T.^°) This theory achieves the desired end of pro-
ducing "contractual" features - reciprocal claims between U.P. and T 
(48) See Jerome v Bentley /l9527 2 A11.E.R.114; Mercantile Credit Co. 
Ltd. v Hamblin J\%^J2 Q.B.194. Early commentators cl e a r l y f e l t 
some reserve as to the acceptability of the common lav/ r u l e , see 
Seavey, 29 Yale L.J. 876, n.49» also the general expression of 
sorrow at the common law rule 4 C.L.J. 320, 328. 
(49) 4 C.L.J. 320, 352. 
(50) A straightforward denial of the position as i t was stated to be i n 
Said v Butt /I92S/ 3 K.B.497» 500 per McCardie J. "Before the 
p l a i n t i f f (U.P.) can succeed he must establish that there was a 
binding and subsisting contract between the Palace Theatre (T) 
and himself."' 
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embracing both executed and executory obligations - yet i t claims a 
r a t i o n a l explanation which does not deny the basic p r i n c i p l e that a 
contract i s a personal bond between the contracting parties (A and T). 
The doctrine of the undisclosed p r i n c i p a l , they claim, i s no more 
anomalous than the doctrine of assignment. Undisclosed principals are 
only anomalous " i n the sense that assignees with a power to sue are 
anomalous ... they are not anomalous i n any other sense. Their 
presence does not contradict the fundamental principles of contract; 
i t l i m i t s only the rule that no person but the contracting party may 
sue or be sued on the contract," ^  ^  
Primitive assignment and precedents 
I w i l l consider, b r i e f l y , the cases upon which the "primitive 
assignment" theory depends. The argument i s , that to contend that 
the contract i n which U.P. i s involved i s a contract between himself 
and T, i s to contradict certain cases. ' I t i s contended that i f X 
knows that Y w i l l not ( f o r any reason, capricious or otherwise) con-
t r a c t with him, he cannot "steal" Y's consent to a contract. There 
i s no "reasonable expectation" that the "contract" w i l l be binding. 
I f , therefore, U.P. i s aware that T would not contract with him but 
arranges to contract v i a A, i f such a contract i s enforceable by 
U.P. then the contract cannot be between U.P. and T but must be 
merely, f o r some other reason, enforceable by U.P. 
In order to "prove" t h i s reasoning, as disproving the U.P. and T 
contract, Goodhart and Hamson c i t e Nash v D i x ^ and Dyster v 
R a n d a l l , w h i c h are claimed to be "express decisions on facts 
(1) 4 C.L.J. 320, 346. 
(2) "Well decided cases" according to Goodhart and Hamson, 4 C.L.J. 
320, 347. 
(3) (1898) 78 L.J. 445. 
(4) Zl9267 Ch.932. 
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expressly r a i s i n g the question whether there was an enforceable con-
t r a c t when the p r i n c i p a l knew that the t h i r d party defendant would 
not contract with him, the p r i n c i p a l . " v ' However, I contend that 
Nash v Dix does not present an arguable case i n the present context 
as i t was expressly found that A acted on his own account and there-
b y 
fore discount argument based upon t h i s case. ' 
In Dyster v Randall, U.P. believed that T would not s e l l him 
certain land, he therefore engaged A to buy i t f o r him without d i s -
closing U.P. Later, A disclosed the agency relationship and T 
refused to complete. Nevertheless, U.P. was awarded specific 
performance of the sale against T. Goodhart and Hamson conclude 
from t h i s t h a t , therefore, the contract cannot have been between U.P. 
and T, f o r i n such circumstances U.P. has attempted to "steal" T's 
consent. The contract which i s enforced must be that between A and T. 
However, such a conclusion, based upon such tenuous foundations, must 
be suspect. The l i n e of reasoning, adopted by the court, displayed an 
extremely robust approach to a p r a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n i n which the 
niceties implied by Goodhart and Hamson appear to have l i t t l e applica-
t i o n . T did indeed plead that he had been deceived, so that no con-
t r a c t existed at a l l . However, i n r e j e c t i n g t h i s submission, the 
court noted f i r s t , that the personal q u a l i f i c a t i o n s of A formed no 
material part of the agreement; second, that i f A had not acted f o r 
U.P., but had acted alone, there was no reason why he should not s e l l 
to U.P. There was l i t t l e point i n r e s t r i c t i n g U.P.s r i g h t s in.these 
(5) 4 C.L.J. 320, 348. 
(6) The case involved the Trustees of a congregational Chapel who 
would not s e l l to Roman Catholics. The Roman Catholics asked N 
to buy and r e - s e l l to them f o r a p r o f i t of £100. The Trustees 
refused to complete and i t was held that the agreement was good 
and enforceable but that N had acted on his own account and not 
as agent. 
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circumstances. ' The court also noted that as t h i s was merely a 
simple agreement f o r the sale of land, A could have assigned the 
benefit to any person and the assignee v/ould have been able to 
enforce specific performance. Perhaps i t was t h i s l a t t e r point 
which gave r i s e to the "primitive assignment" theory. 
Denial of the Goodhart and Hamson approach 
Perhaps a more t e l l i n g case, which denies the Goodhart and 
Hamson approach, i s Danziger v Thompson, ' decided twelve years 
a f t e r publication o f ' t h e i r a r t i c l e . Here, an infant had rented a 
f l a t from T under a wr i t t e n agreement. The agreement was expressed 
as being between T and the infant (A), who was described as the 
"tenant". I t was held that parol evidence was admissable to show that 
A entered the agreement as agent f o r her father (U.P.). Consequently, 
U.P. being the "real tenant", T recovered judgment against U.P. I n 
order that T should succeed, i t was cl e a r l y necessary to f i n d a 
primary l i a b i l i t y i n U.P., not dependent upon any "quasi-assignment", 
f o r otherwise the action would have foundered upon the infant's con-
t r a c t u a l incapacity. 
To c i t e one furt h e r instance i l l u s t r a t i n g that the doctrine of 
the undisclosed p r i n c i p a l does not accord with the notion of assign-
ment, regard may be had to the decision of the House of Lords i n 
(9) 
Keighley, Maxsted and Co. v Durante ' I n t h i s case i t was held that 
the p r i n c i p a l , on whose behalf an agent purports to act, must be 
(7) I t was expressly noted that had the personal q u a l i t i e s of A been 
an essential ingredient of the agreement, then the case would 
have been decided d i f f e r e n t l y . Discussed l a t e r , p. I l l et seq. 
(8) /I94i7 K.B. 654. 
(9) 2T9017 A.C. 240. 
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named or have "been ascertainable by the t h i r d party when the unautho-
ri s e d act was done, i n order that the pri n c i p a l might r a t i f y the act. 
I f the basis of the doctrine of the undisclosed p r i n c i p a l was anala-
gous to assignment of a contract between A and T, then the disclosure 
of P would be quite immaterial. Indeed, there would have been nothing 
to prevent assignment of the ri g h t s of A on the actual facts of the 
case.^ 1 0^ Moreover, the d i f f i c u l t y which t h e i r Lordships experienced 
with what they perceived as common law prin c i p l e s , would be in e x p l i c -
able i f the doctrine had been simply a form of a s s i g n m e n t . ^ 
Nevertheless, the notion of assignment does bear some s i m i l a r i t y 
to the doctrine of the undisclosed p r i n c i p a l . The main point of simi-
l a r i t y , which i t emphasises, i s that the undisclosed p r i n c i p a l ( l i k e 
the assignee of a chose i n action i n his relationship to the debtor), 
(12) 
may be met by any defences or equities which T would have against A. ' 
However, dissimilar points which must be noted a r e : ^ ^ 
(a) Assignment requires a voluntary act by the assignor, whereas agency 
involves a conferment of interests by operation of law. The agent 
has no choice, his very act of creating a contract contemporan-
eously involves the creation of ri g h t s and duties i n U.P. 
(b) The assignee of contractual r i g h t s loses his r i g h t to sue upon 
assignment. The agent retains the r i g h t to sue T u n t i l U.P. 
intervenes and himself sues. 
(10) See the judgment of Scruttons L.J. i n the Court of Appeal 
/T90p7 1 Q.B. 629. 
(11) See per Lord James, "To establish that a man's thoughts 
unexpressed and unrecorded can form the basis of a contract 
so as to bind other persons and make them l i a b l e on a contract 
they never made with persons they never heard of seems a some-
what d i f f i c u l t task." at p.251. 
(12) Sims v Bond (1833) 5 B. and Ad. 389; Browning v Provincial 
Insurance Co. of Canada (1873) L.R. 5 P.C.263. 
(13) See also Williams 23 Can. B.R. 380, 408 distinguishing U.P. 
from an assignee. 
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(c) A party to an assignable contract i s free to assign his ri g h t s 
under the contract. The rules as to the p r i o r i t y of assignees 
are well se t t l e d . An agent who enters an assignable contract on 
behalf of U.P. may also, i t would appear, assign his r i g h t s . 
However, what i s the order of p r i o r i t y of the assignees and U.P.? 
The p r i n c i p a l i s not an assignee and therefore the rules as to 
p r i o r i t y of assignees are not a p p l i c a b l e . ^ 4 ) 
(15) 
Reconsideration of Oyster v Randall^ ' 
Although Dyster v Randall may not adequately support the assign-
ment theory, i t may be that i t indicates a proper approach to the 
doctrine under discussion. As previously considered, the court 
awarded specific performance of a contract at the instance of the 
undisclosed p r i n c i p a l despite the fact that U.P. believed that had T 
known of his existence he would not have entered into a contract. 
However, i t was accepted that the decision would have been d i f f e r e n t 
i f the personal qu a l i f i c a t i o n s of A had been a material factor to T. 
This lays emphasis, I believe properly, upon the contract between 
(16) 
U.P. and T. ' A leading case i n which t h i s approach was adopted 
i s Said v Butt.^ 1"^ Here U.P. (Said) knowing that T (Palace Theatre 
Ltd.) would not contract with him so as to s e l l him a t i c k e t f o r a 
f i r s t night performance, engaged T (Pollock) to buy him such a t i c k e t . 
(14) See Powell, p.166 f o r a suggested approach. 
(15) ^9267 Ch.932. 
(16) Emphasis upon a contract between A and T which, when U.P. seeks 
to enforce, T seeks to avoid because of mistake as to P's 
i d e n t i t y leads to the following l o g i c a l progression. T cannot 
prove he was mistaken as to the i d e n t i t y of A unless A has 
actually impersonated another. I f T argues that he only 
intended to contract with A, then, the reply must be that he 
has e f f e c t i v e l y done so. 
(17) ^19267 3 K.B.497. 
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T, without disclosing U.P. i n any way, contracted i n the usual way f o r 
a t i c k e t . Eventually, on the f i r s t ' n i g h t , U.P. was refused entry to 
the theatre. The question f o r decision was whether U.P., had a r i g h t , 
against T, to occupy the seat.^ ' McCardie J. held that U.P. was 
not able to establish a "binding and subsisting contract between the 
(19) 
Palace Theatre and himself" x ' and consequently had no r i g h t to a 
seat. This decision squarely places the essence of the doctrine upon 
the contract between U.P. and T. This directs attention to the per-
sonal f a c t o r s w h i c h could affe c t the U.P. and T relationship and 
(21) 
so avoids the lo g i c a l problems v ' previously referred to and also 
(18) Goodhart and Hamson submitted that the answer to the question 
ought (consistently with the assignment theory) to have been 
either (a) "No; t h i s i n the circumstances i s a contract, similar 
to a contract to be a lodger i n a private house or to be a 
member of a club, the benefit of which may be taken only by the 
contracting party, the benefit of which i s unassignable. Said 
i s not the contracting party. Said therefore has no r i g h t to 
s i t i n t h i s seat on t h i s night." Or a l t e r n a t i v e l y (b) "No; i n 
the circumstances, by his conduct, Pollock, i n his contract 
between himself and the Palace Theatre made a representation 
that he, Pollock, and he, Pollock, alone, had any interest i n 
t h i s contract." 4 C.L.J.320, 349. However, i t must surely be 
beyond the normal assumption of the parties that i n booking a 
theatre seat one impliedly represents that no one else w i l l 
occupy the seat. Nor, i t would appear, can i t be assumed that 
the benefit of a contract to s i t i n a theatre i s of so personal 
a nature as to be unassignable. I f either of Goodhart and 
Hamson's suggestions were to be the case, then i t would be 
incumbent upon every person who buys a seat f o r another to d i s -
close the agency, c.f. Powell, p . l 6 l . 
(19) At p.500. 
(20) I t i s the d i s t i n c t i o n between "personal factors" and "hindsight 
or caprice" which j u s t i f i e s the d i s t i n c t i o n between Said v Butt 
and Dyster v Randall. 
(21) See footnote 16, p.111. 
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(22) the impractical d i f f i c u l t i e s of the assignment theory. v ' Moreover, 
t h i s approach i s e n t i r e l y consistent with the e a r l i e r case of Smith v 
(23) 
Wheatcroft v ' i n which X entered into negotiations with T, intending 
to buy T's land. Before an agreement was completed X became agent of 
U.P. I t was held that the agreement, subsequently made, was enforce-
able, because T could not show that he had alv/ays had a specific 
objection to dealing with U.P. or that his motive f o r withdrawal was 
other than "hindsight or caprice". 
By acceptance of the doctrine as expounded i n Said v Butt one 
may achieve the desired end of d i r e c t i n g attention to the problem area 
immediately, without hindering the process with the niceties of non-
assignable contracts. However, acceptance of t h i s exposition requires 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the assertion that a contract can exist between P 
and T when T i s unaware of P*s existence. 
Theory based upon contract 
H i s t o r i c a l perspective 
In English law, two forms of contract are recognised; agreements 
(24) 
by specialty and agreements by parol. ' However, the doctrine of 
(25) 
the undisclosed p r i n c i p a l does not apply to contracts under seal; ' 
(22) See footnote 18, p.112. 
(23) (1878) 9 Ch.B.223. 
(24) Per Skynner L.C.B. i n Rann and others Executors of Mary Hughes v 
Isabella Hughes, Administratrix of J. Hughes i n Error. (1778) 
7 T.R.350. 
(25) Combes case 9 Co.Rep.75a at 77a "When any has authority, as 
attorney to do any act, he ought to do i t i n his name who gives 
the authority; f o r he appoints the attorney to be i n his place, 
and to represent his person; and therefore the attorney cannot 
do i t i n his own name, nor as his proper act, but i n the name, 
and as the act of him who gives the authority." 
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A consideration of the d i s t i n c t i o n between the two forms of contract 
i s therefore l i k e l y to reveal aspects leading to understanding of 
the doctrine of the undisclosed p r i n c i p a l . 
"The a f f i n i t y of the deed i s with g i f t , not with bargain, and i t 
i s f a i r to say that the so c a l l e d 'contract under s e a l ' has l i t t l e i n 
common with agreement save i n i t s name and i t s history... " ^ ^ Thus 
i n essence the feature distinguishing the simple contract from the 
deed i s that factor which distinguishes contract from g i f t , i n short, 
consideration. The contract theory to be discussed asserts that con-
(27) 
sideration i s the connecting l i n k between U.P. and T. ' I t i s of 
course a natural corollary of t h i s theory that the doctrine should 
not apply to deeds. 
The leading case of Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. v Selfridge 
(29) 
& Co. Ltd. ' lends much support to the view that a contract formed 
by consideration supplied by U.P. forms the essence of the r e l a t i o n -
ship between U.P. and T. The House of Lords f u l l y considered the 
argument and indeed approached the case as being e s s e n t i a l l y concerned 
with an undisclosed p r i n c i p a l . Two short passages, from the judg-
ments of the Lord Chancellor and Lord Dunedin, are s u f f i c i e n t to d i s -
play t h e i r Lordships' approach. 
(26) Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston, Law of Contract, 8th ed. p.18. 
(27) 16 M.L.R.299, 306. Muller-Freienfels, "The Undisclosed P r i n c i p a l . " 
(28) Seavey accepted t h i s as a proposition of law but questioned i t s 
u t i l i t y , at l e a s t when both seal and consideration were present. 
29 Yale L.J. 859, 880. 
(29) Jyy^J A.C. 847; 84 L.J.(K.B.) 1680; 113 L.T.386; 31 T.L.R. 399-
9 
115. 
"... a p r i n c i p a l not named ( i n t h i s case an undisclosed p r i n c i p a l ) i n 
a contract may sue upon i t , i f the. promisor r e a l l y contracted as agent. 
But again, i n order to e n t i t l e him so to sue he must have given con-
sideration either personally or through the promisee, acting as his 
agent i n giving i t . " ^ ^ 
" I should have no d i f f i c u l t y i n the circumstances of t h i s case 
i n holding i t proved that the agreement was t r u l y made by Dew as agent 
f o r Dunlop, or, i n other words,• that Dunlop was the undisclosed p r i n -
c i p a l , and as such can sue on the agreement. Nonetheless, i n order to 
enforce i t he must show consideration ... moving from Dunlop to 
S e l f r i d g e . " ^ 1 ^ 
Thus the essence of U.P.'s being able to sue T i s that U.P. has 
given consideration. Only the phenomenon of consent i s absent from 
(32) 
the t r a d i t i o n a l view of contract. ' U.P. i s the person who "pays 
the money" and receives the benefit, he actually shoulders the burden 
(30) Per Lord Haldane L.C. at p.853. 
. ( 3 l ) Per Lord Dunedin at p.855* 
(32) I f the r i g h t of U.P. to sue T was simply recognised i n order to 
avoid c i r c u i t y of action (as was suggested by Diplock L.J.'in 
Freeman and Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd. 
J\3&£J 1 A H E' R« 6 5°» 644), then surely U.P. could sue i n 
such a s i t u a t i o n as t h i s . A could sue f o r breach of the agree-
ment and U.P. could sue A i f he f a i l e d to enforce the agreement. 
Yet t h e i r Lordships did not overlook the p o s s i b i l i t y of Dew 
enforcing the agreement, per Lord Parmoor " I abstain from d i s -
cussing what remedy Messrs. A.J. Dew & Co. might have on t h e i r 
contract with the respondents ..." I f the Trust theory was the 
true theory then again surely U.P. as beneficiary could enforce 
through his trustee., A, a contract made f o r his benefit. Ames, 
however, did recognise that the Trust theory could not be 
regarded as an " i s " but simply an "ought". 
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of the agreement i n the form of a detriment which forms the considera-
t i o n moving to T. 
In broad terms Muller-Freienfels has noted what he regards as the 
coherence of the doctrine of the undisclosed p r i n c i p a l , founded upon 
the basis of consideration, with the h i s t o r i c a l development of con-
(33) 
t r a c t . 7 The concept of the undisclosed p r i n c i p a l , developing-
through the Law Merchant, i s seen as naturally leading to the notion 
of bargain or consideration. Only the intentions of the parties could 
be a bar to a contract between U.P. and T. (54-) ^ u s i i j ^ ^ s n o C o i n c i -
dence that the pri n c i p l e of consideration was f i n a l l y s e t t l e d at the 
end of the seventeenth century, and that there i s no clear case of an 
undisclosed pri n c i p a l before the eighteenth century." He claims that 
English judges of the eighteenth century preferred to follow the doc-
t r i n e of consideration, rather than the intentions of the parties, 
(35) 
because of i t s objective and pr a c t i c a l character. v ' Obviously i f 
motive had been important, then establishing a U.P. and T contract 
would have been d i f f i c u l t . However, i f motive i s not important, i t s 
absence i s not f a t a l . I t i s a f a i l u r e on the part of more recent com-
m e n t a t o r s ^ ^ to appreciate the objective existence of contract, 
(37) 
being themselves obsessed with the modern view that a mental 
(33) 16 M.L.R. 299, 308. 
(34) This p o s s i b i l i t y i s of course recognised i n the exceptions to the 
doctrine which take into account, i n t e r a l i a , personal factors. 
(35) "Motive i s not the same thin g as consideration" per Patteson J. 
i n Thomas v Thomas (1842) 2 Q.B.851. 
(36) Pollock 3 L.Q.R.359, 12 L.Q.R.204, 14 L.Q.R.2; Seavey 29 Yale L.J. 
859, 877." 
(37) Although more recently even the mental element i s being questioned. 
See P.S. Atiyah Inaugural Lecture delivered at the Australian 
National University Canberra, 29th July 1970 "Consideration i n 
contracts - a fundamental restatement. 1 1 
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element i s essential, which has led to castigation of the doctrine of 
the undisclosed pri n c i p a l as anoraolous. 
This broad outline of the h i s t o r i c a l development of the doctrine 
of the undisclosed p r i n c i p a l does of course r e c a l l the more detailed 
consideration of the development of contract, from assumpsit, 
undertaken i n the e a r l i e r chapter of t h i s thesis devoted to disclosed 
but unauthorised acts. However, because of the close relationship 
between the argument mounted by Muller-Freienfels and that developed 
( 38) 
by Lewis, ' i t i s necessary to pursue the development of assumpsit 
a l i t t l e f u r t h e r , s p e c i f i c a l l y i n r e l a t i o n to the undisclosed 
p r i n c i p a l . 
Further consideration of the h i s t o r i c a l origins of the doctrine of 
the undisclosed p r i n c i p a l . 
Just as Muller-Freienfels finds the ru l e that an undisclosed 
p r i n c i p a l cannot sue or be sued upon a deed e n t i r e l y i n keeping with 
a doctrine based upon early concepts of contractual form, so Lewis 
explains t h i s aspect of the doctrine. Again the point i s made that 
the binding force behind the archaic formal contract under seal i s 
form i t s e l f . A man i s bound by a formal contract under seal because 
he has promised, intending to be l e g a l l y bound. Thus no matter how 
inadequate modern explanations may be f o r refusing to hold an undis-
closed p r i n c i p a l bound on a sealed instrument executed by his agent 
as p r i n c i p a l , i t i s clear that so to hold the undisclosed p r i n c i p a l 
bound would be to disregard the fundamental nature of the formal con-
t r a c t . The undisclosed p r i n c i p a l has not formally promised-to be 
bound, therefore, how can he be so bound? 
With respect to the basic s i t u a t i o n i n which the undisclosed 
p r i n c i p a l i s sued by and able to sue T, again objections to these 
(38) 9 Col. L.R.116. 
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actions are, when seen against h i s t o r i c a l development of contract, 
shown to be misfounded. 
One of the most ancient contracts, enforced by an action i n debt, 
was the contract a r i s i n g from the completed sale. Here the binding 
force flows from a "quid pro quo". Receipt of something of value 
created an enforceable promise, not simply because of a promise, but, 
because of receipt of a benefit. Long before actions on assumpsit 
were raised, actions i n debt were brought successfully by persons 
b e n e f i c i a l l y e n t i t l e d to payment simply because they were i n s t r u -
mental i n furnishing a benefit. ' 
However, the action of assumpsit or other action f o r breach of 
contract can now be brought wherever i n former times an action of 
debt f o r an obligation a r i s i n g from a commercial transaction could 
have been brought. Any combination of circumstances which gives r i s e 
to a simple contract on which an action of debt could have been 
brought also brings i n t o existence a simple contract based upon con-
sideration. This being so i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see any theoretical 
objection to an action against the undisclosed p r i n c i p a l on the con-
t r a c t developed through assumpsit. The defendants l i a b i l i t y on a 
contract i n the action of assumpsit i s based upon the p l a i n t i f f ' s 
a b i l i t y to show that the defendant has caused the p l a i n t i f f to do 
something which he would not otherwise have done, and which the 
(39) See "The l i m i t a t i o n s of the action of assumpsit as a f f e c t i n g the 
r i g h t of the beneficiary" 52 American Law Register 764 and 53 
American Law Register 112. The subsequent actions of English 
courts i n denying r i g h t s to a beneficiary are described as 
"revealing how f a r ideas fundamental to contract developed i n 
assumpsit (embodying consideration) have tended to o b l i t e r a t e 
the fundamental conceptions l y i n g at the foundation of the more 
ancient contractual l i a b i l i t y expressed by the wr i t s of account 
and debt." 
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defendant has stipulated he should d o . ^ ^ Thus, the l i a b i l i t y of an 
undisclosed p r i n c i p a l (or a disclosed p r i n c i p a l ) l i e s i n his having 
caused a contract with T to be made. The basis of the action on 
assumpsit i s simply that the defendant has so acted so as to cause the 
p l a i n t i f f to adopt a p a r t i c u l a r course of action i n expectation of a 
promised benefit. 
To allow the undisclosed p r i n c i p a l and T reciprocal actions, 
therefore, may be seen as i n perfect accord with the underlying con-
cept of contract developed through assumpsit. There i s no reason to 
deny an action simply because the motivating force, the undisclosed 
p r i n c i p a l , i s hidden. 
The assumpsit theory thus reaches the conclusion that where T 
contracts with the agent of an undisclosed p r i n c i p a l , the contract i s 
with the undisclosed p r i n c i p a l and not with the agent.^^^ 
(40) See p. 40 et seq. i n chapter I I on disclosed agency f o r the 
explanation of executory contracts. 
(41) I f - i t should be argued that the undoubted action which A i s per-
mitted against T i s inconsistent with the r i g h t of action being 
vested i n U.P., t h i s may be countered, quite shortly, by r e f e r -
ence to Gardiner v Davis (1825) 2 C. & P. 49. In t h i s case A was 
permitted an action against T v/here A had carried on a business 
of cow-keeper on behalf of U.P. In answer to A's action, T 
adduced evidence that A was not owner of the business. Abbott C.J. 
countered by explaining that "... the person ostensibly carrying 
on the trade i s , by law, e n t i t l e d to recover f o r goods sold i n the 
course of trade, unless the person so suffering him to carry on 
the trade interferes by asserting his or her r i g h t to the sum due 
... Mrs. Evans (U.P.) has taken no step whatever to assert any 
r i g h t she may have to t h i s money and therefore taking i t that the 
p l a i n t i f f (A) was carrying on the trade i n his own name with her 
p r i v i t y and consent but was r e a l l y a sort of agent to her, as 
she has not interfered to assert any claim to t h i s money, he would 
s t i l l be e n t i t l e d to recover i n t h i s action." In short, i f A 
does not sue T then he sues on behalf of U.P., because of the 
p r i v i t y between A and U.P. and sues upon U.P.s contract. See 
also Joseph v Knox (1813) 3 Camp.320. 
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The agent, because he has asserted he i s a pr i n c i p a l i s unable to deny-
that he i s to be treated as a pr i n c i p a l by T, nevertheless "the law 
with equal consistency and propriety allows the person who has con-
tracted, believing the contract to be with the agent, to proceed on 
the contract as i t actually i s a contract with the real though undis-
closed p r i n c i p a l . '•^'O 
The technical basis of the contract theory would appear sound and 
examination of the early cases, i n which the doctrine was developed, 
appears to extend the support f o r the theory. I t i s necessary to con-
sider but few cases to r e f l e c t the general position. 
Early cases supporting the contract or assumpsit theory. 
The case of Scrimshire v Alderton,(43) f r e q U e n t i y regarded as 
inaugurating the doctrine of the undisclosed p r i n c i p a l , i t s e l f 
contains a clear statement as to the legal relationship created bet-
ween P and T when the parties are unaware of one another. Here, a 
farmer sold oats through a factor who undertook the r i s k of f a i l u r e 
of the buyer. Because of t h i s undertaking, the factor did not trouble 
to inform the farmer of the buyer. The factor f a i l e d and upon di s -
covering who the buyer was, the farmer gave him notice not to pay the 
factor which, nevertheless, he did. The farmer brought an action. 
The Lord Chief Justice stated the rule of law to be applied, i n t h i s 
way: "a factors sale does by the general rule of law create a contract 
between the owner and the buyer." 
(42) 9 Col. L.R.116, 132. 
(43) (1743) 2 Stra. 1182; 93 E.R. 1114. 
(44) See Holmes, The History of Agency, 3 Select Essays i n Anglo-
American Legal History, p.390. Also Goodhart and Hamson 4 C.L.J. 
320. S t o l j a r challenges t h i s assertion, holding that the doc-
t r i n e was already i m p l i c i t i n previous decisions, p.207, see also 
Garratt v Cullum, (1709) Buller, N.P.42. 
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Cothay v Fennell^^) contains an equally positive statement of 
pr i n c i p l e . " I f an agent makes a contract i n his own name the p r i n c i -
pal may sue and be sued upon i t ; f o r i t i s a general r u l e , that 
whenever an express contract i s made, an action i s maintainable upon 
i t , either i n the name of the person with whom i t was actually made, 
or i n the name of the person with whom, i n point of law, i t was made." 
An important but neglected case r e - v i s i t e d 
The rather neglected case of Drakeford v P i e r c y ^ ^ , i t i s sub-
mitted, i s a most important decision depending upon the existence of 
a contract between an undisclosed p r i n c i p a l and T. The Court of 
Queens Bench was a p a r t i c u l a r l y strong court, Blackburn J., Shee J., 
and Lush J., s i t t i n g . The action, upon an account stated, was f o r 
goods sold and delivered by P to T. T, the defendant, pleaded that 
the goods were sold and delivered by one Daines (A) and that Daines 
sold as apparent p r i n c i p a l and that the defendant bought from Daines 
as vendor on his own account without notice that he was only P's agent 
Further, that the defendant, without notice that Daines was any other 
than the p r i n c i p a l , paid the price to him before he knew that P was 
owner of the goods. I t was held that the plea i n defence was bad 
unless T alleged either that A was a factor, or that P had authorised 
A either to represent himself as a pri n c i p a l or to hold himself out as 
e n t i t l e d to receive payment.(47) 
(45) (1830) 8 L.J. K.B. 302; 10 B. and C. 671; 109 E.R. 599. 
(46) (1866) 7 B. & S. 515; 14 L.T.403. 
(47) By the general law, an agent f o r sale does not normally have 
authority to receive payment. Linck, Moeller & Co. v Jameson 
(1885) 2 T.L.R. 206. 
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I t i s clear that i f A has authority to act as a p r i n c i p a l , T i s 
e n t i t l e d to treat him as a p r i n c i p a l . Payment to A w i l l discharge T. 
to apply when A has no authority to act as p r i n c i p a l . The basis of 
t h i s submission i s that because T i s unaware of P, T's contract i s 
solely with A; u n t i l A discovers P's existence there i s no reason 
whatever why T should not obtain a discharge by paying A. However, 
the rule i n Drakeford v Piercy i s e n t i r e l y consistent with the theory 
that T's contract i s with U.P. and, however d i f f i c u l t , i t i s the duty 
of a debtor to seek out and pay his creditor.(^®) The decision i n 
Drakeford*s case r e l i e s upon the contract theory and Powell's concern 
that i t "would be absurd i f a debtor i n any contract had to withhold 
payment u n t i l he was quite certain that the other contracting party 
had no undisclosed p r i n c i p a l behind him" i s simply an emotive plea. 
The rule i s sound, has subsequently been reflected i n p r i n c i p l e ^ " ^ and 
merely amounts to the proposition that T must bear the loss when A 
acts without authority i n concealing his agency. 
Consideration of anomalies i n the development of undisclosed agency 
i n the l i g h t of a constant underlying p r i n c i p l e . 
Certain problem areas i n undisclosed agency have come to be 
regarded with a degree of stoicism. The problems of Armstrong v 
Hov/ever, i t has been submitted by Powell (49) that the same rule ought 
(48) Coates v Lewes (1808) 1 Camp.444. 
(49) Powell, p.172. 
(50) Heald v Kenworthy (1855) 10 Ex. 739. 
( l ) See the pr i n c i p l e reflected i n Jerome v Bentley & C< 
2 A l l E.R.114; Mercantile Credit Co. Ltd. v Hamblin 
2 Q.B. 242. 
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Stokes v ', Humble v Hunter w', Election and Set-off are notorious. I t 
i s c e r t a i n l y a useful exercise to ascertain the degree of certainty 
which may be attained from an application of the contract theory to 
these areas. 
The basis f o r the contract theory, underlying the doctrine of the 
undisclosed p r i n c i p a l , l i e s i n the ancient forms of action, basically 
assumpsit. However, despite the doctrine of precedent, the under-
l y i n g j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r contractual l i a b i l i t y has undergone consider-
able change. Pollock, Anson and Holland supported a theory of contract 
based upon the consensus of the p a r t i e s . T h e doctrine of the undis-
closed p r i n c i p a l was developed p r i o r to t h i s change but under the 
influence of the "consensus" theory the doctrine appeared anomalous 
and t h i s led to exceptions and problem areas which r e f l e c t the c o n f l i c t 
(5) 
between the underlying principles. ' 
(2) (1872) 7 Q.B. 598. 
(3) (1848) 12 Q.B. 307. 
(4) "The at t i t u d e of these writers seems to a large extent due to an 
attempt to force contract, i n English law, into the s t r a i t j a c k e t of 
the analysis which Continental w r i t e r s , notably Savigny, have made 
of contract as i t appears i n the l a t e r Roman law and Continental 
codes based upon that law." Salmond and Williams, "On Contracts", 
2nd ed. p.18. 
(5) Blackburn J. i n Armstrong v Stokes displays a d i s t r u s t of the early 
development and indeed, i t i s submitted, a misunderstanding. " I t 
i s , v/e think, too f i r m l y established, to be questioned now, that, 
where a person employs another to make a contract of purchase f o r 
him, he, as p r i n c i p a l , i s l i a b l e to the s e l l e r , though the s e l l e r 
never heard of his existence, and entered i n t o the contract solely 
on the credit of the person whom he believed to be the p r i n c i p a l , 
though i n fact he i s not. I t has often been doubted whether i t 
was o r i g i n a l l y r i g h t to so hold; but doubts of t h i s kind now come 
too l a t e : f o r we think i f i t i s established law that , i f on the 
f a i l u r e of the person, with whom alone the vendor believed himself 
to be contracting, the vendor discovers that i n r e a l i t y there i s an 
undisclosed p r i n c i p a l behind, he i s e n t i t l e d to take advantage of 
t h i s unexpected god-send..." 
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The problem of Humble v Hunter 
One of the f i r s t examples of the influence of the new approach to 
contract causing c o n f l i c t with established principles of undisclosed 
agency is' the decision i n Humble v Hunter. The facts of the case were 
simply that A signed a charter-party i n his own name describing himself 
as "owner" of the chartered ship. When the f r e i g h t remained unpaid, 
A's p r i n c i p a l , TJ.P., sued T. Lord Denman, C.J., said that A, by des-
c r i b i n g himself as "owner", contracted as p r i n c i p a l and that therefore 
U.P. could not sue. This reasoning of course t o t a l l y denies any doc-
t r i n e of undisclosed agency f o r , of course, every agent of an undis-
closed p r i n c i p a l contracts as a p r i n c i p a l . Subsequent r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n 
of the decision has produced the rule that there can be no undisclosed 
agency where the agent contracts as the only contracting party. That 
i s , warrants that he, and he alone, i s p r i n c i p a l . However, i n Formby 
v Formby^^ the rule was said to be based upon a rule of evidence 
whereby no evidence was to be admitted i f i t would contradict a 
(7) 
w r i t t e n document. 
I t would appear, however, that the rule i n Humble v Hunter i s 
simply an example of a s i t u a t i o n i n which, f a r from recognising the 
o r i g i n a l conception whereby TJ.P. and T acquired mutual r i g h t s and 
l i a b i l i t i e s , an exception has been introduced because of a f e e l i n g that 
i t i s i n some way "wrong" that a non-consensual contract can be created^ 
(6) (1910) 102 L.T.116. 
(7) This rule i s denied by many, 23 Harv. L.R. 513i Mechanic See also 
Higgins v Senior (1841) 8 M. & W. 834; Basma v Weeks Jv)^ A.C.441 
c.f. Second American Restatement para. 189. 
(8) See the recognition of the problems created by the decisions i n 
Humble v Hunter and Pormby v Pormby i n the judgment of Lord Shaw 
i n Drughorn (Fred) Ltd. v Rederiaktiebolaget Trans-Atlantic 
£[91$/ A.C.203, "... the time may arise when the principles of 
these two cases may have to be reviewed i n t h i s House." See also 
8 Unvy. of W. Australia L.Rev. 534 "Undisclosed p r i n c i p a l : i s 
Humble v Hunter s t i l l good law." 
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The problem of Armstrong v Stokes 
Another nineteenth century decision to spark o f f a controversy, 
(9) 
which has scarcely lessened to t h i s dayv , i s the case of Armstrong 
v Stokes. Here P employed A to purchase goods from time to time. Some-
times A acted on his own account but at other times he acted as an 
agent. T had had dealings with A but had never inquired whether A 
acted as an agent or on his own account. P had always paid A and had 
never had any contact with A's sources of supply. I n the instant case, 
P instructed A to acquire certain goods. A acquired the goods from T. 
P paid A f o r the goods at a time at which T was t o t a l l y unaware of P's 
existence. A did not pass the money on to T. T, on discovering P's 
existence, sued P f o r the price of the goods. I t was held that T 
could not succeed. Blackburn J., having indicated that he regarded T's 
r i g h t to sue P to be a " g o d - s e n d " , s o u g h t an exception to the rule 
that T could sue P. 
He found the exception i n the instance where an undisclosed p r i n c i -
pal pays his agent at a time when T i s unaware of P's existence. I n 
t h i s s i t u a t i o n he considered i t would produce intolerable hardship^^^ 
i f the undisclosed p r i n c i p a l should be called upon to pay T when he had 
already, bona f i d e , and without moral blame paid A, at a time when T 
(9) Discussion i s normally centred around the quartet of Armstrong v 
Stokes; Thompson v Davenport (1829) 9 B. & C. 78; Heald v 
Kenworthy (1855) 10 Exch. 739; Ir v i n e v Watson (1880) 5 Q.B.D.414. 
Academic considerations spanning t h i s century are to be found i n 
9 Col. L.R.116; 23 Harv. L.R. 513; 4 C.L.J. 320; 18 Miss. L.J. 436; 
28 M.L.R.I67. See also Second American Restatement para.208 
expressing the uncertainty. 
(10) See footnote 5, p.123. 
( 1 1 ) Following Thomson v Davenport. 
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was s t i l l g iving c r e d i t to T alone, knowing of no one else. He did, 
however, quite frankly admit that the exception v/as of a somewhat 
unsatisfactory nature. " I t might be said, perhaps t r u l y , t h i s i s the 
consequence of that which might o r i g i n a l l y have been a mistake, i n 
allowing the vendor to have resort at a l l against one to whom he 
never gave c r e d i t , and that v/e ought not to establish an i l l o g i c a l 
(12) 
exception to cure a f a u l t i n a r u l e . " v ' 
However, i t would appear that t h i s decision was dictated, not by 
the basic doctrine of the undisclosed p r i n c i p a l , but rather, by the 
view that basically T's only r i g h t i s against A. Blackburn J. merely 
paid l i p service to the established doctrine and, i n e f f e c t , followed 
a l i n e that T only had a r i g h t against U.P., based upon A's r i g h t of 
indemnity from U.P., which should become available to T upon U.P.s 
disclosure. I f A had no r i g h t of indemnity then T's position was 
prejudiced. Thus T obtains s a t i s f a c t i o n from U.P. because U.P. i s 
l i a b l e to A to pay, or to provide funds with which A may pay T. The 
implication of t h i s decision i s , therefore, that T has no o r i g i n a l 
r i g h t against U.P., f o r otherwise he would not be deprived of his 
r i g h t to sue U.P. by the act of U.P., i n paying A. 
H i g g i n s ^ ^ has attempted to explain the decision i n Armstrong v 
Stokes i n much t h i s way, i n d i c a t i n g that T's r i g h t against U.P. i s 
equitable i n nature. But, he considers that a proper understanding 
of the equitable rules reveals that U.P.s act i n paying A ought not 
(12) Armstrong v Stokes was severely c r i t i c i s e d i n I r v i n e v V/atson, 
although the l a t t e r was simply a case of an unnamed p r i n c i p a l . 
(13) 28 M.L.R.I67. "The Equity of the Undisclosed Pr i n c i p a l . " 
Although he believes the facts of Armstrong v Stokes are such 
that agency principles were inapplicable and that the decision 
on the facts was correct. 
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to prejudice T. The important factor i n equity i s not T's knowledge 
of U.P. but rather P's knowledge of his duty to pay T. Therefore, 
the rule i n Armstrong v Stokes, he finds erroneous. However, Higgins 
accepted Goodhart and Hamson's theory of "primitive assignment" as 
the basis of the doctrine. Again, t h i s reveals that the reasoning he 
adopts i n r e l a t i o n to Armstrong v Stokes i s based upon a basic assump-
t i o n that the doctrine of the undisclosed pri n c i p a l i s founded upon a 1
primary l i a b i l i t y between A and T and not between U.P. and T. 
I t i s submitted that a proper understanding of the doctrine reveals 
Armstrong v Stokes to be incorrect. The reasoning i s simple and the 
decision p l a i n i f the correct basis i s adopted. T ought not to be 
prejudiced by U.P.s payment to A, simply because i t was U.P.s duty to 
seek out and pay his creditor. ( ^ 4 ) Emphasis upon the relationship 
between U.P. and T leads n a t u r a l l y to a simple resolution of a d i f f i -
c u l t problem. This i s the solution which i s widely sought a f t e r , but 
(15) 
which has led to such obscure devices i n i t s attainment. ' 
The problem of Set-off 
The notion of set-off i s another s i t u a t i o n which has given r i s e 
to d i f f i c u l t y . Can T, dealing with A, set o f f a debt, due from A to 
T, against a debt due from T to an undisclosed principal? The basic 
rul e i s simple enough. Where A has been authorised to appear as a 
pr i n c i p a l then T can set o f f debts, owed by A, incurred before T knew 
of P. ( ^ However, the d i f f i c u l t y has arisen where P has required A 
to contract expressly on behalf of P (so that T cannot set o f f A's debt) 
(14) Haldane v Johnson (1855) 8 Exch.689. 
(15) Brett J. i n Irvine v Watson commented " i f the case of Armstrong 
v Stokes arises again, we reserve to ourselves s i t t i n g here the 
r i g h t of reconsidering i t . " 
(16) George v Clagett (1797) 7 Term Hep. 359; 2 Esp. 557-
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but A, i n f a c t , contracts i n his own name (thus bringing i n the possi-
b i l i t y of U.P. being faced with a set-off claim by T). 
(17) 
The leading case i n Cooke v Eshelby, v ' here A, i n his own name 
but r e a l l y on behalf of an undisclosed p r i n c i p a l , sold cotton to T. 
T was aware that A was i n the habit of dealing both f o r principals and 
on his own account. In answer to interrogatories, T admitted that he 
had no b e l i e f as to whether A was an agent or not. I t was held, by 
the House of Lords, that T could not set o f f against P, a debt due 
from A. ( l 8 ) 
(19) 
Hov/ever, Powell N ' has argued that the decision ought merely to 
be regarded as authority f o r a rule that i f T has no be l i e f i n the 
existence of P, then P ought to be given the benefit of the doubt. 
Otherwise, T ought merely to have to prove T contracted with A, 
believing him to be a pri n c i p a l or not knowing him to be an agent and 
i t i s immaterial whether A had authority or misrepresented his 
authority to act as p r i n c i p a l . 
This argument again displays the d i f f i c u l t y which arises when the 
basis of the doctrine i s l o s t to sight. I f the contract theory i s 
applied, then, ju s t as i n Drakeford v Piercy, attention i s centred 
upon the relationshi-p between U.P. and T. The resul t i s that, consis-
t e n t l y with other areas of development of similar fact situations, U.P. 
i s not to be prejudiced by A's unauthorised acts unless he has 
(17) (1887) 12 App. Cas. 271. 
(18) The Second American Restatement para. 306(2) also adopts t h i s 
rule,- denying T a r i g h t of set-off i n these circumstances. 
(19) Powell, p. 177. 
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" e n a b l e d " A to appear as an actual contracting party. 
The problem of Election 
F i n a l l y , i n t h i s b r i e f survey of d i f f i c u l t areas which, i t i s sub-
mitted, have been either created or not been resolved because of a 
lack of attention to a basal theory to the doctrine of the undis-
closed p r i n c i p a l , consider the rul e of election or merger. The rule 
i s that T must elect either to sue A or to sue U.P., he cannot sue 
(21) 
both. The rule has been described as "unbending and indiscriminate" v ' 
(22) 
and as "resting on rather barren l o g i c . u K ' 
Under t h i s r u l e , i f T should sue A to judgment then even i f the 
judgment should remain unsatisfied, T cannot, on discovering U.P., sue 
(23) 
U.P.v ' The j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the rule under which T i s held to have 
elected to hold A alone responsible, at a time when U.P.s existence 
remains unknown to him, has been through the doctrine of merger. 
"When one has merged a contract i n a judgment, one can have only one 
judgment, and having merged the contract i n the judgment, one cannot 
use the contract to get a second judgment."(^4) jn s h o r t t the rule 
(20) See Lord Watson's judgment i n Cooke v Eshelby esp.p.278 ".... i t i s 
not enough to show that the agent sold i n his own name. I t must 
be shown that he sold the goods as his own ... and i t must also 
be shown that the agent was enabled to appear as the real con-
t r a c t i n g party by the conduct or by the authority, express or 
implied, of the p r i n c i p a l . " C.f. the notion of "vicarious 
contract l i a b i l i t y " . 
(21) Kendall v Hamilton (1879) 4 App.Cas.504,530 per Lord Penzance. 
(22) Ore Steamship Corporation v Hassel (1943) 137 F. 2d. 326 c i t e d 
S t o l j a r . p.216. 
(23) Priestley v Fernie (I865) 3 H. and C. 977. 
(24) Debenhams Ltd. v Perkins (1925) 133 L.T. 252, 254, 255. Severely 
c r i t i c i s e d as a purely technical reason by Glanville Williams, 
Joint Obligations p.94. 
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cannot be j u s t i f i e d . The rule i s clea r l y based upon some valuation 
of interests which f a i l to recognise the doctrine of the undisclosed 
p r i n c i p a l . The valuation of interests i s , i n f a c t , revealed as simply 
the old argument that T did not bargain f o r U.P.s l i a b i l i t y and what 
the law gives i t can take av/ay. As has been demonstrated, t h i s approach 
i s not sound and, of course, i f one has confidence i n the basic theory 
then one must expect that departure from i t w i l l lead to problems. 
(26) 
The Vatteau v Fenwick^ ' s i t u a t i o n 
The celebrated case of Watteau v Penwick raised a very contro-
(27) 
v e r s i a l v ' and d i f f i c u l t problem, one which i s only very t e n t a t i v e l y 
considered with i n a section dealing with the doctrine of the undis-
closed p r i n c i p a l . The problem which the case raises i s , the extent 
to which an undisclosed p r i n c i p a l i s l i a b l e f o r contracts entere~d~into.,^ 
without authorisation, by his agent. 
B r i e f l y , the facts of the case were that P, a brewer, purchased 
a beerhouse from one Humble (A), whom he permitted to continue to 
operate the beerhouse as P's manager. A's name remained over the 
(28) 
door, the licence having been taken out i n his name. I t was 
agreed between A and P that A should have no authority to buy any goods 
f o r the business except bottled ales and mineral; a l l other goods were 
(26) JlQB^J 1 Q.B.346. 
(27) Discussed 23 Harv. L.R. 513, 599, 601, Mechem; 29 Yale L.J. 859, 
Seavey; 4 Camb. L.J. 320, 366; 17 Can.B.R. 693, Montrose; 17 Can. 
B.R.248, 254, Palconbridge; 28 M.L.R.I67, 172, Higgins; 1 Okl. 
L.R. 3, Seavey; ^ L96l7 C.L.J. 239, Hornby; 39 Minn. L.R. 307, 
Aaron; 47 Nab. L.R.768, Conant; /l%j7 J.B.L.122, H i l l ; Notes 9 
L.Q.R.lll; 8 Harv. L.R.49; 10 Col. L.R. 763. 
(28) Under the Beerhouse Act, 1840 (3 & 4 Vic t . C .6l) , section 1, a 
licence could only be issued to a person resident upon the 
premises. 
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to be supplied by P himself. A, ignoring the r e s t r i c t i o n , purchased 
cigars and other goods which were suitable f o r such an establishment 
and which a normal manager would be authorised to buy. Clearly A had 
no actual authority from P to purchase the goods, nor had he any 
apparent authority to purchase on P's behalf because, P being undis-
closed, there was no appearance of agency at a l l . However, i t was 
held that U.P. (as he was) was l i a b l e to T. The pr i n c i p l e upon v/hich 
TI.P. was held l i a b l e Wills J. expressed as being: "the p r i n c i p a l i s 
l i a b l e f o r a l l the acts of the agent which are wi t h i n the authority 
usually confided to an agent of that character, notwithstanding l i m i -
t a t i o n s, as between the pr i n c i p a l and the agent, put upon that autho-
r i t y . ' ^ 2 9 ^ 
This p r i n c i p l e Wills J. supported by reference to the law of par-
tnership. However, i t i s now widely accepted that t h i s argument 
was erroneous because section 5 of the Partnership Act, 1890 i s i n 
direct c o n f l i c t with the p r o p o s i t i o n . ^ " ^ 
The second ground upon which Wills J. based his p r i n c i p l e was the 
(32) 
decision i n Edmunds v Bushell and JonesN . Here P was a hat manu-
facturer owning two businesses. One business was outside London. The 
(29) P. 348, 349. 
(30) " I n the case of a dormant partner, i t i s clear that no l i m i t a t i o n 
of authority as between the dormant and active partner w i l l a v a i l 
the dormant partner as to things v/ithin the ordinary authority of 
a partner. The law of partnership i s , on such a question, nothing 
but a branch of the general law of pri n c i p a l and agent, and i t 
appears to me to be undisputed and conclusive on the point now 
under discussion," p.348. 
(31) Powell, p.77 "the l i a b i l i t y of a dormant partner i s not the 
same as that of an ordinary undisclosed p r i n c i p a l , and the choice 
of the example of a dormant partner by Wills J., i n V/atteau v 
Fenwick v/as, perhaps unfortunate." 
(32) (1865) L.R.I Q.B.97. 
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London business was managed by A under his own name. A was authorised 
to draw cheques but was forbidden to draw or accept b i l l s of exchange. 
Nevertheless, A, f o r business purposes, accepted four b i l l s and the 
question arose as to whether P was l i a b l e on the b i l l s . The decision 
that P was l i a b l e has i t s e l f given r i s e to considerable debate. 
(33) 
Montrose x ' considered the case to be one of apparent authority, on 
the basis that the f i r s t indorsee of the b i l l s was aware of P's exis-
tence and A's agency. On t h i s basis he considered "Edmunds v Bushell 
and Jones, therefore, i s no authority f o r making a p r i n c i p a l l i a b l e 
i n the absence of actual or apparent authority. 1 1 
I n direct contrast, Hornby,(^4-) k a s a s s e r - t e d that the decision i s 
"no authority on the s i t u a t i o n where an agent purports to act as an 
agent" because the s i t u a t i o n was, i n f a c t , one i n which the prin c i p a l 
(35) 
remained wholly undisclosed. ' 
Thus depending upon which approach i s adopted either on the 
authority of the Montrose approach (a) Edmunds v Bushell and Jones i s 
no authority f o r the decision i n Watteau v Penv/ick where P was cer-
t a i n l y undisclosed or, following Hornby's approach, (b) Edmunds v 
Bushell and Jones i s no authority f o r the p r i n c i p l e propounded by 
Wills J., i n so f a r as i t refers to the "usual authority of an agent," 
f o r the facts of the case did not disclose agency. 
The need f o r Watteau v Fenwick 
Nevertheless, the decision i n Watteau v Penwick has been des-
(37) 
cribed as being "as necessary as i t was simple." v ' Perhaps the 
(33) 17 Can. B.R.693, 699. 
(34) ^ 19617 C.L.J. 239, 244. 
(35) Hornby cites Cockburn C.J. at p.99. "Bushell was therefore the 
agent of the defendant Jones, and Jones was the p r i n c i p a l , but 
he held out Bushell as the pr i n c i p a l and owner of the business." 
(36) Or, to express the argument d i f f e r e n t l y , Edmunds v Bushell and 
Jones i s either, authority f o r the Watteau v Penwick p r i n c i p l e but 
not f o r the decision, which did not f a l l w i t h i n the p r i n c i p l e which 
related to disclosed agency, or, i t i s authority f o r the decision 
on undisclosed agency, but not f o r the p r i n c i p l e which was pro-
pounded as authority f o r the decision. 
(37) S t o l j a r , p.58. 
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e a r l i e r American decision i n Hubbard v Tenbrook best expresses the 
basic pr i n c i p l e of ju s t i c e reflected i n the decision. In Hubbard v 
Tenbrook^ ' A had been appointed to conduct a business, but was f o r -
bidden to buy on c r e d i t . Mr. Justice Mitchell stated: "A man conduc-
t i n g an apparently prosperous and pr o f i t a b l e business obtains credit 
thereby, and his creditors have a r i g h t to suppose that his p r o f i t s go 
into his assets f o r t h e i r protection i n case of a pinch or an unfavour-
able turn i n the business. To allow an undisclosed p r i n c i p a l to 
absorb the p r o f i t s , and then, when the pinch comes, to escape responsi-
b i l i t y on the ground of orders to his agent not to buy on cr e d i t , 
would be pl a i n fraud on the public." 
This passage indicates an approach, to the resolution of the prob-
lem under discussion, which has been fur t h e r developed by Conant i n 
(39) 
his "Objective Theory of Agency"x ' His basic explanation, of the 
rea l p r i n c i p l e behind Watteau v P e n w i c k , £ s that as A posed as 
owner and neither he nor U.P. made any representation of agency autho-
r i t y , the only basis f o r U.P.s l i a b i l i t y i s estoppel based upon 
apparent ownership of the business. U.P. i s l i a b l e to the extent 
of the value of the assets of the business because he directed A to 
appear as owner and i s , therefore, estopped from denying A's ownership 
of those assets or T's execution against those assets. 
Two points spring immediately from t h i s explanation. The f i r s t , 
i s that i t raises the notoriously d i f f i c u l t conceptual problems of a 
l i a b i l i t y based upon estoppel. The second, i s that i t raises an 
(38) Cited 47 Nab.L.R. 678,688. (1889) 124 Pa.291, 16A. 817. 
(39) 47 Nab.L.R.678. 
(40) He too submits that the "apparent authority rationale f o r the 
decision i s wrong.11 
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e n t i r e l y new l i a b i l i t y of, almost, unlimited p o t e n t i a l . ' I f A i s 
given the appearance of an owner then i t would appear that any act 
which he carries out ought to be s u f f i c i e n t to impose l i a b i l i t y upon 
U.P. An agent may thus do what would not be usual i n an owner, the 
pr i n c i p l e appears to be quite free from any res t r a i n i n g concept of 
"usual authority", such as that indicated i n Watteau v Penwick i t s e l f . 
Indeed, the l i m i t a t i o n indicated i n the l a t t e r case and i n Kinahan and 
Co. Ltd. v Parry, that the agent's act should have been f o r U.P.s 
benefit would seem to be both unreasonable and inconsistent under the 
"Objective Theory". 
However, there does appear to be some measure of agreement, 
amongst proponents of a l i a b i l i t y based upon estoppel, that U.P.s 
l i a b i l i t y should be l i m i t e d to the assets of the business. More-
over, as Fridman^^ has pointed out, the refusal of the House of 
(41) Certainly the dishonest agent who benefits himself alone would 
appear to impose l i a b i l i t y upon U.P. under t h i s theory. Of 
course i t may be argued that i f the mischief i s to protect 
innocent t h i r d parties, then t h i s i s a desirable end. Never-
theless, most theories have sought to avoid taking U.P.s 
l i a b i l i t y so f a r . See Higgins, 28 M.L.R. I67, 173. i n d i c a t i n g 
U.P.s l i a b i l i t y to depend upon U.P. having benefited from A's 
actions. Also Ames 18 Yale L.J.443. c.f. Kinahan & Co. Ltd. v 
Parry Jl310j 2 K.B. 389 which followed V/atteau v Fenwick but 
was reversed by the Court of Appeal, on the ground that there 
was no evidence that the goods supplied to A had been f o r the 
use of the U.P. and not f o r A personally. 
(42) See Hornby f}3&[] C.L.J. 239, 246; Conant 47 Nab. L.R. 678, 688; 
22 ILL. L. Rev. 652 "Ostensible Agency or ownership." 
(43) Pridman, p.193. 
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Lords to accept that an undisclosed p r i n c i p a l could r a t i f y an unautho-
rised act on the part of his a g e n t i n d i c a t e s that, f o r policy 
reasons, the courts are prepared to place a l i m i t a t i o n upon the scope 
of an undisclosed principal's l i a b i l i t y f o r his agent's acts. The 
extent to which any pr i n c i p l e displayed i n Watteau v Fenwick may be 
of general application i s uncertain. 
Recognition of a class 
Whatever, the bounds of the decision i n Watteau v Penwick, i t 
appears to be indisputable that there are certain classes of case, 
decided i n favour of t h i r d parties, which cannot be supported upon 
grounds of either authority or apparent authority (nor under the doc-
t r i n e of the undisclosed p r i n c i p a l , i f i t d i f f e r s from authority) and 
which must, i t appears, be based upon the existence of some "inherent 
agency power. "^"^ These basically relate to circumstances i n which 
an agent, who i s neither authorised nor apparently authorised, i s 
able to dispose of a proprietory interest of his p r i n c i p a l . Perhaps 
Watteau v Fenwick i s simply unusual i n that i t i s an exception to the 
usual reluctance of the courts to permit an agent, without authority 
or apparent authority, to bind his p r i n c i p a l by contract. For i t i s 
submitted that i t i s only acceptance of the creation of a contractual 
relationship between U.P. and T which i s i n keeping with the needs of 
(44) Keighley, Maxted v Durant JJ$OlJ A.C.240. Biggins' d i s t i n c t i o n 
between special and general agencies i n t h i s context would 
appear ingenious but unconvincing 28 M.L.R. 167» 174* 
(45) Such decisions led to the passing of the Factors Acts, see 
47 Nab. L.R. 679, 693» and decisions considered i n the section 
dealing with disclosed agency. 
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the s i t u a t i o n . v ' This again leads to the notion of an "inherent 
agency power"^ ' and i t s contractual approach, which, although i t 
would appear not to have the a n t i q u i t y , giving re s p e c t a b i l i t y , present 
i n the development of assumpsit at the root of the doctrine of the 
undisclosed p r i n c i p a l , would meet the needs of the s i t u a t i o n . I n 
short, recognition of true agency principles i n t h i s area i s l i k e l y to 
lead to recognition of the need f o r f i r m l y based policy decisions, the 
need f o r which was argued i n the previous section upon disclosed agency. 
This, i t would appear, may lead to the dispersal of doubts, so f r e -
quently expressed i n t h i s area, the following passage being t y p i c a l : 
"... i t remains a question of no l i t t l e theoretical interest whether 
the courts w i l l f i n a l l y decide there should be a l i m i t on the l i a b i l i t y 
of an undisclosed p r i n c i p a l , and where that l i m i t should be imposed."^^ 
Conclusion 
The much c r i t i c i s e d doctrine of the undisclosed p r i n c i p a l has, I 
believe, been shown to be not only a desirable concept, indeed one 
much envied i n non-common law jurisprudence,^ 9^ but further to be a 
development f a l l i n g c l e a r l y w i t h i n the h i s t o r i c a l notion of contract. 
The apparent anomaly i n recognising a contractual relationship between 
(46) What i f the cigars supplied to the beerhouse i n Watteau v Penwick 
had been defective? Surely U.P. ought to have had an action f o r 
breach of contract? See Higgins 28 M.L.R. I67, 175* 
(47) See 29 Yale L.J. 859, 881. 
(48) Fridman, P. 194. See also Hornby j^SQ] C.L.J. 239, 246. 
(49) See 18 M.L.R.33 "Comparative Aspects of Undisclosed Agency." 
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U.P. and T has been shown to arise from a f a i l u r e to recognise the 
h i s t o r i c a l origins and development of the theory underlying the law 
of contract. The current view of the contract as a consensual agree-
ment ought not to overshadow the part which e a r l i e r theories of con-
t r a c t have played i n the development of other branches of our law. 
I t i s s a t i s f y i n g to ascertain that survival of the doctrine of the 
undisclosed p r i n c i p a l i s i n no way threatened by unsound foundations. 
Recognition of the basal theory of the doctrine ought to provide a 
platform from which may be launched crusades into areas of unsound 
development w i t h i n the doctrine, which have been referred to i n t h i s 
thesis. 
The problem of Watteau v Penwick i s considered i n the overall 
conclusion to the thesis as an aspect of "inherent agency power" and 
the problems associated with inherent agency powers have been discussed 
i n the section r e l a t i n g to disclosed agency^"^ 
(50) See the Second American Restatement paras. 161A and 194i 195 
l i n k i n g the areas of disclosed and undisclosed agency with 
inherent agency powers. 
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FINAL CONCLUSION 
The broad conclusions of t h i s thesis may be b r i e f l y stated i n 
three parts. The f i r s t relates to the findings as to the conceptual 
basis of the relationship between P and T where:-
(a) A acts i n accordance with P's instructions, whether P i s d i s -
closed or undisclosed, or, 
(b) A acts outside the scope of P's instructions but appears, to T, 
to act wi t h i n t h e i r l i m i t s . 
I t would appear that i n these situations the relationship between 
P and T i s contractual i n o r i g i n and that the relevant principles 
have been developed upon a sound contractual theory. This f i n d i n g 
requires acceptance of the h i s t o r i c a l fact that the law of contract, 
as we now know i t , i s derived from diverse sources. Nevertheless, 
enforcement of the several principles of agency related, i n r e l a t i o n 
to the situations under discussion, can be j u s t i f i e d as consonant v/ith 
j u s t i c e i n that they are enforced i n accordance with the inherent 
notion of ju s t i c e i n t r e a t i n g l i k e cases a l i k e . Each s i t u a t i o n 
involves a common pr i n c i p l e , the fundamental p r i n c i p l e of our law, 
which requires that undertakings based upon contract should be 
enforced. The theory of the law of contract, as a consensual under-
taking, ought not to be used as a basis f o r c r i t i c i s m of an e n t i r e l y 
sound development, the origins of which have become obscured by sub-
sequent b e l i e f . The rules of agency must be recognised as being sui 
generis, j u s t i f y i n g agency as a branch of law. 
The second f i n d i n g relates to those nebulous areas i n which:-
(a) a relationship i s recognised between U.P. and T and where A has 
exceeded P's instructions i n what may be described as the Watteau 
v Penwick s i t u a t i o n , or, 
(b) a relationship i s recognised between P and T where P i s disclosed 
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but A does not have any appearance of acting i n accordance with 
P's instructions and does i n f a c t exceed those instructions. This 
may be described as the Smellie v Pry or Hambro v Burnand type 
s i t u a t i o n . 
Although i t i s possible once more to trace the relationship i n 
each case to contractual o r i g i n s , such a theoretical basis gives no 
guidance as to the development of principles. This i s t r u l y an area 
i n which pure agency rules have been developed or i n which "Inherent 
Agency Powers" arise. The relevant principles of law arise simply 
because of the relationship of p r i n c i p a l and agent. Nevertheless the 
conceptual device of agency, i n t h i s area, ought to be recognised as 
being contractual and may be j u s t i f i e d h i s t o r i c a l l y through the action 
of assumpsit. 
The t h i r d and f i n a l concluding part concerns points one and two 
i n perspective. Where a given s i t u a t i o n f a l l s w i t h i n part one, the 
developed law exhibits a satisfactory degree of certainty and may be 
supported as being e n t i r e l y consonant with p r i n c i p l e . However, where 
a s i t u a t i o n f a l l s w i t h i n part tv/o, although a theoretical foundation 
to a contractual relationship, based upon h i s t o r i c a l o r i g i n s , meeting 
the conceptual needs of the s i t u a t i o n , may be found, the basal theory 
provides no guidance as to pr i n c i p l e f o r prediction or future develop-
ment. What, f o r instance, of the predicament of the Patagonian 
merchant? I f the case f a l l s w i t h i n the nebulous principles surrounding 
inherent agency power then he would be successful against P, i f not, 
then he would be l e f t disadvantaged because of the notion of apparent 
authority. Quite c l e a r l y i t i s of the utmost importance that a 
thorough going review of policy and pr i n c i p l e should be undertaken i n 
t h i s area. Seavey and the American Restatement have perhaps pointed 
the way f o r the future i n undertaking a catalogue of situations from 
which i t may be possible to develop a consistent body of doctrine. 
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Mearns too has suggested a possible policy foundation to any develop-
ment f o r the future, through the notion of "vicarious contract l i a -
b i l i t y " . However, i t i s unfortunate to relate that English progress 
i n t h i s area appears to be i n a p a r t i c u l a r l y sorry state. The notion 
of inherent agency power has not been expressly accepted i n any court 
and t h i s must render development even more uncertain. The recent 
events i n the Court of Appeal (Burt v Claude Cousins; Barrington v Lee; 
So r r e l l v Finch) adequately demonstrate the p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s 
a r i s i n g from a lack of basic theory - these cases alone must point to 
the urgent need f o r a new s t a r t . Unfortunately i n each case leave was 
given f o r an appeal to the House of Lords but, as yet, no appeal has 
been pursued. 
Where the undisclosed p r i n c i p a l s i t u a t i o n arises, that which has 
been described as the Watteau v Fenwick s i t u a t i o n , the uncertainty 
which exists i s perhaps most s i g n i f i c a n t l y an indictment of the 
common law system under which a problem may be allowed to fester f o r 
want of l i t i g a n t s . Nevertheless, the uncertainty remains and i s a 
source of concern, c a l l i n g f o r resolution. I t i s indeed unfortunate 
that Agency, being developed i n the Law Merchant, should, at t h i s time, 
exhibit f a i l u r e i n the overriding requirement of certainty so revered 
by Lord Mansfield. 
1. 
APPENDIX I 
Qualifications to the Rule i n Bolton v Lambert 
The q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , or alleged q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , to the Rule i n 
Bolton v Lambert^ have, l i k e the case i t s e l f , given r i s e to con-
(2) 
siderable debate. v ' Further i t i s uncertainty as to the existence 
and extent of exceptions which, i n part, necessitates a search f o r a 
sound basal theory to the "apparent authority" s i t u a t i o n . Any basal 
theory which, l i k e the estoppeltheory, r e l i e s upon the doctrine of 
r a t i f i c a t i o n must i t s e l f stand or f a l l by the efficacy or otherwise 
of the doctrine. 
The alleged exceptions to the Rule i n Bolton v Lambert may, i t 
has been suggested, ' be accounted f o r and, either dismissed as 
spurious or accepted as genuine, i n accordance with the general p r i n -
c i p l e that the "Rule" must not cause "extra hardship to T." What then, 
i s the hardship which the doctrine of r a t i f i c a t i o n imposes -upon T? I n 
general terms the hardship may be simply stated as consisting i n hold-
ing T to a bargain which he entered in t o with A, which he believed to 
be with P, by permitting P to r a t i f y A's act. Thus the economic o b l i -
gations which the r a t i f i c a t i o n imposes upon T are, indeed, precisely 
(1) (1889) 41 Ch.D. 295. 
(2) See Wambaugh, "A problem as to r a t i f i c a t i o n " , 9 Harv. L.H.60; 
Mecham, "A question of r a t i f i c a t i o n " , 24 Am. L.R.58O; Sondley, 
"An effect of r a t i f i c a t i o n " , 25 Am.L.R.74; 19 South Carolina 
L.R.788; 42 Temple L.R.I; 6 Australian Law 95; 2 Mich. L.R.25; 
Tamaki, "The Rule i n Bolton v Lambert", 19 Can. B.R.733; Seavey, 
29 Yale L.J. 859, 891; Hunter, "What i s the effect of r a t i f i c a t i o n 
of an agent's unauthorised contract?" 5 Louisianna L.R. 308. 
(3) S t o l j a r , p.193. 
2. 
those obligations which he believed he had incurred i n his i n i t i a l 
negotiation with A. Clearly the reason f o r T*s desire to withdraw 
must be simply that the bargain is'now considered to be less a t t r a c -
t i v e . The mere fa c t that one party to a bargain i s disappointed has 
never been a s u f f i c i e n t reason f o r s e t t i n g aside the transaction! 
Thus any true exception to the "Rule" must be one which reveals a 
"hardship" which exceeds being bound to the legal consequences flow-
ing from the obligation between A and T. 
I t may be objected that as no o f f e r was made by T to A, then no 
contract could be created between them. This, however, reveals a 
f a i l u r e to appreciate the nature of r a t i f i c a t i o n . Unless the exchange 
of o f f e r and acceptance between A and T creates some contractual r e l a -
tionship then there would be nothing f o r P to r a t i f y ; t r u l y Bolton v 
Lambert would reveal a v i o l a t i o n of basic principles of o f f e r and 
acceptance. However, there can be no doubt that the exchange between 
A and T does create a contractual relationship, the relationship recog-
nised i n Collen v Wright as warranty of authority. The p r i n c i -
ples of o f f e r and acceptance do exhibit characteristics peculiar to 
agency^^ i n that an o f f e r and acceptance exchanged between A and T 
creates a contract between P and T, and Bolton v Lambert i s no 
exception to t h i s p r i n c i p l e . I t i s apposite at t h i s stage to consider 
a s i t u a t i o n , widely c l a s s i f i e d as an exception to the Rule i n Bolton 
v Lambert, which may not, i n f a c t , be an exception. This i s the 
sit u a t i o n where T i s aware that the purported agent i s not authorised* ' 
(4) (1857) 8 E. and B. 647. 
(5) See footnote 29, p.79. 
(6) When viewed from the current theory of consensual contract. 
(7) See 21 Unvy. of Chicago L.R. 248, Seavey; 5 L.Q.R. 440, 44I; 
S t o l j a r , p.194. 
3. 
Exception One 
Perhaps the most frequently ci t e d case to adopt t h i s approach i s 
(8) 
that of Watson v Davies i n which Bolton v Lambert was distinguished. 
The facts of Watson's case were that the defendant, T, offered to s e l l 
land to the board of management of a charity. At a f u l l meeting of 
the board, an inspection of the land was agreed upon and the p l a i n t i f f 
together with twelve other members of the board, A, was instructed to 
carry i t out. I t was found, as a f a c t , that t h i s inspection party 
accepted the defendant's o f f e r "subject to r a t i f i c a t i o n " by the f u l l 
board. Before the f u l l board of management could r a t i f y the accept-
ance, i n fact early on the day appointed f o r the r a t i f i c a t i o n meeting, 
the defendant telegraphed a revocation of his o f f e r . The board went 
ahead with the r a t i f i c a t i o n and the p l a i n t i f f , on behalf of himself 
and the other members of the board, sued f o r specific performance. 
Maugham J. ' stated that " I n a case where the agent f o r one party 
to a negotiation informs the other party that he cannot enter in t o a 
contract binding his p r i n c i p a l except subject to his approval, there 
i s i n t r u t h no contract or contractual r e l a t i o n u n t i l the approval has 
been obtained. The agent has incurred no r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I n Bolton 
v Lambert the decision of the Court was, I think, founded on the view 
that there was a contractual r e l a t i o n of some kind which could be 
turned into a contract with the company by r a t i f i c a t i o n , whilst i n 
the absence of r a t i f i c a t i o n there was a r i g h t of action against the 
agent f o r breach of warranty of authority. I t was admitted that 
there could be no r a t i f i c a t i o n of a legal n u l l i t y . An acceptance by 
(8) /l93l7 1 Ch.455; followed i n the recent case of Warehousing and 
Forwarding Co. of East Afric a , Ltd. v J a f f e r a l i , Ltd. £L3&AJ 
A.C.I. 
(9) At p.468. 
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an agent subject i n express terms to r a t i f i c a t i o n by his p r i n c i p a l i s 
l e g a l l y a n u l l i t y u n t i l r a t i f i c a t i o n , and i s no more binding on the 
other party than an unaccepted o f f e r v/hich can, of course, be with-
drawn before acceptance." 
This analysis of the legal principles behind the "Rule i n Bolton 
v Lambert" cl e a r l y demonstrates that the "Rule" could have no applica-
t i o n to the factual s i t u a t i o n disclosed i n Watson v Bavies. The case 
f e l l to the ground upon a f a i l u r e to s a t i s f y the requirement of the 
law of contract that there must be established an o f f e r and unquali-
f i e d acceptance, no matter what form t h i s may take. Here there was no 
consensually expressed inten t i o n to be bound. Indeed, Maugham J. went 
on to state expressly that, "Bolton v Lambert does not apply. Refer-
ence to that case w i l l show that the contract was one entered into by 
a Mr. Scratchley on behalf of a company called Bolton Partners, Ltd. 
He had t o l d the defendant that he would refe r the defendants w r i t t e n 
o f f e r to his directors, and he had subsequently w r i t t e n to the defen-
dant st a t i n g , erroneously, that the directors had accepted the l a t t e r 1 s 
w r i t t e n o f f e r . On the face of the documents there was, therefore a 
complete contract, and i t was held by the Court of Appeal that the 
defect a r i s i n g from the circumstance that Mr. Scratchley had not 
obtained a proper authority to bind the company could be cured by a 
r a t i f i c a t i o n , and t h i s even though the defendant, the other party to 
the bargain, had purported to withdraw his o f f e r . " 
Quite c l e a r l y Watson v Davies^"1"^ ought not to be regarded as 
providing any exception to the Rule i n Bolton v Lambert. 
(10) A l t e r n a t i v e l y , i t could not be said to give r i s e to a s i t u a t i o n 
of "holding out", as authority i s negatived. 
5. 
Exception Two 
The second s i t u a t i o n , i n which an exception to the "Rule" i s said 
to arise, i s where t h i r d party r i g h t s have vested or where the "Rule" 
v/ould operate to prejudice r i g h t s vested i n t h i r d p a r t i e s . ^ ^ ^ 
(12) 
Cotton L.J., i n Bolton v Lambert, ' expressly stated that "an 
estate once vested cannot be divested ... by an application of the 
doctrine of r a t i f i c a t i o n . " 
Probably the most frequently ci t e d authority f o r t h i s proposition, 
(13) 
i s the case of Bird v Brown. ' Here P had forwarded goods to T. 
His agent, A, on hearing of T's insolvency, gave an unauthorised 
notice of stoppage i n t r a n s i t u . The t r a n s i t ended and the goods came 
int o the possession of T's trustee i n bankruptcy. P purported to 
r a t i f y A's act two days a f t e r the notice had been given but a f t e r the 
trustee came int o possession. The decision was that the r a t i f i c a t i o n 
came too lat e to divest the trustee i n bankruptcy of his vested r i g h t 
to r e t a i n the goods. This p r i n c i p l e would c e r t a i n l y appear to con-
s t i t u t e an exception to the Rule under discussion. 
However, there i s some evidence to suggest that the Bird v Brown 
pri n c i p l e i s i n f a c t u n l i k e l y to be applied today. In Hutchings v 
Nunes^^ the person who stopped t r a n s i t , before delivery to the i n s o l -
vent T, was merely a merchant i n Jamaica who had close business relations 
with P, the s e l l e r , i n Baltimore. The Jamaican merchant heard of T's 
insolvency, wrote informing P but acted before P repli e d authorising 
the stoppage. The Judi c i a l Committee of the Privy Council was pre-
pared to uphold the r a t i f i c a t i o n , upon evidence that P was "not at a l l 
(11) Powell, p.144; Pridman, p.54. 
(12) At p.307. 
(13) (1850) 4 Exch.786. 
(14) (1863) 1 Moore N.S. 243. 
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(15) surprised" x ' when he heard that A was to intervene on his behalf and 
a general authority so to do was implied. I t i s submitted that i t 
'must be a p a r t i c u l a r l y rare case i n which such a general authority 
w i l l be found to be absent. 
A further point of i n t e r e s t , i n Hutchings v Nunes, i s that although 
the head note refers to r a t i f i c a t i o n of A's act, P's l e t t e r of autho-
r i s a t i o n had been posted before A's stoppage; A could therefore have 
been regarded as authorised, as at the time of stoppage. St o l j a r has 
described t h i s l a t t e r r a t i o decidendi as being unsatisfactory, f o r i t 
would s t i l l allow an exception to Bolton v Lambert when, say, a l e t t e r 
of authorisation was posted a f t e r a time l i m i t , which may be extremely 
s h o r t / 1 6 ^  I t i s a simple step to allow r a t i f i c a t i o n where i t i s 
certain that P w i l l subsequently approve of the act. This second 
"exception" i s , therefore, l i k e l y to be of minimal e f f e c t . However, 
i t does introduce the t h i r d point f o r discussion, the " t i m e - l i m i t " . 
Exception Three 
(17) 
Bibbins v Dibbins v ' i s frequently c l a s s i f i e d along with the 
second exception, r e l a t i n g to vested r i g h t s . Hov/ever, a more s a t i s -
factory explanation i s that i t turned on the issue of a t i m e - l i m i t . 
A r t i c l e s of partnership provided that on the death of either partner, 
the survivor should have the option of purchasing the deceased's share 
by giving w r i t t e n notice of intent i o n to do so wi t h i n three months 
from the date of death. The surviving partner, P, was unable to give 
notice, as he was of unsound mind during the three month period. His 
(15) At p.255, 256. 
(16) S t o l j a r , p.196. 
(17) ^18967 2 Ch. 348. 
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s o l i c i t o r , A, did give notice on his behalf w i t h i n the t i m e - l i m i t hut, 
owing to the insanity, his act was unauthorised. Subsequently an order 
was made under the Lunacy Acts authorising a notice to be given on P's 
behalf and a second notice was given a f t e r expiry of the three month 
period. Chitty J. treated the case as that of an attempted r a t i f i c a -
t i o n of an unauthorised notice. He held that as the option to purchase 
had not been exercised within the time l i m i t , there was no notice cap-
able of being r a t i f i e d a f t e r the expiration of the three months. More 
precisely, he ruled that an unauthorised agent's exercise of an option 
to purchase i s not susceptible to r a t i f i c a t i o n , by P, outside the time 
l i m i t f i x e d f o r the option. This q u a l i f i c a t i o n upon the "Rule", i t 
would appear, i s quite sound. 
(18) 
In Reynolds v Atherton^ ' Younger L.J., accepted the pr i n c i p l e 
with these words, "... whether or not the doctrine of r a t i f i c a t i o n 
( i n Bolton v Lambert) w i l l i n the House of Lords survive the c r i t i -
cism of Lord Justice Pry upon i t i n his book on Specific Performance, 
the doctrine of that case has not yet extended to any r a t i f i c a t i o n 
a f t e r the date l i m i t e d f o r acceptance." 
That such an exception may exist i s no doubt a blow to supporters 
of the estoppel theory, f o r i t places some l i m i t a t i o n upon P's oppor-
t u n i t y to sue under an arrangement which binds him to T upon T's 
insistence. However, i f the l i m i t a t i o n i s r e s t r i c t e d to those s i t u a -
tions i n which an express time l i m i t i s imposed then, perhaps, i t may 
be received with equanimity. Is the q u a l i f i c a t i o n confined to the 
express time l i m i t ? 
North J., i n Portuguese Consolidated Copper Mines, Ltd., Re, 
(19) 
ex parte Bosanquet, ex parte Badman, ' expressed surprise that no 
(18) (1921), 125 L.T.R. 690, 698. 
(19) (1890) 45 Ch.D.22. 
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mention of a requirement of r a t i f i c a t i o n within a reasonable time was 
made i n Bolton v Lambert i t s e l f . Indeed a detailed consideration of 
the judgments, delivered i n the Court of Appeal, would seem to leave 
no room f o r manoeuvre. They appear to indicate that, subject to r a t i -
f i c a t i o n , there was a complete and binding contract from the moment 
of acceptance by the agent, i n accordance with the long settled doc-
t r i n e of r e l a t i o n back. Further, t h i s would follow i n the natural 
course of events and T i s unable to withdraw, therefore l o g i c a l l y , a 
requirement as to r a t i f i c a t i o n w i t h i n a reasonable time has no place 
i n the "Rule". For as Cotton L.J. s a i d : ^ ^ 
"When and as soon as authority was given to Scratchley to bind 
the company the authority was thrown back to the time when the act was 
done by Scratchley, and prevented the defendant from withdrawing h i s , 
i 
because i t was then no longer an o f f e r , but a binding contract." 
and Lindley L.J.:^''"^ 
" I can f i n d no authority i n the books to warrant the contention 
that an o f f e r made and i n fact accepted by a pr i n c i p a l through an 
agency or otherwise, can be withdrawn." 
and Lopes L.J.: 
"^ R a t i f i c a t i o n gives/ ... the same effect to the contract made 
by Scratchley as i t would have had i f Scratchley had been clothed with 
a precedent authority to make i t . " 
Despite these three clear statements of p r i n c i p l e , Chitty J., i n 
Dibbins v Dibbins, (discussed e a r l i e r ) decided seven years a f t e r Bolton 
v Lambert, distinguished the e a r l i e r case on the grounds that there 
had been no question of a time l i m i t w i t h i n which r a t i f i c a t i o n was to 
(20) At p.308. 
(21) At p.309. 
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be made. Clearly on t h i s reasoning, had the o f f e r been open f o r a 
specific time, then no r a t i f i c a t i o n would have been possible a f t e r that 
time. Further, however, i n Metropolitan Asylam Board v Klngham,^"^ 
Fry J. held that " i f the r a t i f i c a t i o n i s to bind, i t must be made 
v/ithin a reasonable time a f t e r acceptance by an unauthorised person." 
Nov/, there was nothing i n the facts of Kingham's case to lead to such 
a wide statement of p r i n c i p l e . The case could have been disposed of 
upon the more easily discernable p r i n c i p l e adopted i n Dibbins v 
Dibbins. 
.Exception Four 
Kingham's case concerned a contract to supply eggs. On the 18th 
of September, 1888 the defendants submitted a tender to supply the 
p l a i n t i f f Board with eggs at a specific price, from the 30th of 
September, 1888 to the 30th of March, 1889. Acceptance of t h i s o f f e r 
was approved by a meeting of the Asylam Board on the 22nd. of September 
but the corporation seal was not af f i x e d to the acceptance. The same 
day the p l a i n t i f f ' s clerk informed the defendants of the acceptance. 
On the 24th of September the defendants withdrew the o f f e r on the 
grounds that they had submitted an incorrect price i n error. On the 
6th of October the corporation seal was formally a f f i x e d to the accept-
ance. Fry J., i n his judgment, distinguished Bolton v Lambert on the 
wide pri n c i p l e that i n that case r a t i f i c a t i o n had been made within a 
reasonable time. But furth e r , he held that no r a t i f i c a t i o n would be 
possible i n any case beyond the time at which performance of the con-
t r a c t was to commence, f o r beyond t h i s would always be an unreasonable 
time. Had the matter remained as l e f t by Fry J., then the "Rule" could 
(23) (1890) 6 T.L..R.217. 
(24) He expressed strong views on the whole doctrine of Bolton v 
Lambert i n his book on Specific Performance. 
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have been applied with precision, following the p r i n c i p l e that the time 
(25") 
f o r r a t i f i c a t i o n ended upon the date f o r performance of a contract; v ' 
again the exception could have been accepted by the estoppel theorists 
as providing no great problem. 
However, the issue of reasonableness, as to the time of r a t i f i c a -
(26) 
t i o n , arose again i n ex parte Bosanquet. ' The Court of Appeal 
introduced the q u a l i f i c a t i o n upon Bolton v Lambert that the r a t i f i c a -
t i o n must come within a reasonable time, having regard to a l l the c i r -
cumstances. This decision reversed the f i r s t instance decision of 
North J., who, despite protest at what he considered to be an unsatis-
factory p r i n c i p l e , had been unable to distinguish Bolton v Lambert. 
Cotton and Lindley L.J.J., accepted the q u a l i f i c a t i o n upon Bolton v 
Lambert, without c i t i n g authority, no doubt on the simple grounds 
that i t was considered equitable that P should have no more than a 
reasonable time w i t h i n which to r a t i f y A's unauthorised act. 
Bow.en L.J., c l e a r l y troubled by the lack of logic i n the q u a l i f i -
cation, attempted to rat i o n a l i z e the decision. Fry J., i n his book, 
(27) 
Specific Performance^ , had said, " I t i s apprehended, therefore, 
that the real meaning of the learned judges /in Bolton v Lambert/ was 
that the contract would be avoided i f i t were not shown within a 
reasonable time that Scratchley's act had been r a t i f i e d . So that the 
contract was contingent upon a subsequent expression of w i l l of one of 
(25) For as Fry J. (p.217) explained, i t i s only at t h i s point of time 
that "hardship" may ensue f o r T, "The defendants /~T_7 could not 
know then whether they were to supply the eggs or not." 
(26) See footnote 19. ante. 
(27) Third ed. p.735. 
11. 
the contracting parties, 'and existed as a contract before that w i l l was 
exercised or expressed." Thus when pressed with argument that A*s 
unauthorised act created a contract subject to a subsequent avoidance 
(or r a t i f i c a t i o n ) making a q u a l i f i c a t i o n as to time superfluous, Bow.en 
L.J. indicated that he considered: "... r a t i f i c a t i o n i s not an election 
not to avoid the contract - because o r i g i n a l contract, from my point 
of view there was none, they not having been authorised agents to make 
i t - but an election to confirm the act which professed o r i g i n a l l y to 
be done by the authority of the company, although i t was not; and as 
i t i s an election i t must take place withi n a reasonable time, and the 
standard of reasonableness depends upon the circumstances of each 
case." 
Although the question of reasonableness i s necessarily l e f t at 
large, i t might be wondered at the equity of permitting withdrawal of 
an apparently completed contract which i s not, as i n the case of o f f e r , 
(28) 
merely intended to remain open f o r a reasonable time.^ Indeed, on 
the facts of ex parte Bosanquet, the parties having contrived to act 
as though bound a f t e r knowledge of the want of authority, i t was 
found that r a t i f i c a t i o n was made within a reasonable time. 
Although the q u a l i f i c a t i o n of "reasonable time" has been widely 
a c c e p t e d , ^ would appear, from ex parte Bosanquet i t s e l f , that 
the q u a l i f i c a t i o n ought to be treated with some care. The case arose 
i n respect of an i r r e g u l a r i t y i n allotment of shares i n a company and 
the subsequent r a t i f i c a t i o n of the allotment. However, i n addition 
to any question of reasonableness as to the time of r a t i f i c a t i o n both 
(28) See note 12 Col.L.R.455. 
(29) See the bold statement i n Fridman, p.57. 
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Cotton and Bow.en L.J.J, l a i d stress that an important element f o r con-
sideration i n r e l a t i o n to reasonableness was, whether there had been 
any a l t e r a t i o n i n the "state of the company" so as to render any 
r a t i f i c a t i o n "inequitable". 
Perhaps the most acceptable approach, which would relieve the 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n of i t s p o t e n t i a l l y catastrophic impact upon the useful-
ness of the estoppel theory of apparent authority, i s to regard a 
repudiation, by T, on grounds of A's lack of authority, as merely a 
very important factor i n determining the issue of reasonableness as to 
the time of r a t i f i c a t i o n . Certainly the question of reasonableness of 
the time f o r r a t i f i c a t i o n does not appear to have given r i s e to i n t e r -
(31) 
vention i n the application of Bolton v Lambert i n reported cases. w ' 
(32) 
Channel J. i n Re Tiedemann and Ledermann Preres v , whilst accepting 
that r a t i f i c a t i o n must be made within a reasonable time held that a 
r a t i f i c a t i o n was an effe c t i v e adoption of a sale contracted two months 
previously, involving a commodity upon a f l u c t u a t i n g market. On the 
27th of A p r i l A had sold, i n P's name, a quantity of wheat to T. A 
contracted i n t h i s way, using P's name, because T had refused to deal 
with A personally following previous unsatisfactory transactions. A 
had, i n f a c t , the fraudulent inte n t i o n of s e l l i n g on his own behalf. 
Early i n June the market price of wheat f e l l and T who by now suspected, 
(30) Per Bowen L.J. at p.36, "We have not the materials from which we 
can safely come to the conclusion that there has been such an 
al t e r a t i o n i n the prospects of the company as rendered i t unfair 
that that which had been assumed to be, i n the f i r s t instance, 
good between the parties should be made good by a subsequent 
adoption or election ..." 
(31) Fridman, p.57i i s only able to c i t e one case, involving an easily 
implied specific date, as authority f o r the proposition that 
r a t i f i c a t i o n , i n general, must be wi t h i n a reasonable time -
the case of Metropolitan Asylums Board v Kingham. 
(32) 2 Q.B.66. 
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c o r r e c t l y , that A was secretly acting f o r his own benefit, refused to 
carry out the contract. A thereupon called upon P to r a t i f y the con-
t r a c t and P did so, Channel J. applied Bolton v Lambert and held T's 
("331 
repudiation, although before r a t i f i c a t i o n , to be i n e f f e c t i v e . 
Thus i t may be that t h i s extension of the t h i r d exception to the 
"Rule" may be of l i t t l e application and need not unduly r e s t r i c t the 
application of the estoppel p r i n c i p l e to apparent authority. 
Exception Five 
What may be regarded as the f i f t h possible e x c e p t i o n ^ ^ , to the 
(35) 
Rule under discussion, said to flow from the case of Walter v James , 
i s that r a t i f i c a t i o n may not operate restrospectively i f i t would 
prejudice T.^^ 
The facts of Walter's case were that P, having requested that A 
should pay o f f a debt which P owed to T, countermanded the authorisa-
t i o n before A actually made over the payment. A, however, considered 
that T should be paid and he subsequently paid the amount that P owed. 
Following t h i s , A and T, r e a l i z i n g that as A's act was unauthorised and 
that P would, therefore, be under no duty to reimburse A, agreed upon 
the return of the money by T to A. T then sued P f o r the money s t i l l 
owed to him. The ingenious P at once purported to r a t i f y A's unautho-
rised act (paying T) and pleaded the e a r l i e r payment i n s a t i s f a c t i o n 
of the debt. Quite c l e a r l y t h i s plea could not be allowed to succeed. 
I t was held that A and T could cancel the payment before P r a t i f i e d , 
and therefore the r a t i f i c a t i o n could not deprive T of his r i g h t to sue 
fo r the debt. 
(33) The case involves d i f f i c u l t questions of voidable contracts and 
t h e i r r a t i f i c a t i o n , not discussed here. 
(34) I t has been argued that Walter v James and Bolton v Lambert are 
irreconcilable. 5 L.Q.R. 440, 441. 
(35) '(1871) L.R. 6 Ex. 124. 
(36) Interpreted as such i n Powell, p.141* 
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(37) Martin B. indicated the rule to he "When a payment i s not 
made by way of g i f t f o r the benefit of the debtor, but by an agent who 
had not the debtor's authority to pay, i t i s competent f o r the 
creditor and the person paying to rescind the transaction at any time 
before the debtor had affirmed the payment, and repay the money, and 
thereupon the payment i s at an end, and the debtor i s again responsible." 
This formulation would appear to r e s t r i c t the rule to the payment of 
debts. However, Bolton v Lambert i t s e l f was the f i r s t reported case 
to i n t e r p r e t Walter's case as authority f o r the more general proposi-
t i o n that A and T may mutually agree, under a general cancellation 
power, that t h e i r acts should be negatived. Indeed i t was i n these 
(38) 
terms that Cotton L.J. distinguished Walter's case. ' "... there 
was an agreement between the assumed agent of the defendant and the 
p l a i n t i f f to cancel what had been done before any r a t i f i c a t i o n by 
the defendant." 
(39) 
In a note i n the Law Quarterly Reviewx ' i t was argued that 
Bolton v Lambert involved precisely the same point of law as did 
Walter v James except, that i n the l a t t e r case payment was involved 
whereas i n the former acceptance was at issue. Therefore, on p r i n c i p l e , 
assuming Bolton v Lambert to be correct, as the r a t i f i c a t i o n relates 
back to the time of A's act, any subsequent cancellation of the payment 
as between A and T must be i n e f f e c t i v e , as was the attempted withdrawal, 
before r a t i f i c a t i o n , i n Bolton v Lambert. S t o l j a r , ^ ^ however, 
argues that there i s i n fact no inconsistency i f one considers when 
(37) At p.128. 
(38) At p.307. 
(39) 5 L.Q.R. 440, 441. 
(40) S t o l j a r , p.194. 
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the rule of r e l a t i o n back does apply. I n Bolton v Lambert, he asserts, 
i t applied because the.question was whether T was bound to P. In waiter 
v James the question was simply whether T had been paid or no 
Tamaki,^^ however, suggests a more s a t i s f y i n g explanation of 
Walter's case, consonant with the doctrine of r e l a t i o n back. He quite 
simply notes that the b i - l a t e r a l cancellation effected i n Walter's 
case, when considered along with the f i c t i o n of "agency i d e n t i f i c a t i o n " 
i s more rea d i l y acceptable, on p r i n c i p l e , than the u n i l a t e r i a l action 
undertaken by T i n Bolton v Lambert. Under the f i c t i o n of "agency 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n " , P and A are regarded as one; cancellation by A 
therefore may be regarded as cancellation by P. Further, even i f i t 
be argued that P must r a t i f y a l l of A's acts, i t may be that i f P 
r a t i f i e d A's acts, as i n Walter v James, then t h i s would include the 
cancellation. 
The uncertainty which surrounds t h i s exception suggests that a 
wider sample of academic thought may be of assistance. 
F r idman^^ does not c l a s s i f y Walter's case as an exception i n 
i t s own r i g h t , simply regarding the case as f a l l i n g w i t h i n the category 
of cases i n which r a t i f i c a t i o n was attempted too l a t e , that i s , out-
side a time l i m i t . 
Powell^""^ extracts the wider r a t i o , that Bolton v Lambert does 
(41) A neat approach but not aesthetically pleasing, f o r the answer 
to the l a t t e r question would depend upon the movement i n time 
at which the question i s posed and, taking into account the doc-
t r i n e of r e l a t i o n back the answer could be, yesI and T would be 
deemed to be s a t i s f i e d . 
(42) 19 Can. B.R.739. 
(43) Fridman, p.54. 
(44) He cites Dibbins v Dibbins, post, relegating Walter's case to a 
footnote. 
(45) Powell, p.141. 
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not apply i f i t would resu l t i n hardship, but he does not attempt a 
detailed analysis, simply regarding the facts of Walter's case as a 
clear i l l u s t r a t i o n of the wider p r i n c i p l e . 
Seavey^^ stoutly asserts that English c a s e s a d o p t i n g Bolton 
v Lambert "are wrong" and that the f i c t i o n of r e l a t i o n back adopted 
merits the "harshest language used by the c r i t i c s " f o r i t amounts to 
mere "worship of a transcendental shrine" of doctrine. 
Certainly Walter v James may properly be regarded as an exception 
to the doctrine of r e l a t i o n back, but equally, the decision handed 
down by the case may be regarded as one directed by the exigent c i r -
cumstances. 
Exception Six 
To consider one f i n a l possible exception to the "Rule i n Bolton 
v Lambert", one with p o t e n t i a l l y devastating consequences f o r the 
estoppel theory, i t i s necessary to consider a case decided sixteen 
years previously. Halsbury^"^ cites the case of Mayor, Aldermen,' 
Citizens of Kidderminster v Hardwick^°\ as authority f o r the pro-
position that r a t i f i c a t i o n of a contract does not give P a r i g h t of 
(46) The Rationale of Agency, 29 Yale L.J. 859, 891. 
(47) Recently approved i n p r i n c i p l e i n Lawson v Hosemaster Machine Co. 
Ltd. 2^966/ 2 A l l E.R. 944, esp. Danckwerts L.J. at 951. 
(48) A less withering and more dispassionate consideration of the doc-
t r i n e and i t s alternatives i s undertaken by Wambaugh 9 Harv.L.R.60. 
He considers the merit of Bolton v Lambert to be that i t emphasises 
that once A has accepted T's o f f e r , then T's o f f e r v / i l l not 
expire by lapse - that A's act i s not a mere n u l l i t y . He considers 
thereafter the rule has been taken too f a r and that before r a t i f i -
cation T ought to be able to withdraw. Note the Second American 
Restatement para.88(a), there i s no r a t i f i c a t i o n possible a f t e r 
withdrav/al. 
(49) Halsbury, 4th ed. Vol.1 para.762. 
(50) (I873) 9 L.R. Ex.13. 
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action i n respect of breaches of contract occurring p r i o r to r a t i f i c a -
t i o n . 
The facts of the Kidderminster case concerned an ir r e g u l a r accept-
ance of a tender f o r the purchase of a t o l l . Subsequently the offeror 
f a i l e d to s a t i s f y the terms of his tender and only then was an attempt 
made to regularize the acceptance by the passing of a resolution by 
Kidderminster Corporation. I t would appear that authority f o r 
Halsbury's rul e i s derived from the alternative grounds f o r t h e i r 
decision given by two of the three judges s i t t i n g i n the appellate 
court. I t was held that the contract was not binding because of 
irr e g u l a r acceptance and that an offeror could withdrav; at any time 
before r a t i f i c a t i o n . 
This case was followed i n Mayor, Alderman, Citizens of Oxford 
v Crow^"^ which was decided four years a f t e r Bolton v Lambert. Here 
the defendant, the leasee of a building belonging to the p l a i n t i f f 
corporation, offered to surrender his lease and erect a new building 
on the s i t e i n question, provided, the corporation, i n return, granted 
him a new lease f o r seventy f i v e years. The o f f e r was made to and 
accepted by a Public Improvements committee which had not been appoin-
ted, as was required, under the Corporation Seal. Romer J. held that 
the purported contract v/as i n v a l i d , i n the absence of authority under 
seal. He considered that the Kidderminster case led inexorably to the 
rule that a contract which must be made under seal must be r a t i f i e d , 
where necessary, by an instrument under seal and that u n t i l t h i s was 
done the offeror may revoke. 
I submit that t h i s l a t t e r rule may be accepted as flowing from the 
cases or a l t e r n a t i v e l y that policy considerations i n r e l a t i o n to local 
(1) JlQS^J 3 Ch. 535. 
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authorities d i f f e r from those of general application. However, i f the 
rul e i n Bolton v Lambert i s to have any c r e d i b i l i t y or substratum of 
p r i n c i p l e , the Kidderminster decision cannot stand f o r the wider 
p r i n c i p l e outlined i n Halsbury. The matter appears to have received 
(2) 
.too l i t t l e attention. Fridman v ' baldly states the p r i n c i p l e enuncia-
ted i n Halsbury, without comment upon the clear contradiction with the 
doctrine of Bolton v Lambert. Powell relegates the case to a f o o t -
note r e f e r r i n g to modifications of Bolton v Lambert. 
S t o l j a r ^ alone grasps the n e t t l e and indicates that the 
Kidderminster decision i s simply not consistent with Bolton v Lambert, 
of which he i s a staunch supporter. The "modification" would produce 
the absurdity of T being technically incapable of revoking his o f f e r , 
w h ilst having, at the same time, the advantage of having revoked or 
withdrawn his o f f e r . I t i s , therefore, apparent that t h i s f i n a l 
exception i s fraught with d i f f i c u l t y . The exception i s of such 
uncertain scope, i f i t exists at a l l , that speculation upon i t s tech-
n i c a l i t i e s i s muted i f not s i l e n t . 
Conclusion 
This general uncertainty pervades the whole issue of the doctrine 
of r e l a t i o n back as applied to Agency. Indeed, even the precise time 
at which a r a t i f i c a t i o n takes effect i s uncertain. On p r i n c i p l e i t 
i s assumed that r a t i f i c a t i o n must be effective from the time P mani-
fests his approval of A*s unauthorised act - i t i s unnecessary that 
(2) Fridman, p.%. 
(3) Powell, p.144. 
(4) S t o l j a r , p.192. 
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T should, at t h i s time or ever be acquainted with the fa c t of P's 
(5) 
r a t i f i c a t i o n * . However, i f t h i s i s so then i t raises extremely 
d i f f i c u l t questions of proof over the whole f i e l d of r a t i f i c a t i o n . 
The conclusion must be that the doctrine of r a t i f i c a t i o n i s an 
unsound foundation upon which to b u i l d any greater theory. 
(5) See Warehousing and Forwarding Co. of East Africa, Ltd. v 
J a f f e r a l i and Sons Ltd. Jjs&ly A.C.I, where i t was held r a t i f i -
cation was effective when communicated where Bolton v Lambert 
did not apply, i . e . where A's acceptance was subject to P's 
approval. See Fridman, p.58 f o r speculation as to the effective 
time of r a t i f i c a t i o n . 
APPENDIX I I 
Burt v Claude Cousins and Co. Ltd., and Another^ ' 
The facts of Burt's case were that the f i r s t defendants were 
acting as estate agents f o r the sale of the second defendant's hotel 
and the p l a i n t i f f was a prospective purchaser. The hotel had been on 
the market f o r a short time when the f i r s t defendant called i n f o r a 
drink and casually mentioned his profession and that he would be 
pleased to introduce prospective purchasers. The second defendant, 
equally casually, agreed that he might proceed to do so. Nothing was 
said as to commission or terms. Negotiations were embarked upon bet-
ween the p l a i n t i f f , introduced by the f i r s t defendant, and the second 
defendant. The negotiations, conducted through s o l i c i t o r s , proved 
f r u i t l e s s , mainly i t appeared, because of the p l a i n t i f f I s f a i l u r e to 
s e l l his own property, so enabling him to complete the contract. During 
the course of negotiations the p l a i n t i f f , having agreed "subject to 
contract" to purchase, upon request from the estate agent, forwarded 
a deposit of £2,075- The estate agent took the deposit, but did not 
inform the prospective vendor of t h i s event. When the p l a i n t i f f 
f i n a l l y withdrew, he demanded return of his deposit, only to learn 
that the estate agent had gone int o l i q u i d a t i o n . To recover the money, 
he sued the estate agent, who did not enter an appearance, and the 
prospective vendor. 
Lord Denning M.R. summarised the issue i n t h i s way: "The case 
raises once more the question of which of two innocent persons i s to 
suffer f o r the default of a third? This i s alv/ays a d i f f i c u l t 
question. But i n t h i s case i t depends on the capacity i n which the 
(1) j\31\J 2 Q.B.426; JV)1\J 2 A l l E.R.611. 
2, 
estate agents received the deposit. Did they receive i t as 'agents 
(2) 
f o r the vendor' ' 
Previous to the decision i n Burt's case there are only h a l f a 
dozen or so reported cases i n which the capacity of estate agents 
(•*) 
holding prospective purchaser's deposits has been at issue. v ' 
Further, as Sachs L.J. was anxious to note, i n Burt's case, " t h i s i s 
the f i r s t such case ... i n which i t i s necessary to consider what i s 
the position as between purchaser and vendor /words his Lordship 
adopted to cover prospective purchaser and prospective vendor/ ••. 
when nothing was expressly said as between the purchaser and the 
estate agent about the terms on which the deposit was to be held. I n 
a l l the previous cases ... much has turned on some special f a c t 
emerging i n the course of the evidence." Thus Burt's case i s the f i r s t 
where "there i s nothing /in the f a c t s / that makes /"it/J turn on any 
fact or matter." 
The leading authority upon the nature of the legal relationship 
between a vendor and an estate agent i s Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd. v 
C o o p e r . A l t h o u g h the case was concerned with commission earned 
by estate agents, the observations upon the nature of the estate agent's 
employment are, undoubtedly, of general application. 
(5) 
Viscount Simon L.C. ' outlined the l i m i t s upon the implication 
of terms into such contracts of "employment", i n the absence of express 
(2) At p.614. 
(3) Mynn v J o l i f f e (1839) 1 Moody and Rob 327; Rayner v Pascall and 
Cann (1948) 152 Est. Gaz. 270; Brodard v Pilkington (29th A p r i l 
1953) ^9717 2 W.L.R.941. A97l7 2 A l l E.R. 630; Ryan v Pilkington 
/l352/~1 W.L.H. 403. A95^7 1 A 1 1 E * R # 6 8 9 5 R* v P i 1 1 ^ 1 1 ^ 0 1 1 (1958) 
42 Cr. App. 233. nSjU 2 W.L.R. 942. /T^jj 2 A l l E.R. 631; 
Goding v Frazer O-SSjJ 1 W.L.R. 286. /1966 / 3 A l l E.R.234. 
(4) Zl94l7 A.C.108. 
(5) At p.120. 
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agreement. "... i n contracts made with commission agents there i s no 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r introducing an implied term unless i t i s necessary 
to do so f o r the purpose of giving to the contract the business effect 
which both parties to i t intend i t should have."^^ 
I t i s noteworthy that none of the judgments i n Burt's .case makes 
reference to t h i s statement of p r i n c i p l e , yet essentially a l l three 
judges decided the matter by a consideration of the nature of the ' 
"implied agreement" between vendor and purchaser. 
In Burt's case Sachs and Megaw L.J.J., giving the majority 
decision, considered themselves bound by the Court of Appeal decision 
i n Ryan v Pi l k i n g t o n . v ' Lord Denning M.R. distinguished the case on 
i t s f a c ts. Ryan's case involved an estate agent who took a deposit, 
signing a receipt "as agent" f o r the vendors, before absconding with 
the money. Hodson, Morris and Wilmer L.J.J, held that "the f i n d i n g of 
fa c t that Pilkington (the estate agent) had purported to receive t h i s 
sum of money as agent i s unassailable..." f u r t h e r , "... /~he_7 must 
(8) 
have been acting within the scope of his ostensible authority."^ 1 
The prospective vendor was, i n consequence, held l i a b l e to the pro-
spective purchaser, f o r the former was e n t i t l e d and was constructively 
(6) This statement of principle i s i t s e l f unexceptional, see 8 
Halsbury's Laws of England 3rd ed. p.122, 123, "Such implica-
t i o n must i n a l l cases be founded upon the presumed inten t i o n 
of the parties and upon reason, and i n order to give the trans-
action that efficacy that both parties must have intended i t to 
have"; however, " i f the contract i s effective without the 
suggested term and i s capable of being f u l f i l l e d as i t "stands, 
generally speaking, an implication w i l l not be made." 
(7 ) See footnote 3, ante. 
(8) At p.414. 
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i n possession of the deposit upon i t s receipt by h i s agent. Hodson 
and Wilmer L.J . J , both spoke i n terms of the agent having acted within 
h i s "ostensible" or "apparent" authority, whereas, Morris L.J., spoke 
of his acting within h i s "implied" authority. This diverse and 
imprecise terminology Megaw L.J., i n Burt's case, interpreted as 
e s s e n t i a l l y r e f e r r i n g to what "today, when there has been further 
d e f i n i t i o n of the terms ... /~would_J7 be described as implied 
authority. "^"^ He did, however, remark that even i f the case were to 
be understood as i l l u s t r a t i n g "ostensible" authority he would s t i l l have 
extracted the same princip l e leading him to follow i t s s t r i c t u r e s i n 
Burt's c a s e . ^ ^ 
I t may be that the term "implied authority", i n th i s context, i s 
i t s e l f not s u f f i c i e n t l y precise, i n that i t does not express the d i s -
t i n c t i o n , e s s e n t i a l to t h i s problem, between "usual" authority, 
implied by law generally v/ith respect to p a r t i c u l a r agencies and 
"implied" authority v/hich i s implied i n a s p e c i f i c instance as i n c i -
dental to the execution of an express authority, to be ascertained by 
reference to the evidence disclosed by the spec i a l circumstances of 
(12) 
the case. ' Megaw L.J., i n Burt's case, by equating the finding of 
"implied" authority v/ith "ostensible" authority, to be applied 
generally with reference to estate agents, c l e a r l y interpreted Ryan's 
(9) Unfortunately the Court did not have before i t the report of P i l -
kington's prosecution, 42 Cr.App.233> for fraudulent conversion 
of the deposit. He was convicted on an indictment for alleged 
fraudulent conversion of the purchaser's money and not that of 
the vendor. 
(10) See the illuminating judgment i n Freeman and Lockyer (a firm) v 
Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd. J\3^ 2 Q.B.480,502-504, 
per Diplock L . J . and Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd. £19687 
1 Q.B.549f583, per Lord Denning M.R. 
(11) At p.626. 
(12) In Ryan's case Wilmer L.J., at p.413> set out the circumstances 
which led to h i s finding that "ostensible" authority existed. 
Lord Denning M.R. i n Barrington v Lee JJSllJ 3 A l l E.R.1231 con-
sidered there to be special circumstances v/hereby an actual autho-
r i t y to receive a deposit "as agent for the vendor" was to be 
implied i n Ryan's case. 
5. 
case as i l l u s t r a t i v e of "implied usual authority". 
Any implication of a term whereby an estate agent i s enabled to 
enter an undertaking binding upon h i s p r i n c i p a l must, however, take 
account of the well established rule that generally "an estate agent 
has no implied authority to make a contract so as to bind the vendor; v ' 
nor to give any warranty; nor to receive part payment of the pur-
(15) 
chase money on behalf of the vendor. ' This d i f f i c u l t y , combined 
with the fa c t that at the "deposit stage" there i s no binding contract 
at a l l . and, therefore, the prospective vendor i s not e n t i t l e d to the 
payment of any sum of money from the prospective purchaser led Sachs 
L.J., i n Burt's case, to the formulation of an extremely tortuous 
(l6) 
implied term which he explained i n t h i s way:^ ' 
"He (the estate agent) i s authorised, or perhaps i t would be 
better to say instructed, to hold that deposit i n h i s own possession 
unless and u n t i l the event occurs upon which he i s authorised to d i s -
pose of i t . I n the event of the purchaser demanding i t s return before 
any contract i s concluded ( i . e . during the 'pre-contract' period) he 
has to return the deposit to him. In the event of a contract being 
conciuded, i t i s to be disposed of i n accordance with the terms of that 
contract, be they express or implied. The instruction to hold the 
deposit i n h i s , the estate agent's, possession i s one which during 
the pre-contract period precludes him, i n the absence of the consent 
of both depositor and the vendor, from handing i t over to the vendor 
(13) See Hamer v Sharp (1874) L.H. 19 Eq.108; Wragg v Lovett /l94§7 
2 A l l E.E. 968. 
(14) See H i l l v Harris ]V)Q£ 2 Q.B.601. 
(15) Mynn v J a l i f f e (1834) 1 Mood and H. 326. 
(16) At p.620. 
I 
6. 
or any person the l a t t e r may nominate, but, of course, e n t i t l e s him 
to place i t i n h i s , the estate agent's, account at a bank of repute. 
The above terms correspond with the practice of estate agents as set 
out i n the evidence i n the instant case and also i n other cases which 
have been before the courts. Indeed, i t has by now become, to my 
mind, a matter of j u d i c i a l knowledge that i t i s the practice of estate 
(n) 
agents to receive deposits on the above mentioned standard terms." v ' 
Megaw L.J. was s a t i s f i e d that implied authority to take a deposit, 
as an incidental instruction, was established merely because the pro-
spective vendor was "not surprised" that the estate agent took a deposit. ' 
However, following the finding of an implied term, the majority 
took a further step i n holding that t h i s n ecessarily meant, as an i n c i -
dent of the term, that l i a b i l i t y for loss of the deposit lay with the 
prospective vendor. The question which must be posed i s : I s t h i s 
aspect of the term necessary in order to give the contract the business 
(19) 
effect which both parties intended i t should have? x ' I t has been 
suggested that, "To take a deposit may indeed be an act necessary for, or o r d i n a r i l y incidental to, the effective execution of the agent's 
;erm t l 
,,(21) 
express authority, but to imply a t  hat he holds the money as 
agent for the vendor i s a non sequitur. 1 
(17) Lord Denning M.R. found upon the evidence adduced i n Burt's case 
i t s e l f that, on the contrary, there was no such established busi-
ness practice. The evidence of practice, he found, established 
that estate agent's took deposits and held them as "stakeholders". 
Megaw L.J., at p.625, dismissed evidence of a business practice, 
short of a custom, as irr e l e v a n t where one party was not engaged 
i n a p a r t i c u l a r trade. 
(18) One may wonder at the implication of a term i n circumstances i n 
which there i s no agreement ( i ) upon i t s existence and ( i i ) as 
to the t e s t to be employed i n i t s establishment. 
(19) See Viscount Simon L.C. i n Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd. v Cooper, c i t e d 
e a r l i e r p.2. 
(20) See Bowstead on Agency, 13th ed. p.28 and 72. 
(21) 121 N.L.J. 1066, 1067, L.J. Kovatts. 
7. 
Nevertheless, the majority i n Burt's case'found no d i f f i c u l t y i n 
making t h i s important step. Sachs L.J. indicated t h i s to be because 
the implied instruction put i t "into the power of the estate agent to 
demand and receive deposits. I f as i s normally to be expected, he i s 
honest and keeps the deposit money i n some separate account as he ought 
to - a l l i s well. I f he i s dishonest - he can demand a deposit from 
more than one purchaser, he can use the deposit to pay the expenses of 
h i s f a i l i n g business, he can use i t 'to rob Peter to pay Paul 1 (as 
amongst depositors) or he can misappropriate i t i n some other manner 
not unfamiliar i n another Division of t h i s court. Prima f a c i e , at 
l e a s t , defaults are due to dishonesty ... However one defines h i s 
position, the p l a i n f a c t i s , that at a l l pre-contract stages he i s the 
vendorfe commission agent and could not otherwise have got hold of the 
deposit." In conclusion he expressly stated that the celebrated st a t e -
(22) 
ment of Holt C.J. i n Hern v Nichols^ ' "... for seeing that someone 
must be a loser by t h i s deceit, i t i s more reasonable that he that 
employs and puts a t r u s t and confidence i n the deceiver should be the 
loser, than a stranger...", should be applied, "even i f , which I very 
much doubt, that application s l i g h t l y extends i t s hitherto sphere of 
operation." 
(23) 
Lord Denning M.R. in Barrington v Lee v following h i s dissenting 
judgment i n Burt's case, returned to h i s c r i t i c i s m of the reasoning 
adopted by the majority i n the l a t t e r case. He said, " I n coming to 
t h e i r conclusion i n Burt's case, the majority used reasoning which i s 
appropriate to a claim i n t o r t . They said that the vendor had 
employed the estate agent and had put him i n a position to ask for a 
deposit. The vendor should, therefore, he answerable for h i s defaults. 
The r i s k should f a l l on him and not on the purchaser. That i s the very 
language which i s used to j u s t i f y the l i a b i l i t y of a pri n c i p a l for the 
frauds or other wrongs of h i s agent. Indeed Sachs L . J . quoted the 
(22) (1701) 1 Salk. 289. 
(23) At p.1237. 
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well known cases on tort on the s u b j e c t . " ( ^ ) 
Edmund Davies L.J . , i n Barringtonls case, ' although he f e l t 
bound by the precedent of Burt's case, also c r i t i c i s e d the reasoning. 
He said "... i t i s too s i m p l i s t i c to say that, because i t was the 
would be vendor who appointed the estate agent i n a position to 
receive a deposit, he should be held l i a b l e to recompense the purchaser 
(26) 
i f loss r e s u l t s . " ^ ' 
Lord Denning M.R. summarised what may be regarded as the view of 
the opponents of the solution proposed i n Burt's case by asking the 
(27) 
question^ ' : "What i s the cause of action against the vendor? ... I 
cannot think that the purchaser can sue the vendor for money had and 
received, seeing that the vendor has never received the money, nor 
been e n t i t l e d to receive i t . I f the purchaser cannot sue the vendor 
i n money had and received, how can he sue him? Not i n contract, 
because the vendor never promised to pay i f the agent defaulted. Not 
i n t r u s t because the vendor never had any control over the money. Not 
i n t o r t , because there was no t o r t . " 
I submit, with respect, that the several arguments related i n t h i s 
summary reveal an incomplete appreciation of the application of principle 
of agency and t h e i r conceptual foundation. Sachs and Megaw L.J. J , seek 
to impose l i a b i l i t y on the prospective vendor by means of a term, 
(24) Hern v Nichols and Lloyd v Grace, Smith & Co. J\3YfJ A.C.7I6. 
(25) At p.1239. 
(26) He indicated that a possible approach to resolution of the prob-
lem of adjustment of lo s s between vendor and purchaser "should 
depend very l a r g e l y (and possibly conclusively) upon what rights 
could have been asserted by each of them i n respect of the money 
in the agent's hands at a l l material times." 
(27) At p.1237, 1238. 
9. 
implied into the contract between the estate agent and prospective 
vendor, that the agent may bind the p r i n c i p a l to underwrite l o s s . 
Here there i s revealed a search for a consensual agreement, s a t i s f i e d 
through the medium of the implied term. There i s great d i f f i c u l t y i n 
implying such a term, as the c l a s s i c t e s t , that i t should be e s s e n t i a l 
to the business effect the parties desired, would appear to be 
achieved by a term i n which r i s k was placed upon the agent or pro-
spective purchaser. In short, the c l a s s i c t e s t as to conditions to 
be s a t i s f i e d for the implication of a term would appear not to be 
s a t i s f i e d . 
Lord Denning M.R. looks for a cause of action whereby the prospec-
t i v e purchaser may seek recovery. "... there i s c l e a r l y an implied 
promise by someone to repay i t ^ t h e deposit_7 i f the negotiations 
break d o w n . ' He finds no consensual undertaking on P's part and 
therefore no contractual term. This leads him inexorably to the denial 
(29) 
of l i a b i l i t y on P's part. ' Recognition of agency powers would not 
n e c e s s a r i l y lead to t h i s conclusion. 
Thus the notion of inherent agency power would provide a platform 
upon which to build a coherent system of agency r u l e s , without the 
s t r a i t j a c k e t accepted by Lord Denning and without the obvious devia-
tion from well s e t t l e d p r i n c i p l e s , as was evident i n the majority 
decision i n Burt's case. 
(28) Barrington's case, p.1238. 
(29) See S o r r e l l v Finch and passage c i t e d p.84. 
May 13th, 1976 
S o r r e l l v Finch (The Times, May 12, 1976) 
Subsequent to preparation of t h i s thesis an appeal to the House 
of Lords has, i n S o r r e l l v Pinch, reversed the decision of the Court 
of Appeal (Unreported, see Appendix I I ) . 
However, the grounds upon which t h e i r Lordships reversed the 
previous decision were not unanimous and the case, I believe, s t i l l 
exhibits want of fundamental agency p r i n c i p l e s . Indeed, Lord 
Edmund-Davies, who sat i n the Court of Appeal i n Barrington v Lee, 
adopted a different approach from that which he previously outlined 
as h i s favoured argument i n the l a t t e r case (see footnote 26, p.8 
Appendix I I ) . I n the instant case, he held that the claim for return 
of deposit could not succeed, " i n the absence of express or implied 
authority", on A's part, to receive the deposit on behalf of the 
prospective vendor. (C.f. the d i f f i c u l t y i n implication of such a 
term i n Burt's case). Lord R u s s e l l , however, adopted the argument 
previously advanced by Lord Edmund-Davies. 
Perhaps i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that t h e i r Lordships f e l t i t to be a 
"hard case", i n that the prospective vendor was obliged by the Court 
of Appeal decision to shoulder the whole loss i n respect of f i v e 
deposits. This might be contrasted with the forthright statement of 
the preferred l i a b i l i t y , of the prospective vendor, i n Burt's case 
(see p. 84 ). 
Although the issue with respect to estate agents deposits i s 
resolved, p r i n c i p l e s of agency are s t i l l at large. 
